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ABSTRACT 
The South African government launched two public transport reform programmes in the last 
two decades to address generally declining services as well as specific problems with 
paratransit, the dominant service provider. One programme aims to incorporate paratransit in 
new bus-based networks in cities; the other is a national paratransit fleet renewal scheme. 
Cape Town is arguably most advanced with the former, and the first phase of its bus network 
is nearing completion. Paratransit operators have shown resistance to both programmes, yet 
there have been few efforts to gain direct insight into their views on their businesses or their 
attitudes to reform. It is thus difficult to identify reasons behind their unenthusiastic response, 
or to understand if revisions to the programmes might cause more operators to opt in.  
This research employed a case study strategy to investigate paratransit operators’ business 
aspirations and needs in Cape Town, and to identify commonalities between their attitudes 
and the aims of the reform programmes to inform potential amendments to these programmes. 
The details of incorporating paratransit operators in the new bus system in Cape Town were 
not systematically recorded, and it was thus first necessary to trace the engagement process 
between the municipality and these operators. Information was drawn from a variety of 
sources over a six-year period. Against this background, semi-structured qualitative 
interviews were conducted with 30 operators and eight drivers from different parts of the city 
to explore their aspirations and views on reform. Access was arranged through trusted 
intermediaries and the eight associations to which respondents belonged.  
The research revealed that operators were not necessarily passive players waiting for 
government-led change: some established large transport enterprises, whereas others built 
small-scale businesses. Propositions were subsequently drawn, amongst other things, on the 
prospects of and potential revisions to the reform programmes. The recapitalisation 
programme has had the broader reach of the two programmes. The national government 
should consider extending it and reviewing its financial support mechanism to make it more 
accessible to small operators. Larger businesses might be well positioned for incorporation in 
bus operating companies, but concerted efforts must be made to build trust with these 
operators and to familiarise them with the transition process. By documenting operator 
incorporation in the bus system, and providing first-hand insight into paratransit aspirations 
and attitudes to reform, the research ultimately contributes a basis from which to understand 
operators’ existing responses to reform and the potential for their greater participation in it.    
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ACRONYMS AND TERMS 
BRT Bus Rapid Transit 
CfTS Centre for Transport Studies (at the University of Cape Town) 
IPTN Integrated Public Transport Network (can include a BRT component) 
NLTA National Land Transport Act (No. 5 of 2009) 
NLTTA National Land Transport Transition Act (No. 22 of 2000) 
NTA National Taxi Alliance  
NTTT National Taxi Task Team 
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PTNOG Public Transport Network Operating Grant (IPTN operating grant) 
PTOG  Public Transport Operating Grant (conventional bus subsidies) 
PTS Public Transport Strategy (national reform programme) 
SANTACO South African National Taxi Council 
TRP Taxi Recapitalisation Programme 
VOC Vehicle Operating Company (in an IPTN) 
Local municipality names in South Africa 
Local municipalities in South Africa can include more than one settlement, at the core of 
which might lie a city surrounded by smaller towns and unsettled areas. The name of the local 
municipality can refer to a geographical area or to the local governing entity, but this might 
differ from that of the core city. Below is a list of such municipalities referred to in this thesis: 
local municipality core city  local municipality core city 
Buffalo City East London  Mangaung Bloemfontein 
City of Cape Town  Cape Town  Mbombela Nelspruit 
City of Johannesburg Johannesburg  Msunduzi Pietermaritzburg 
Ekurhuleni Germiston  Nelson Mandela Bay Port Elizabeth 
eThekwini Durban  Tshwane Pretoria 
 v i i i  
Exchange rate 
The exchange rate that I used in the text was USD1.00 = ZAR12.00, which was a typical 
South African rand rate against the United States dollar in the first half of 2015.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The South African government is investing heavily in reforming urban public transport. This 
reform process has significant implications for the businesses of paratransit1 operators, yet 
these operators’ business aspirations and attitudes to reform are poorly studied. The purpose 
of this research was to investigate these aspirations and attitudes, and how they relate to 
government’s reform programmes. But in order to understand why studying paratransit 
operators and their views is important it is necessary to understand the public transport 
context in South Africa and the current approach to reform. The first part of this chapter 
provides this contextual background. The second part of the chapter presents a review of prior 
studies in this field, the aims of the research in relation to gaps in current knowledge, and the 
design of the research process.  
1.1 PUBLIC TRANSPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Public transport has played a critical role in the development of South African cities. The 
apartheid era government forcibly evicted non-white citizens from urban centres and relocated 
them to less accessible land on the outskirts of cities, or even further afield in artificial 
homelands. Cities sprawled along clear racial lines. Black African people were moved 
furthest from economic opportunity in purpose-built townships, to be brought back daily into 
the city core for low-skilled jobs. White populations were favoured with the most central and 
economically and physically attractive locations connected by car-focussed infrastructure. 
Coloured, Indian and other population groups were situated in between white and black areas 
to form spatial buffers. The state furnished publicly subsidised bus and rail services to 
overcome the distance that it created between much of the predominantly black urban labour 
force in the townships and the centres of employment in cities. However, rather than 
providing a means of mobility, these services were used to control the movement of the 
displaced. As an outlet for the unmet demand and as a symbol of resistance, small transport 
operators originating from within oppressed communities provided clandestine services to fill 
                                                
1 The term paratransit as used in this thesis refers to unscheduled public transport services that 
typically utilise small buses, minibuses (vans) and smaller four- or two-wheeled vehicles. Paratransit 
in one or more of these formats is common in developing world countries – see, for instance, Cervero's 
(2000) international review of these services. In South Africa the most common form of paratransit is 
the 16-seater minibus-taxi, or, more colloquially, the taxi. Minibus-taxis should not be confused with 
taxis that charge per-kilometre fares, which in South Africa are referred to as meter(ed) taxis.  
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the gap left by government-sanctioned services. Such paratransit operations grew in number 
and prominence as the apartheid regime gradually crumbled and struggled to maintain its 
segregationist practices.  
Along with the transition to democratic governance in the 1990s the purpose of public 
transport shifted. From a means to control the dispossessed, public transport had to become a 
facilitator of movement for those for whom private car ownership was out of reach and 
walking not a feasible option to get to work. Public transport could thus begin to play an 
important role in addressing the imposed spatial and racial inequality of South African cities 
by serving especially these poor, often peripheral households. For instance, in Cape Town 
47% of the population fell below the poverty line in 2012, yet this segment of the population 
spent between 45% and 70% of household income on access, versus international norms of 5-
10%. More than two-thirds of this 47% was concentrated in the outlying south-eastern sector 
of the city removed from most economic opportunities (City of Cape Town [CoCT], 2013a). 
Indeed, though infrastructure development in Cape Town and Johannesburg after the end of 
apartheid is in line with that of international peers, specifically in terms of equity the two 
largest South African cities still lag behind these peers (see Figure 1-1). By bringing poorer 
city dwellers closer to economic opportunity public transport stood to play a large role in 
addressing the urban inequality issue in this country. 
Present-day public transport systems are, however, under pressure. The national statistics 
agency noted in its 2013 household travel survey (n=54 341) that 39% of all work trips in the 
country used public transport as main mode, followed by private motorised transport at 38% 
and walking at 22% (Statistics South Africa [StatsSA], 2014). This survey also captured the 
deficiencies of public transport. Of the overwhelming majority of households reporting 
problems, the two foremost issues on both trains and buses were non-availability and 
unreliability. On paratransit operators’ minibus-taxis, expensive fares and reckless drivers 
were the chief problems. Only 13.5% of surveyed households reported experiencing no 
problems with the services that they used. The burden that currently weighs on public 
transport is thus not only the large number of people carried, but also the problems with the 
way in which the service is being delivered. Moreover it is unlikely that there will be 
substantially different land use patterns, rapid increases in the supply of urban road space, or 
greater affordability of automobiles. As the urban portion of the population in South Africa 
grows from 61.7% in 2010 to a projected 71.3% in 2030, a large proportion of the estimated  
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7.8 million new city dwellers across the country will have to be accommodated on public 
transport (United Nations Human Settlements Programme [UN-Habitat], 2013:170). It is thus 
foreseeable that the pressure on public transport will continue to increase, especially in cities. 
 
Figure 1-1: Cities with solid prosperity factors 
 
Source: UN-Habitat, 2013 
The source defines equity as inequality of income and consumption 
and social and gender inequality of access to services and infrastructure. 
 
The agencies responsible for public transport have not been idle in the two decades since the 
political transition (see Table 1-1 for the institutional context of public transport in South 
Africa). In 1996 the national Department of Transport (DoT) developed the first post-
apartheid transport policy, the White Paper on National Transport Policy (DoT, 1996). This 
was followed by a strategic plan, Moving South Africa, published in 1999 (DoT, 1999). The 
former was developed in the context of transport being one of the government’s five priority 
socio-economic development areas, while the latter recognised problems and identified 
improvements to be made in both the passenger and freight transport sectors.
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Table 1-1: Division of public transport institutional functions in South Africa 
 
 
Function Paratransit Scheduled bus Rail 
Policy  National Department of Transport National Department of Transport National Department of Transport 
Planning  Municipal department with oversight over transport planning / Municipal Transport Authoritya 
Municipal department with oversight over transport planning / 
Municipal Transport Authoritya 
National Department of Transport:  
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 
Competition 
regulation 
Provincial Department of Transport and Public Works: 
Provincial Regulatory Entityb 
Provincial Department of Transport and Public Works: 
Provincial Regulatory Entityb 
National Department of Transport: Rail Safety Regulator and 
National Public Transport Regulator 
Right-of-way 
infrastructure 
South African National Road Agency Limited /  
Provincial Department of Transport and Public Works / 
Transport for Cape Townc 
South African National Road Agency Limited /  
Provincial Department of Transport and Public Works / 
Transport for Cape Townc 
National Department of Transport:  
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 
Station / ranking 
Infrastructure 
Municipal department with oversight over transport 
infrastructure / Municipal Transport Authority /  
Paratransit route associationsd 
Municipal department with oversight over transport 
infrastructure / Municipal Transport Authority 
National Department of Transport:  
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 
Law 
enforcement  
National / provincial / municipal traffic law enforcement 
agenciese 
National / provincial / municipal traffic law enforcement 
agenciese 
National Department of Transport:  
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 
Service 
provision  Paratransit operators and route associations
f Private scheduled bus operators 
National Department of Transport:  




a Municipalities can establish transport authorities under which all transport functions can be integrated; few have done so in practice  
b Municipalities can apply for the regulatory function to be devolved to them, in which case there would be a Municipal Regulatory Entity 
c Roadway ownership and maintenance responsibility depends on the road classification hierarchy 
d Municipalities provide major ranking facilities, but paratransit associations operating from those ranks often perform day-to-day management 
e Traffic law enforcement responsibility is aligned with the agency that owns a particular stretch of roadway 
f The relationship between individual operators and route associations in providing services is discussed later in this section 
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Moving South Africa intended to “unwind,” in its words, the stranglehold of the “legacy 
transport system.” This legacy was the passenger movement network inherited from the 
apartheid years that no longer served the needs of the country but nonetheless persisted in 
terms of physical, financial and institutional form. In particular, Moving South Africa 
recognised that the transport legacy in cities was three networks comprising separate services. 
These were the commuter rail and bus services to connect townships to city centres, the 
system of roads and private cars for the privileged minority, and paratransit that infiltrated the 
gaps between these other motorised modes. It furthermore recognised that of the three 
networks the paratransit system continued to be largely unregulated and unfunded by the 
public sector. Moving South Africa identified the need to unify these separate networks, which 
had become highly peak-biased, poorly utilised, often unsafe, and costly on both the demand 
and supply side.  
Despite the good intentions of Moving South Africa, the 2007 Public Transport Strategy and 
the National Planning Commission’s National Development Plan affirm the ongoing poor 
performance and inadequacy of urban public transport services (DoT, 2007a; National 
Planning Commission [NPC], 2011). Public transport offered a “third class service” (DoT, 
2007a:10) that held a large segment of riders captive, while losing those who could afford 
private cars (DoT, 2007a; NPC, 2011). In relation to urban form and equality, towards the end 
of the 2000s the urban public transport situation in South Africa could be summarised as 
follows:  
• Public transport networks in general were under-performing when it came to reversing 
urban inequality. Public transport has failed to increase passengers’ travel options and 
reduce reliance on private car travel, and the apartheid era urban transport legacy 
remained largely intact. 
• Despite significant state subsidies rail and scheduled buses had been stagnating. The fixed 
nature of rail infrastructure, poor incentives to innovate and compete brought on by 
subsidisation, and a cumbersome bureaucracy had contributed to rail and bus services’ 
inability to respond effectively to sprawling urbanisation and peripheral informal 
settlement growth. 
• Paratransit operations had filled many of the markets under-served by rail and bus 
services, including both main line and local area services. Paratransit operators often did 
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so without government sanction or support; however, the paratransit ownership and 
operational model encouraged minimal investment in vehicle replacement and 
maintenance, competition on the road – sometimes violently so – and dangerous driving 
behaviour. 
A reason for both the success and the failure of the paratransit sector is its simple business 
model that commonly relied, and still today relies, on a “daily target” system or a commission 
system (Barrett, 2003; Botha, personal communication 2011, 20 June; Joubert, 2013; Khosa, 
1994). The target is a fixed daily amount that the owner expects the driver to pay for the use 
of the vehicle, while the commission is a percentage of fare revenue that the driver keeps at 
the end of the day or week. In the course of a day’s operations the driver must collect 
sufficient farebox revenue to cover the target or to earn sufficient commission income. The 
remaining revenue from fares after the target is met, or the commission on fare income, is the 
driver’s source of income. Thus, the more passengers a driver collects the larger the driver’s 
earnings. The owner’s income is the fixed daily target amount or farebox revenue after 
commission is paid, out of which he or she must cover vehicle replacement, maintenance, 
insurance and other ownership costs. To maximise income the owner minimises expenditure 
particularly on vehicle replacement and maintenance. This income can then be used to 
purchase a second or subsequent vehicle, and the model is replicated. The target and 
commission systems thus serve both the driver and the owner. The harder the driver works the 
greater the income potential, while the owner is at arm’s length of day-to-day operational 
concerns yet is assured of a daily income that can be used to expand the vehicle fleet. A key 
failure of this business model is that it promotes what Lomme (2008) refers to as “destructive 
competition”2: drivers are incentivised to speed and compete aggressively on the road with 
one another and with other modes for potential passengers. Meanwhile vehicle numbers 
increase yet owners have little motivation to invest in fleet maintenance and replacement. 
The paratransit business model is indeed so successful at replicating itself and displacing 
formal service providers that the sector as a whole has become the dominant public transport 
mode in the country. The official statistics published in the 2013 household travel survey 
places its national share of main mode for work trips at 68%, followed by buses with 19% and 
rail at 13%. However, calculating the true share that paratransit holds is a challenging task, as 
the sector is not a consolidated collective. The national paratransit representative body – the 
                                                
2 Cervero (2000) and Golub (2003) use “cut-throat competition” as s synonym for destructive 
competition in the paratransit context.  
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South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO) – claims a membership of 187 000 
individuals (Venter, 2012), while the DoT estimates a national fleet size of 135 000 minibuses 
(cited in Van Ryneveld, 2010). There is no clear explanation for the number of SANTACO 
members outstripping the national fleet estimate. Amongst other reasons, it could be that not 
all SANTACO members are active operators, that the scale of unlicensed operations is being 
underestimated, or that a considerable proportion of the paratransit fleet is made up of 
vehicles other than minibuses. These are not the only unknown factors. Enterprise size, the 
local route association structure, and legal and taxation compliance are also likely to vary 
within and between cities.  
1.2 CURRENT APPROACH TO PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORM  
The urban public transport picture that persists in South Africa into the second decade of the 
21st century is thus of a flawed system dominated by an atomised though pervasive paratransit 
component. This system nonetheless plays a crucial role with respect to pronounced economic 
and locational inequality and sustained urbanisation. Paratransit operators3, in particular, have 
proven themselves to be well placed to play a lead – if not mandated – role in responding to 
these urban challenges. What has also persisted over the last two decades is government 
efforts to address the failings of urban public transport.  
The White Paper and Moving South Africa led the way, but other programmes have followed 
at various levels of government with the aim of reforming public transport systems. The task 
of reform, as identified in these documents, was clear: make public transport car-competitive, 
increase travel options by improving the quality, safety, extent and affordability of public 
transport, and integrate the different modes of public transport. Some reform programmes 
have specifically targeted paratransit businesses and operations. Due to the integral role that 
paratransit plays in passenger transport, urban public transport reform will necessarily involve 
paratransit reform whether or not it is the explicit intention of such programmes. 
                                                
3 The roles of operator and operators’ associations are intertwined in operating paratransit services, but 
for the purposes of this thesis these entities are treated separately. In this thesis the term paratransit 
operator is used to indicate the owner of a vehicle or fleet of vehicles providing licensed or unlicensed 
paratransit services, and a paratransit association is the representative and management structure of a 
cooperative of paratransit operators. Though some owners drive their own vehicles for financial or 
other reasons, the definition of an operator does not include paratransit vehicle drivers. Drivers are by 
and large employees. 
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The most comprehensive public transport reform programme to date is the DoT’s Public 
Transport Strategy (PTS) (DoT, 2007a) and the related 2007-2010 Public Transport Action 
Plan (DoT, 2007b). The PTS aimed for municipalities to create Integrated Public Transport 
Networks (IPTNs) in the 12 largest cities and six more densely populated districts in the 
country by 2014, and complete the networks in the 12 cities by 2020. These networks would 
rely principally on high-quality bus, or “bus rapid transit” (BRT), services. The general 
restructuring principle was that paratransit and subsidised bus operators whose routes would 
be affected in part or in full by new bus routes would have to withdraw their vehicle from 
these routes. Such operators could opt to be incorporated in the new systems by forming 
companies capable of offering the new services.  
Progress has been more limited than planned. Only two cities have introduced BRT services: 
the first IPTN routes were launched in Johannesburg in 2009 under the Rea Vaya brand and in 
Cape Town in 2011 as the MyCiTi, and expanded since in both cities. The Johannesburg and 
Cape Town services form part of these cities’ respective IPTN "first project phases", 
incorporating in both cases a small number of trunk lines linked to multiple feeder services. 
Many of these first phase trunk and feeder routes are operational, though construction of 
additional routes is ongoing in both these cities. A number of other city municipalities have 
drawn up similar plans to build upgraded bus or BRT systems. The first IPTN services in 
Tshwane and George were launched in December 2014, though large-scale operations are still 
to commence in Ekurhuleni, Nelson Mandela Bay, Rustenburg and Polokwane. Municipal 
officials and consultants have presented progress on several of these projects at an IPTN/BRT 
session that has been a fixture since 2011 at the annual Southern African Transport 
Conference held in Pretoria. Amongst such presentations Cape Town has increasingly been 
noted as being in the lead position with implementing its IPTN and appears to have become a 
reference case for other cities, the National Treasury and the DoT.  
At a number of points since being initiated the PTS and cities’ IPTN projects have drawn 
heated reactions and protests from local and national paratransit interests, as periodically 
reported in the press around the country (e.g.: Butler & Dimbaza, 2009; Hartley, 2012; 
Hartley & McKune, 2008; Hweshe & Lewis, 2009; “Soweto taxi protest looms”, 2011; “Taxi 
drivers promise more chaos”, 2009). Reform is clearly a sensitive topic, but the reactions that 
it has elicited from the paratransit sector should be viewed in the context of a long history of 
government efforts to establish greater control over paratransit operations. These efforts 
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diminished toward the latter years of the apartheid era, as documented by Khosa (1992; 
1995). Government attempts to control paratransit numbers eventually ceased in the late 
1980s. Any operator could apply for, and was awarded, a zonal operating permit. These 
permits allowed service within a wide radius from a base of operations, thus not limiting 
operations to any particular route. The ‘taxi wars’ ensued as paratransit groupings fought to 
gain and maintain territorial control of the most lucrative routes.  
In the mid 1990s the post-apartheid government launched the National Taxi Task Team 
(NTTT) to investigate the causes behind the taxi wars and to propose actions to ameliorate the 
situation. The main issues emerging from the NTTT’s investigation were clustered around: 
economic sustainability; industry formalisation; regulation and control; safety; infrastructure; 
training; labour relations; and transport policy (NTTT, 1997). The NTTT’s findings were 
incorporated into the 1996 White Paper and Moving South Africa (DoT, 1996; 1999), and 
served as foundation for the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP) launched in 1999 
(Boudreaux, 2006). The findings also laid the basis for the introduction of a route-based 
operating licensing system enacted under the National Land Transport Transition Act (No. 22 
of 2000) (DoT, 2007b) and carried over into the current National Land Transport Act (No. 5 
of 2009). The NTTT recommendations also ultimately led to the establishment of 
SANTACO, with regional sub-structures, to act as intermediary between government and 
minibus-taxi owners and associations (SANTACO, 2014).  
The TRP is a national public transport reform programme focussing on paratransit. It 
incorporated the conversion of the poorly defined radius-based permits to route-based 
licenses, as well as a subsidised minibus vehicle renewal scheme (DoT 2006; 2013a). 
Scrapping of old vehicles was made conditional on the operator being in possession of a valid 
route-based operating licence. Uptake by operators has been slower than expected, though not 
insignificant. While the TRP was launched in 1999, it took until 2006 for the programme to 
come on stream. From 2006 until the end of the initial run of the TRP in 2013 the target was 
to scrap around 136 000 minibuses nationally. Figures quoted by the Transport Minister in 
August 2013 showed that 54 159 vehicles had been scrapped over the programme’s first six 
years 4  (Ensor and Vecchiato, 2013). Significantly, government aspirations to formalise 
                                                
4 The TRP has since been extended, though target dates for such extension are not available. Neither 
the Taxi Scrapping Administrator nor the Department of Transport responded to requests for a more 
recent national figure. Statistics indicating vehicle scrapping rates at local level were also not 
available. 
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paratransit ownership structures through the TRP have not been realised. The intention, as 
expressed in Moving South Africa, was to enable paratransit operators to be in a position to 
bid competitively for public transport service contracts. This reorganisation of the paratransit 
sector would arguably have created conditions more conducive to the introduction of a reform 
scheme envisaging large-scale service contracts, such as those envisioned in the PTS. Instead, 
paratransit industry reorganisation has had to be incorporated in the scope of cities’ respective 
IPTN projects.  
1.3 RECENT RESEARCH ON PARATRANSIT PARTICIPATION IN 
REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The present public transport reform approach impacts profoundly on paratransit operators’ 
businesses, yet these operators’ aspirations and attitudes to reform have not been well 
researched. This is particularly the case in relation to the PTS: operators’ reactions to the 
programme periodically come to the fore (as per the press articles cited in section 1.2 above), 
but the motivations underpinning these reactions have not been studied in depth.  
That there was an imperative for operators to be participants in the reform process is not in 
question. The National Land Transport Act (NLTA, No. 5 of 2009:s79) protects operators 
against summary withdrawal of valid operating licences: should municipalities wish to 
withdraw licenses they either have to wait for the validity period to run out or offer operators 
an alternative. The country’s constitution furthermore directs the public sector to encourage 
participation in policy processes (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as 
amended, 2009:s195). There are, however, many forms of participation. With reference to 
Arnstein’s (1969) ladder rungs of different forms of participation, were paratransit operators 
manipulated or coerced by the public sector, were they subject to tokenism (being informed, 
consulted or placated), or were they true partners in reform with control over their 
involvement? Operators’ attitudes could well have been shaped by the particular manner in 
which there were participants in reform. 
In laying the foundation for the reforms that followed, the NTTT set an unmatched precedent. 
Over the course of 36 hearings held across the country in a five-month period spanning 1995 
and 1996, the NTTT engaged directly with 1 102 individuals, the vast majority of whom were 
paratransit owners: 717 owners participated through verbal submissions, and 85 by way of 
written submission (NTTT, 1997). Subsequent endeavours to expand knowledge on 
operators’ attitudes have focussed largely on the history of the industry and on the TRP. Only 
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a handful of studies have systematically engaged paratransit operators to gain insight into 
their attitudes towards aspects of government’s reform agenda, the suitability of the 
regulatory regime, and their business environment, needs and aspirations. The methodological 
approaches of these studies are also pertinent insofar as they illustrate reasons for the limited 
research in this field. 
Jakoet (2001) conducted a questionnaire-based survey of small bus and paratransit operators’ 
preparedness for tendering for subsidised public transport services in the Western Cape – one 
of South Africa’s nine provinces. The study’s focus was on bus operators as the initial target 
of the tendering programme, with a subsidiary interest in paratransit operators, who would be 
targeted at a later stage. The questionnaires comprised multiple choice, tabular and open-
ended questions and there was a subsequent quantitative analysis of business, labour and 
training needs. Bus operators were approached telephonically to opt in prior to receiving a 
questionnaire. The South African Bus Operators Association provided a list of all its 
members, out of which 74 bus operators were identified who could be contacted directly. Less 
than half of these operators could be reached via telephone, and Jakoet states that only 
“around 10%” of this first wave of respondents completed the questionnaire. In follow-up 
telephone conversations respondents revealed that they were distrustful of the study’s 
confidentiality; respondents were concerned that their competitors and government authorities 
would be able to link their responses to their personal details. The help of the South African 
Black Technical and Allied Careers Organisation (SABTACO), an organisation that Jakoet 
deemed trusted by operators, was enlisted to endorse the second wave of the study with a 
cover letter, and operators could opt to receive the results of the study for their own market 
research purposes. Despite all these efforts only 17 bus-related questionnaires were 
completed.  
With regard to paratransit operators the provincial government was unwilling to release 
operators’ contact details on the basis of such information being “classified” (Jakoet, 
2001:60). The Western Cape Taxi Council (WCTC) and the Western Cape Taxi Association 
(WCTA) were subsequently approached to assist. The WCTC completed questionnaires 
during its meetings and engaged its member operators to distribute and collect further 
questionnaires, but the WCTA failed to retrieve any completed questionnaires. In total 14 
paratransit operators completed the questionnaire. The number of paratransit operators whom 
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Jakoet attempted to contact has to be inferred from the reported response rate of ±20%, i.e. 
approximately 70 operators.  
As with bus operators, paratransit operators reported confidentiality as the main reason for 
non-response, rather than problems with completing the questionnaire. However, paratransit 
operators responded poorly to the open-ended question in which they were asked to note the 
three main problems that they foresaw in moving to the tendering system. Jakoet does not 
specify in which way responses were poor, e.g. whether the answers were incoherent or 
whether the item non-response rate was high. Regardless of reasons, only bus operators’ 
responses were taken into account in relation to a question that lay at the core of the study. 
This was not reported as being problematic because the study focussed on bus operators, yet it 
raises pertinent methodological issues in relation to studying paratransit operators’ views on a 
reform programme. Gaining access to paratransit operators was a difficult undertaking; it 
required sustained effort and ultimately required the assistance of representative bodies. Even 
so, few operators ultimately participated in the study. Amongst those who did participate, 
asking them to express broader concerns around reforms to their business environment 
through written responses to a questionnaire had limitations.  
One of these limitations was that self-completed questionnaires are an arm’s-length method of 
data collection. With telephonic communication being impossible the researcher had no direct 
channel through which to clarify questions, or overcome paratransit respondents’ obstacles to 
answering them. A further limitation was in the use of a quantitative approach reliant on 
arm’s length interaction to understand views on a complex issue – in this case what operators 
foresaw as problems in moving to a new regulatory regime. The results of the open-ended 
question tasking operators to list their three predominant concerns were distilled into a tabular 
incidence count. Ten of the 17 bus respondents listed needing capital as their primary 
problem. The representivity of this result amongst the 74 bus operators with direct contact 
details, and more who could not be contacted, is unclear. Moreover, an in-depth exploration 
of the reasons why operators prioritised particular problems above others is not possible with 
such a methodological approach. Subsequently gauging in which ways the reform programme 
overlaps with operators’ motivations is problematic.  
Closer to the current reform programmes, Magubane and Manicom (2003) investigated 
perceptions of the TRP amongst paratransit operators in Pietermaritzburg, the capital of the 
Kwazulu-Natal province. The study took place prior to the initiation of vehicle scrapping. It 
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relied on a focus group interview as well as 137 questionnaires that were administered face-
to-face to paratransit operators belonging to 21 of the 31 associations in Pietermaritzburg at 
the time. The research method description is very brief – the overall size of the research 
population was not mentioned and thus the response rate and potential representivity of the 
findings are unknown. The results were presented in a quantitative analysis of operator 
demographics, business practices, and finances, and their responses to, and understanding of, 
the TRP. The study concluded that operators understood the TRP mainly in relation to its day-
to-day impacts on their businesses, rather than in terms of the policy’s strategic intention of 
providing operators with public financial support and improving labour conditions. Some of 
the findings are contradictory: for instance, if 59% of respondents thought that the objective 
of the programme was for government to impose taxes on operators, generally an unpopular 
move, why would 77% of respondents have a positive attitude towards the programme? As 
with Jakoet’s study above, a possible explanation may lie in operators’ limited ability to 
engage with hypothetical scenarios and express their views through questionnaire-based 
engagement.  
Similar to Magubane and Manicom, Mashishi (2010) assessed paratransit owners’ perceptions 
of the TRP, though in this instance well into the programme’s implementation. The structured 
component of the research took place in Temba, a township outside Pretoria, on the basis that 
it served as a “microcosm” of paratransit operations in the common township-and-city 
pairings found in South Africa. “Oral, unstructured and informal interviews” also took place 
with paratransit owners, driver and users in some 33 similarly located townships or villages 
across five of the country’s nine provinces (Mashishi, 2010:5,103), though there are no 
further details of this component of the study. The structured part of the study was conducted 
by way of an interviewer-administered 66-question questionnaire. It spanned demographic 
information; paratransit business characterisation; closed- and open-ended questions on 
operators’ views on the TRP (as well as one question on awareness of the existence of the 
IPTN programme); and a Likert-type rating of the success of the TRP in Temba. The sample 
was 100 of the 283 paratransit operators registered in Temba, and there were 94 completed 
questionnaires. This is a remarkable feat given the length of the questionnaire and the use of 
only two fieldworkers. (It is unclear whether the author participated in questionnaire 
administration or whether any incentives were given for questionnaire completion).  
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Mashishi highlighted failings and successes of the TRP, and drew up a number of policy and 
practical recommendations. The outcomes of the open-ended questions and of the informal 
interviews were not presented except for a brief statement that the latter largely corroborated 
the surveyed quantitative findings of the study. The study’s method description does not 
provide sufficient detail to explain its apparent success, nor does it reflect on any difficulties 
or breakthroughs encountered in the data collection process. There is mention of a pilot study 
amongst respondents with knowledge of the paratransit industry and TRP, though their 
number is unknown and it appears as if they were not drawn from the study sample. Perhaps 
the most crucial challenges to replicating this study’s success is that Mashishi does not 
indicate how respondents were accessed or what strategy was used to achieve the high 
response rate. The only indication in this regard is the inclusion in the appendices of letters 
from three Temba-based paratransit operator associations authorising the research amongst 
their members. The role that these associations played in furthering the research is not spelt 
out.  
Amongst the body of literature on current reform programmes in South Africa the most in-
depth study was that of Van Schalkwyk (2009) on the TRP, as part of his doctoral degree. It 
investigated the reasons behind the slow progress of implementing the TRP as at the end of 
2008; the investigation relied on 54 qualitative semi-structured interviews, as well as e-mail 
exchanges, with direct and indirect role-players in the paratransit industry across South 
Africa. Interviewees included five paratransit operators, 14 drivers and six paratransit 
organisation representatives variously located in the North West, Gauteng and Western Cape 
provinces of South Africa. Van Schalkwyk traced in detail the origins of the TRP, the parties 
involved in its formulation and the extent of their involvement, and suggested ways in which 
the TRP should take cognition of institutional dynamics to hasten its implementation. Its key 
contribution is that it offers the first (and likely only) comprehensive review of the TRP 
formulation process. It differs from the aforementioned studies in that it does not report on 
one particular group of respondents’ views or attitudes towards a policy programme, but 
rather aims to understand different groups’ contributions to a policy formulation process. This 
is in line with the study’s theoretical location in the political sciences, in particular in public 
policy analysis. The study does not dwell on the details of how the TRP could be reworked in 
view of responses from any of the specific researched groups involved in its formulation, but 
it nonetheless serves as a valuable reference resource. 
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The most recent study on policy and reform that engaged with paratransit operators is that of 
Wosiyana (2013). The study investigated whether the TRP met its objectives through focus 
group discussions and qualitative interviews with government officials involved in the 
programme, passenger and labour organisations and 100 paratransit operators in Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg. Though it contains only a short report of the process followed in conducting 
the research, the study presents and consolidates responses around a list of problems with, and 
unmet expectations of, the TRP. The findings for the most part overlap with the above-
mentioned studies on the TRP, and Wosiyana similarly concludes that the programme is an 
imperfect tool to resolve the numerous problems of the paratransit sector. Though it does not 
make substantial strides in relation to the TRP or general public transport reform discourse, it 
is noteworthy and included here because it is the only study that was conducted from within a 
government organisation – in this case by the eThekwini Transport Authority. 
In reflecting on this body of research there are some broad trends in terms of research 
approach and subject matter. One commonality is that method descriptions tend to be very 
limited compared to discussions of findings and recommendations, or are absent altogether. 
The ways in which respondents were selected, how respondents were accessed, the 
timeframes of data collection, and the difficulties encountered in engaging paratransit 
respondents in general were poorly described, if at all. This shortcoming from the outset 
scuppers attempts to replicate the research, and also does not provide a basis for comparing 
the successes and failures of any particular approach. A second comment in relation to 
research method is that all studies, bar that of Wosiyana, were part of formal, university-based 
postgraduate research. It might be expected that such academic research engage more with the 
theoretical literature, methodological debates or indeed with precedent of similar studies. In 
relation to subject matter the TRP has been better documented that the PTS, particularly 
regarding paratransit operator engagement at IPTN project level. This may be partially 
explained by the PTS being the more recent by around seven years, it being implemented by 
local government rather than being a countrywide programme, and its subsequent more 
limited geographical extent.  
This is not to say that PTS and IPTN project implementation has not been documented or 
criticised. A number of publications in, or related to, conference proceedings provide such 
evidence. Browning (2013) and Von der Heyden, Hasting & Leitner (2014) motivated for a 
review of the programme at national level, highlighting areas where implementation has been 
 16  
lagging. McLachlan (2010) assessed challenges faced by the PTS’s approach to paratransit 
transformation nationally and in the creation of IPTNs in Johannesburg and Cape Town. 
Wilkinson (2010) reviewed paratransit formalisation in Cape Town’s MyCiTi project against 
the backdrop of the PTS. Included in this literature are also Venter’s (2013) and McCaul and 
Ntuli’s (2011) appraisals of Rea Vaya’s first-phase operator negotiation process from 
academic and practitioner points of view, respectively.  
However, where the PTS-focussed body of literature differs from that on the TRP is in the 
absence of paratransit operators as a primary source of information. Despite links that the 
aforementioned authors draw between slow progress on PTS implementation and resistance 
from paratransit operators to IPTN projects, they did not report on paratransit operators’ 
underlying motivations for resisting change or assess such operators’ aspirations for their 
businesses. Failing such investigation the extent of overlap between operators’ aspirations and 
motivations and the aims of this reform programme is obscure. A further distinction between 
the two programmes is that no equivalent of Van Schalkwyk's (2009) detailed report on the 
implementation process of the TRP has been produced or is in open circulation for any of the 
cities developing their IPTNs. There is no repository of government reports on public 
transport reform implementation, and available reports on the implementation experience of 
the reform programmes are limited to the academic publications discussed in this section and 
technical reports on infrastructure completion. These publications do not discuss the details of 
engagement between municipalities and operators, and as a result ways in which such 
transition processes informed operators' responses to the PTS and IPTN projects are obscure. 
Thus, even if more were known about operators’ attitudes, it would be difficult to comment 
on how the substance and process of engagement could better reflect or deal with operators' 
concerns.  
1.4 RESEARCH AIMS AND QUESTIONS 
My research had two aims. The first aim was to gain direct insight into the potentially 
heterogeneous needs and aspirations of paratransit operators, as well as into their attitudes 
towards public transport reform in Cape Town. As the lead city in terms of progress with its 
IPTN Cape Town offered a potentially wider scope for studying PTS programme 
implementation and consequent impacts on paratransit operators in comparison with other 
cities in South Africa. The results of the investigation into operators’ aspirations and attitudes 
could then be tested against the objectives and outcomes of the PTS and TRP programmes to 
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identify points of overlap or opposition. Identifying these commonalities – or lack thereof – 
was the second aim of my research. Responding to both aims would subsequently allow me to 
put forth propositions around how the reform programmes could be revised to benefit Cape 
Town’s reform process. These propositions could also be tested through further research in 
other cities in South Africa attempting to install IPTNs. However, the aforementioned 
shortage of detailed literature on the operator transition aspect of the IPTN also applied in 
Cape Town. Without this it would not be possible to understand how they participated in 
reform, thus contextualising their responses. My research therefore also included 
documenting the process that the municipality followed in incorporating paratransit operators 
in its MyCiTi system.  
Cape Town’s first phase MyCiTi routes opened in 2011 (Figure 1-2 shows the initial project 
phasing approach). In subsequent years operations commenced on most of the remaining 
routes in this project phase, and the long-term operating contracts covering first phase routes 
were concluded in 2013. Engagement between municipal officials and paratransit operators 
and associations in Cape Town since the inception of the MyCiTi project focussed on the first 
phase of the system and the establishment of the aforementioned operating contracts.   
This project phase also impacted on some of the routes of the two subsidised bus operators in 
Cape Town, Golden Arrow Bus Services (GABS) and Sibanye Bus Services. They were thus 
also included in the engagement process, though collectively their share of affected operations 
by fare revenue was relatively small at 20.35% (CoCT, 2012a). Broader consultation was 
limited, and related only to the temporary provision of contracted services for the FIFA World 
Cup soccer championship held in mid-2010 (CoCT, 2010) and a pilot service for the second 
phase of the project running from 2014 to 2017 (CoCT, 2013b) as a precursor to more 
permanent second-phase routes. Except for the pilot service, the attitudes within Cape Town’s 
paratransit sector in relation to future phases of the MyCiTi system and to the broader 
programme of reorganisation and reform remained largely untested. Cape Town thus offered 
an opportunity to investigate operators’ views from outside and within the MyCiTi project 
environment, as well as in relation to the TRP.  
Where paratransit’s reactions to reform were documented in Cape Town and in the rest of the 
country, the existing literature (as examined earlier in this chapter) raised concerns about the 
viability of the PTS as a reform strategy. A primary issue was whether installing new and




Figure 1-2: Initial MyCiTi project phase proposal 
Source: CoCT, 2012a 
extensive upgraded bus or BRT systems was the appropriate mechanism for public transport 
reform in general, and paratransit reform in particular. Alternatives to such a BRT-led reform 
approach had not been explored or discussed. Investigating such alternatives would be 
pertinent to my research both in evaluating what paratransit operators might be willing to 
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accept in terms of a government-led reform programme, and in proposing potential revisions 
to the PTS to increase the potential for successful implementation to the benefit of passengers. 
There was also the broader socio-political context to consider. Operators’ participation in 
reform was likely to have been shaped not only by reform programmes, but also by the 
operating licence-based competition regulation system, and the historically oppositional 
relationship between paratransit and government reaching into the apartheid past. In addition 
to operators’ involvement, expectations and attitudes to reform, the manner in which 
government disposed of its public transport policy-making, regulatory and implementation 
functions was also pertinent to the research. In this complex policy and practice environment 
the research was guided by three research questions. These questions emerged from the 
research aims, but were more specific: 
1. What approach did government follow in incorporating paratransit operators in public 
transport reform? 
This question directed enquiry into alternative approaches to reform, existing national public 
transport reform programmes, identifying parties engaged in its formulation, and progress 
with reform programme implementation in Cape Town.  
2. How do paratransit operators’ needs and aspirations around their businesses relate to the 
current approach to public transport reform?  
This question narrowed the focus to paratransit operators to direct investigation into which of 
their needs were unmet by government’s reform agenda and whether they expressed an 
internal desire for reforming their industry.  
3. How might the current approach to public transport reform be adjusted to capitalise on 
the needs and aspirations of paratransit operators?  
The last question sought to unify the responses to the previous questions. If it emerged that 
government’s reform approach did not carry the support of the dominant public service 
provider, did not address paratransit operators’ needs and aspirations, and had little prospect 
of increasing operators’ participation, it would be of value to consider alternative approaches 
to reform.  
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1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
I used the case study strategy as described by Yin (1994) to respond to the research aims. The 
study was of a single case in a real-life context (Yin, 1994:1): that of a public transport reform 
process in Cape Town that sought to restructure paratransit operators’ businesses and 
incorporate them into a new service model. The contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 1994:1) that 
I studied and aimed to explain was operators’ limited participation in the reform process. 
Below I set out motivations for using case study as the research strategy and a qualitative 
approach to researching the case and phenomenon, and I identify the procedures and sources 
of evidence that I utilised.  
Case study as research strategy 
Aristotle believed in three “intellectual virtues,” or spheres of knowledge: episteme, analytical 
scientific knowledge, or universal truth; techne, technical knowledge or know-how; and 
phronesis, practical wisdom in social and political contexts. The contemporary planning 
theorist Flyvbjerg (2001) points out that phronesis, despite its roots in the works of one of the 
masters of the philosophical tradition, did not proceed to join episteme and techne in their 
domination of the academic endeavour. He suggests that episteme and techne have served 
natural science enquiry well in the positivist paradigm in their contributions to explanatory 
and predictive theory, but that the messiness and dynamism of social contexts do not 
necessarily allow for ready description or generalisation. In so doing Flyvbjerg points to the 
problematic application of the natural science-sourced positivist paradigm in social science 
research: human behaviour and social interaction are irregular and thus not easily controlled 
or measured and distilled to absolute truths, nor can the researcher claim a value-free, 
objective and “expert” perspective when conducting research amongst human subjects (Crook 
& Garratt, 2011; Guba & Lincoln, 1998; Somekh & Lewin, 2011). He motivates for a shift 
away from a binary position for or against the positivist paradigm in social science research, 
arguing instead that practical wisdom must form the basis of social inquiry. This practical 
knowledge he defines as a contextual understanding of practice, conflict and power. The 
purpose of such knowledge is to clarify the problems, risks and possibilities that humans and 
societies face.  
Case study serves well as a strategy to build “inside” practical knowledge in a social context. 
Flyvbjerg’s (1998) detailed report on the Aalborg Project is a seminal example of this. The 
Aalborg Project was a public sector-driven scheme initiated in the late 1970s to reorganise 
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public transport, traffic and land use in and around the historic centre of the Danish city of 
Aalborg. As a large-scale transport reform programme it initially seemed to satisfy the needs 
of multiple actors, though in the course of implementation few of the original aims were 
achieved. An analysis of the programme and its implementation, of who the involved actors 
were, or of what their attitudes were did not suffice to explain why the programme did not 
reach fruition. It was only by viewing programme and implementation in the context of 
values, interests and the practice of power that its failure could be adequately understood. 
This involved tracing where actual (not assumed) power lay, the roles of actors in supporting 
or blocking progress, their motivations for doing so, and their specific needs and desires. 
Flyvbjerg argues that if from the outset practical wisdom had been incorporated in project 
design, there would have been the potential for much learning around how failure might have 
been better avoided during implementation.  
At a conceptual level there were parallels between the Aalborg Project and the public 
transport reform process in Cape Town that suggested the use of the case study as research 
strategy. The project was a transport reform programme. The main actors included national 
and local institutions with a hand in reform programme formulation and its implementation; 
in both there were also local public and private sector actors affected by implementation. The 
outcomes differed from the original pre-determined aims, yet reasons for certain actors’ 
resistance to change were not apparent.  
Besides conceptual similarities and the precedent that Flyvbjerg set in the urban transport 
arena, Yin (1994:9) offers specific grounds for selecting case study as a research strategy that 
motivated for its use in the case of public transport reform in Cape Town. Firstly, my research 
sought to answer “how” and (implicit) “why” questions: Why did paratransit operators not 
actively participate in public transport reform? Was their reluctance related to how 
government attempted to incorporate them in the reform endeavour or because it did not meet 
their needs and aspirations? How could the reform approach be revised? Secondly, it was an 
investigation into a contemporary set of real-life events. Thirdly, I had little or no control over 
these events. It was a reform process with both national and citywide dimensions, and as an 
outsider I had no control over events.  
A last motivation for using case study as research approach is that it is a comprehensive 
strategy that relies on convergence between multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994:13). 
Separate investigations of the reform programme and implementation, of who the involved 
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actors were, or of what their attitudes were would not have sufficed to explain paratransit 
operators’ limited participation in public transport reform in Cape Town. It was only by 
collectively investigating reform, ways in which it impacted on paratransit operators, and 
operators’ specific aspirations and attitudes that their resistance could be understood and 
propositions around potential outcomes and ameliorating actions be drawn.  
Qualitative face-to-face approach to engaging operators 
Paratransit operators and the associations they belong to are hard-to-reach research subjects. 
Operators do not have easily accessible contact numbers or business addresses, and are 
therefore difficult to reach without going through the association to which they belong. 
Associations are also difficult to access, as there is not a publicly available source of contact 
information. Jakoet’s (2001) study demonstrated these challenges in practice. Operators 
furthermore have little choice but to belong to an association, whether due to legal 
requirements or to the territorial protection offered by associations, in return for which 
associations extract membership fees. As a result associations play a de facto regulatory role 
in controlling entry to the market, and effectively become gatekeepers to information and 
access. There are likely to be significant politics and power struggles, informed in no small 
part by years of territorial competition with rival associations and the historically adversarial 
relationship with government that Khosa (1992; 1995) reported. Trust and openness are 
consequently scarce commodities, which places the outsider researcher at a disadvantage. 
This offers a partial explanation for the small number of attempts, particularly of a structured 
nature, at gaining direct insight into the attitudes of paratransit operators (as reported in 
section 1.3 above).  
A common approach employed in the transport arena to gather attitudinal data is to conduct a 
quantitative survey amongst a sample population, and then, in the positivist tradition, to 
formulate generalised recommendations from the results. In my earlier discussion of the 
studies by Jakoet (2001), Magubane & Manicom (2003) and Mashishi (2010) I pointed to 
practical limitations of this quantitative approach in the paratransit field. If the research 
universe is difficult to access, drawing a sample and assessing representivity are problematic, 
and surveys administered by mail or telephonically are not feasible due to lack of contact 
information. Face-to-face administration seems to hold greater promise, but the nature of the 
research topic still presented challenges to a quantitative approach. My research questions 
directed enquiry into reform policy-making and implementation, the relationship of 
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paratransit operators to policy and policy-makers, relationships and motivations within the 
paratransit sector, and alternative approaches to reform. A questionnaire allows for open-
ended questions to be posed for more detailed exploration, but even so as a means of 
investigating inter-related and potentially hypothetical topics in depth it has limitations 
amongst a paratransit respondent group. The prior studies provided some guidance. 
Paratransit operators did not respond to the open-ended questions of Jakoet’s questionnaire, 
while Magubane & Manicom’s study contained contradictory results around topics of a 
hypothetical nature. Mashishi failed to directly discuss responses to open-ended questions, 
and focussed on quantifiable aspects.  
In engaging operators I used a qualitative, face-to-face approach. Decisive issues proved to be 
the need to build trust and the need for in-depth exploration. I was guided in this by literature 
on qualitative approaches in the transport field (Arce, 2003; Clifton & Handy, 2003; 
Grosvenor, 1998; Morris & Adler, 2003) and discussions with specialists in ethnography, 
urban planning and educational research at the University of Cape Town. With trust being a 
central issue, it was crucial to engage operators face to face to establish trust directly, to be in 
a position to note non-verbal information that would allow me to identify issues underpinned 
by strong emotions, and to avoid, or steer away from, offensive or sensitive topics that could 
undermine trust. My physical presence would also allow me to guide the interview flow in 
order to best draw out responses to the research questions.  
These considerations led to my selecting qualitative semi-structured interviewing to engage 
operators. A semi-structured interview is organised around topics, as opposed to only rigidly 
pre-defined questions, that would allow for sufficient flexibility to explore the multiple points 
of view that were likely to emerge in pursuing the complex subject of the research. Gillham 
(2000) defines this specifically as a research interview, as opposed to, for instance, a medical 
history, employment selection or market research interview. He argues that regardless of the 
type of interview, the expert interviewer will always have a structure in mind. Such an expert 
can apply the structure flexibly according to what emerges in the course of the interview, and 
thus the structured-unstructured polarity becomes somewhat arbitrary in practice.  
Procedures and sources of evidence  
Studying the case of public transport reform in Cape Town and the phenomenon of limited 
paratransit operator participation in reform did not, however, rely only on conducting 
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interviews with operators. The case study involved multiple procedures5 and sources of 
evidence, as per the guidance that Yin (1994) offers.  
The first procedure was to identify alternative approaches to reform that could situate the 
Cape Town case. These alternatives could also be explored during the interviews and could 
inform potential revisions to the existing reform approach. Alternatives were identified by 
reviewing published literature on public transport reform as an over-arching concept, on 
different approaches through which paratransit or road-based public transport operations 
could be reformed, and on examples of such approaches employed in cities in Latin America 
and Sub-Saharan Africa. This review is presented in Chapter 2. One of the alternative 
approaches was based on the experience with reform in Nelson Mandela Bay. After 
opposition from the paratransit industry to the installation of a BRT system, from 2008 until 
2011 the reform process in this city diverged substantially from the national and Cape Town 
approaches. Mr Paul Browning was involved as a consultant in the Nelson Mandela Bay 
process in these early years, and communication with him in person and via e-mail 
supplemented published literature on this approach. 
The second procedure was to document the development of the South African national 
approach to paratransit reform since 1994, and how this approach unfolded in practice in 
Cape Town since its IPTN plan was unveiled in 2007. The procedure drew on primary and 
secondary sources, and its results are presented in Chapter 3. A key resource for this 
procedure was popular press articles. From April 2008 until June 2014 I selectively collected 
557 such articles on paratransit regulatory matters, the TRP and PTS, and IPTN 
implementation. The main geographic focus was on Cape Town and national matters, with a 
subsidiary interest in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. The majority of these articles 
focussed on the actions and reactions of public agencies, paratransit representative 
organisations and paratransit operators in relation to IPTN implementation. Another ongoing 
activity was my attendance at the Southern African Transport Conference (SATC) every year 
from 2007 to 2014. It provided the opportunity to monitor the same themes as in the popular 
press, but in this case drawing on my notes during presentation sessions, exchanges with 
practitioners and academics attending the event, and the conference proceedings.  
                                                
5 Yin (1994) uses the term procedures to describe the detailed steps involved in data collection and 
interpretation, i.e. it is broadly synonymous with research methods. 
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Moving South Africa (DoT, 1999) was the only hard copy publication that served as evidence 
on national public transport reform. The remainder of national policy and reform programme 
documents were in electronic format, of which many were not in open circulation. I obtained 
available electronic publications from consultants who were involved in their production or 
acquainted with the original authors, through university colleagues who had them on record, 
and, least frequently, from internet archives. Notable amongst these is a copy of the NTTT 
report that I obtained from one of this report’s authors, via e-mail. Despite substantial efforts I 
nonetheless could not unearth an official TRP report. This programme's aims and process had 
to be inferred from Moving South Africa, press articles, and academic publications such as the 
studies referred to in section 1.3 above. Periodic face-to-face discussions and e-mail 
exchanges with Mr Browning, another author of the NTTT’s final report, were instrumental in 
clarifying gaps that published sources left on TRP formulation and implementation. A formal 
meeting with Mr Neville Dingle, an author of the NLTA, and Mr Browning at SATC in 2013 
was key to clarifying the intentions of the Act with regard to paratransit reform and of the 
National Treasury in funding such reform. Face-to-face exchanges with Mr Philip van 
Ryneveld, a specialist consultant on municipal finance in South Africa who was involved in 
the development of the NLTA, also proved insightful on IPTN funding mechanisms and the 
early planning processes of Cape Town's IPTN. 
There were a number of publications on transport planning and IPTN implementation in Cape 
Town that I used to construct the account of the operator transition process in this city. These 
were the City of Cape Town's 2007 and 2013 Operating License Strategies (CoCT, 2007a; 
2013c) and its Comprehensive Integrated Transport Plan (CoCT, 2013d). Sources specific to 
the IPTN were the two MyCiTi business plans (CoCT, 2010; 2012) and the MyCiTi technical 
progress reports published monthly between December 2009 and November 2012, with a last 
issue published in February 2013. Though the MyCiTi documents were accessible online 
within months of their publication, the information on the operator transition and engagement 
process in them was scant. My popular press article collection proved to be a useful resource 
in addressing this shortcoming. Also of great value were periodic meetings and e-mail 
exchanges between 2010 and 2014 with one of the two industry transition facilitators on the 
first phase of MyCiTi, Mr Nico McLachlan. He facilitated the formation of Kidrogen 
(“Company B”) and provided details of the transition process that were not clearly presented 
in the official documents or in the popular press.  
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The third procedure of the case study was preparing for and conducting interviews with 
paratransit operators. A key resource was Mr Thabiso Botha, who was a colleague of Mr 
McLachlan on the industry transition facilitation team for the first phase of MyCiTi. He was 
acquainted with a number of operators in Cape Town and elsewhere in the country, and 
served as intermediary to the interviews that I conducted. There are few people in the country 
as uniquely positioned as Mr Botha to provide the research (in my case) or practitioner 
(MyCiTi industry transition) spheres with informed background on, and access to, paratransit 
operators. Over meetings in 2011 preparatory to conducting the interviews, and immediately 
prior to and after the majority of interviews, he provided critical insights into the structure of 
the paratransit organisational hierarchy in the country and in Cape Town. This served a role in 
gaining insight into the manner in which paratransit operators might better be engaged around 
reform topics. Ms Siwe Coka, who represented certain operators in the second MyCiTi 
project phase, served as an intermediary during three additional interviews in 2013. This 
supplemented Mr Botha’s contribution. I describe the method that I followed to conduct the 
interviews, including the differing roles of the two intermediaries, in Chapter 4. Operators’ 
responses during the interviews were a key source of information for the case study, as were 
my notes made during and after the interviews on respondents’ verbal and non-verbal 
responses. This is captured in Chapter 5.  
The last procedure was to generate propositions from the data unearthed in the above-
mentioned case study procedures that could be tested in further research. Punch (2005:16) 
distinguishes between such theory generation or theory after research, which is common in 
qualitative research, and theory verification or theory before research, which is often where 
quantitative research is directed. In the context of case study, Yin (1994:30-32) uses the 
equivalent terms of analytic generalisation and statistical generalisation, highlighting that 
case study specifically supports analytic generalisation (i.e. the generation of propositions).  
The research questions formed the basis of generating the propositions. The research 
questions focussed on three inter-linked topics: government’s approach to reform, the needs 
and aspirations of paratransit operators in the context of reform, and the opportunities to 
adjust reform so that there could be greater overlap between the reform process and operators’ 
needs and aspirations. In order to generate propositions, I compared the key themes and 
prominent issues that operators raised during the interview process (the data collected in the 
third case study procedure) with the aims, process and outcomes of the government reform 
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process reform (the data from the second procedure). I also reflected on potential alternative 
reform approaches (the data emerging from the first procedure) as part of this process. Where 
it emerged that operators’ needs and aspirations might continue to lead to their limited 
participation of reform, I proposed revisions to aspects of the existing reform approach, or 
alternative approaches. Where there were opportunities for greater participation, I proposed 
that there be increased focus on the aspects of the existing reform approach that could allow 
such greater participation to occur.  
The propositions that I drew in the Cape Town case are presented and motivated in Chapter 6. 
This discussion is structured in three parts: the public sector’s role in reform, paratransit 
industry considerations that could lead to greater participation in reform, and the prospects of 
reform implementation as an overarching process. In Chapter 7 I discuss ways in which these 
propositions could be generalised through further case research in other cities in South Africa 
and further afield where public transport reform processes involve the participation of 
paratransit operators. 
1.6 DOCUMENT LAYOUT 
Chapter 1 introduces public transport reform in South Africa, identifies paratransit 
participation in reform as a key issue to improving public transport, and reviews prior studies 
of paratransit attitudes to reform in this country. This is followed by descriptions of the aims 
of the research and of the case study strategy that the research employed. In this chapter I 
motivate for studying the motivations and aspirations of paratransit operators, as well as the 
reform implementation process, in Cape Town as a revelatory case in relation to public 
transport reform that seeks to restructure paratransit operations.  
Chapters 2 and 3 respond to the first research question on the approach that government took 
to public transport reform in Cape Town. In Chapter 2 I demonstrate that there are different 
approaches to restructuring or improving paratransit operations. This chapter draws on 
international literature to describe the concept of public transport reform and three dimensions 
along which such reform can be understood. Alternative approaches to public transport 
reform are then explored from a theoretical perspective, illustrated by case reviews of public 
transport and paratransit reform in seven cities in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America. 
Drawing on the alternatives discussed in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 describes the contemporary 
approach to public transport reform in South Africa, the implementation of reform in Cape 
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Town, and the impacts on and reactions of paratransit operators in this city. The national 
discussion identifies key moments in the evolution of public transport reform since 1994, 
while the Cape Town discussion focuses on the engagement process between the local 
municipality and paratransit operators around their inclusion in the MyCiTi system.  
Chapters 4 and 5 form a partial response to the second research question by identifying needs 
and aspirations, and attitudes to reform, amongst a selection of paratransit operator 
respondents in Cape Town. Chapter 4 describes the process of conducting and documenting 
interviews with paratransit operators in Cape Town. In this chapter I discuss respondent 
selection, interview framing, the challenge of gaining access to respondents, the critical role 
of the intermediaries in facilitating access, and the course of conducting and capturing the 
interviews in practice. I also reflect on how my expectations of the outcomes of the interviews 
changed in the course of preparing for and conducting the interviews. Chapter 5 presents the 
results of the interviews with paratransit operators. It firstly presents the attitudes, aspirations 
and needs that respondents voiced during the interviews, structured thematically. The chapter 
then discusses my observations on the non-verbal outcomes of the interviews. These 
observations centre on the issues of trust and on the hierarchical structure of the paratransit 
industry.   
Chapter 6 completes the response to the second research question, and also offers the 
response to the third research question on ways in which the approach to reform could be 
adjusted to increase operators’ participation therein. This chapter is structured in three parts: 
public sector considerations, operators’ business aspirations and attitudes, and potential 
outcomes of the present approach to reform. Across these different aspects the chapter reflects 
on the alternative approaches to public transport reform from Chapter 2, reform 
implementation processes in South Africa and in Cape Town as discussed in Chapter 3, and 
the process and findings of interviews with operators in Cape Town as presented in Chapters 
4 and 5. It identifies specific areas of convergence or divergence between operators’ attitudes 
and the existing approach to reform, and against such constraints or opportunities suggests 
ways in which the reform approach could be adjusted.  
Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the research findings in relation to the aims of the 
research. It also reflects on the contribution of the research, and on the implications of such 
contribution on further research in the arena of public transport reform both in other cities in 
South Africa and in contexts beyond these cities. 
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2 PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORM: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
At its core this thesis was concerned with investigating paratransit operators’ participation in 
public transport reform in Cape Town, and, if warranted, to motivate for revising the reform 
approach. Appropriately targeted reforms would stand a better chance of addressing the 
shortcomings of paratransit services by attracting larger numbers of operators to participate. 
There is a large body of international literature dedicated to public transport reform that could 
assist in unravelling different reform approaches and their impacts on operators.  
In this chapter I review the literature from both theoretical and practical perspectives. In the 
first part of the chapter I discuss public transport reform as an over-arching concept, drawing 
out the different dimensions of reform. I subsequently identify different approaches through 
which paratransit or road-based public transport operations could be reformed. In the latter 
part I illustrate the different theoretical approaches to reform by reviewing cases of public 
transport and paratransit reform in seven cities in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America. 
The chapter closes by drawing lessons from the different approaches and cases that could 
apply in the context of Cape Town’s reform process and paratransit operators’ participation 
therein.  
This chapter serves two purposes. Its first purpose is to enable a characterisation of the 
approach to public transport reform in Cape Town, as discussed in Chapter 3. This underpins 
the response to the first research question around the approach that government took to 
incorporating paratransit in public transport reform. The second purpose of this chapter is to 
highlight alternatives that could be considered where it proves necessary or desirable to adjust 
the approach to reform in Cape Town to enable increased operator participation. I return to 
this discussion in Chapter 6. 
2.1 DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORM 
There is a wide range of regulatory regimes that govern competition within and between 
public transport modes and that guide contracting and funding arrangements between public 
authorities and public transport operators. Gwilliam (2002, 2008), Halcrow Fox (2000), 
Meakin (2004), Turnbull (1999) and Walters & Jansson (2008) describe the characteristics 
and effects of these regimes. Regimes vary in the extent to which they draw on public 
authorities’ institutional capacity and typically result in operators competing with one another 
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in one of two ways: operators compete either for the market (i.e. prior to licensing or 
contracting) or in the market (“on-the-road”). Regulatory regimes that rely on competition for 
the market typically require greater public authority involvement and include gross or net cost 
service contracting, management contracting, and franchising or concession arrangements, 
and typically rely on greater levels of public funding. Competition in the market is frequently 
found where there are low levels of public sector capacity or funds. Such on-the-road 
competition occurs where services operate in an open market, in instances where licences 
prescribe only requirements governing the quality of services, or where there are specific 
restrictions to fare levels or the total size of vehicle fleets.  
Drawing on Halcrow Fox, Bayliss (2002) captured regulatory regimes in plotting a public 
authority’s level of involvement in competition regulation against its level of managerial and 
funding involvement (see Figure 2-1).  
 
Figure 2-1: Public transport regulatory regimes and transitions 
Source: Bayliss, 2002 
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Public monopolies are located at the end of the scale requiring the most public authority 
involvement, while at the other end open market competition requires the least public 
authority involvement. In a given public transport market each mode may be governed by a 
single, discrete regulatory system, or may be subject to a hybrid arrangement, which can 
change over time. As a hypothetical example, in one city there may be one set of road-based 
public transport services (Bayliss’s “bus domain”) regulated through concessions and another 
set of road-based services regulated through quality licensing.  
In effect Bayliss sketches the playing field on which the public sector engages operators in 
order to deliver a service to passengers. Inherent in Bayliss’s illustration, and supported by 
Gwilliam (2008), particularly in the road-based public transport sector, is that the relationship 
is dynamic. A regime transition may take place by design, e.g. the introduction of minimum 
safety standard regulations or through the restructuring of the ownership of operations, or due 
to unplanned or undesirable circumstances, for example bankruptcy or institutional collapse. 
While Bayliss focuses on the public sector perspective and the extent to which it intervenes in 
the market, Meakin (2004:14) adds the perspective of the operator: that the “task of 
regulation” is also determined by the composition of the operator industry, the incentives 
driving them, and whether policy matches or clashes with their interests.  
The collective work of these authors suggests that there are different dimensions according to 
which public transport systems might be analysed, and the reform of such systems be 
approached (see Figure 2-2). Public transport reform in this sense would be a regime 
transition by design. A first dimension of such public transport reform is that of modes and 
services. This involves, amongst others, the infrastructure and vehicle type, whether the 
service is scheduled or not, and whether routes are fixed or not. This dimension is typically 
what a passenger experiences directly. A second dimension is that of competition regulation, 
and is the way in which the relationships between the public authority and the operator, and 
between operators, are mediated. This is the horizontal axis of Figure 2-1 above. Mediation 
may be by way of contract agreements, permissions (such as operating licences), in the open 
market subject only to general legislation, or even clandestine, i.e. without official sanction. 
The last dimension drawn from this literature is that of the operator business structure. This 
dimension plots whether the business is publicly or privately owned, the degree to which it is 
a formal enterprise, and the size of the business. Existing public transport operations, as well 
as the aims of a public transport reform programme, can be located in each of these three 
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dimensions. This would allow the extent to which an existing situation differs from a 
proposed future scenario envisaged in a reform programme to be assessed.  
 
Figure 2-2: Dimensions of public transport reform 
Figure 2-1 does not allow for informal modes to be plotted; that is, modes that are not 
publicly regulated and operate outside the law. It focuses on formal public transport, which is 
fully regulated and legally compliant. Understanding the degree to which a reform 
programme requires a shift along each of the dimensions from informal to formal would 
provide an indication of how complex the reform task might be. Figure 2-2 is an attempt to 
recognise such complexity.  
Lest there be an impression that informality is necessarily “bad”, Gwilliam (2002:xiv) 
cautions that, in the context of passenger transport reform in developing world cities, the 
potential contribution of the paratransit sector should be mobilised rather than villainised. 
This is particularly due to the key role that paratransit already plays in responding to 
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dispersed yet significant passenger demand in such cities. The reform trajectory thus need not 
necessarily be from one extreme of the informal-formal scale to the other. Indeed, as Cervero 
(2000) points out, there is a spectrum of policy positions on paratransit. These span from tacit 
acceptance of the paratransit status quo (in effect ignoring paratransit), official recognition of 
paratransit, paratransit regulation by imposing external control to market entry, and outright 
prohibition. In the next section I present different approaches to public transport reform where 
paratransit is a major player in the market, mindful that each approach may require a greater 
or lesser shift along one or more of the aforementioned dimensions and may reflect a different 
policy position on paratransit.   
2.2 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REFORM 
There is a range of mechanisms to reshape paratransit within public transport reform 
processes: as part of a multi-modal public transport renewal process; through the introduction 
of a new mode to replace or absorb paratransit; as a targeted programme specific to 
paratransit; or as any combination of these or other approaches. Regardless of the approach, a 
number of aspects ought to be considered when conceiving a paratransit reform strategy as 
these bear directly on the complexity of the task of reform. These aspects include the timing 
and interplay between the different components – be it financial, operational, infrastructural, 
or institutional – of the reform process, the roles assigned to the different role players in the 
process and how these roles might change, as well as the benefits and limitations of any 
approach. Regardless of the location, paratransit’s readiness and capacity to change would 
likely present a key limiting, or enabling, factor.  
This section presents an overview of potential approaches to paratransit reform. The aim is to 
highlight trade-offs within each of the discussed approaches in relation to the three 
dimensions of reform as presented above. The following approaches are explored: 
comprehensive BRT introduction and paratransit assimilation; a stepped paratransit transition 
and upgrading to more formal operations such as BRT or formal bus services; instituting a 
paratransit competition regulation regime through introducing franchises or concessions; and 
in situ paratransit service and regulatory improvements that materially change neither the 
ownership structures nor the competition regulation regimes. The presented approaches are 
not a comprehensive list of ideal models for reform, but rather a selection of diverse scenarios 
that should be part of the considerations of any agency embarking on a process to reform 
paratransit. The basis for selection was: the availability of published literature on the approach 
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to allow such trade-offs to be identified; evidence of reform implementation and its impact on 
paratransit operations in practice; and the involvement of paratransit-type services utilising 
minibuses or buses. The geographical focus was on approaches that had been tested or 
attempted in cities in Latin America, where much of the South African government’s recent 
policy interest has been focussed (see below and in Chapter 3), and in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where there are similar urbanisation patterns and public transport system structures compared 
to South Africa.  
BRT implementation and paratransit assimilation 
Comprehensive corporatisation of paratransit and its incorporation in BRT service provision 
lies at the core of the BRT concept as popularised in Latin America. Expansion of the Rede 
Integrada de Transporte (RIT, or Integrated Transport Network) in Curitiba in the 1970s saw 
the unveiling of what is now commonly referred to as the first BRT services (Institute for 
Transportation and Development Policy [ITDP] & Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit [GIZ], 2012). A refined “second wave” to include bus system innovations 
and paratransit was popularised in Bogota’s Transmilenio system. The Bogota approach – 
BRT paired with incumbent operator upgrading – has since found its way to many other cities 
across the globe, including in the PTS in South Africa. This diffusion of BRT technology has 
been well documented (see Deng & Nelson, 2011; Mejia-Dugand et al (2013); and  
Wood, 2014a; 2014b). 
This public transport reform approach typically aims to install comprehensive, citywide 
networks of high-quality bus services, which would replace and incorporate existing public 
transport services. In areas of high passenger demand (i.e. on “trunk”, or main, lines) 
dedicated road space and preferential treatment at intersections are commonly provided to 
increase bus travel speed. In low demand areas the services (so-called feeders and/or 
distributors) are less distinguishable from standard bus services, bar perhaps the unified 
vehicle and infrastructure branding matched to that of trunk services. Other system-wide 
features typically include cashless fare collection and central operational monitoring and 
management. 
Development agencies such as the ITDP and GIZ (formerly GTZ) have done much to support 
the spread of the Bogota-type BRT concept internationally. These efforts have included the 
production and dissemination of guideline publications (e.g. Wright, 2003; 2004; 2011; 
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Wright & Hook, 2007). Amongst other parties, GIZ and ITDP identified that there was little 
consensus on what actually constituted BRT, and specifically good-quality BRT. In 2012 they 
produced a best-practice guide and scorecard, The BRT Standard (ITDP & GIZ, 2012; with 
annual revisions since). While a useful contribution towards a universal definition of BRT, it 
is heavily infrastructure-focussed. Noticeably absent are criteria around paratransit or other 
existing operator incorporation, which may be misleading. Without flagging the social impact 
on operators as a critical element of system planning, and the potential that such operators 
may scupper BRT implementation, cities planning to adopt or in the throes of developing 
BRT services may on paper achieve a gold score which, when put into context, may turn out 
to be unachievable. 
Despite the conceptual debate around what constitutes BRT, in practice the BRT-led approach 
tends to conform to a particular logic. The total network plan is typically broken into project 
phases and corridors, which allows the complexity and cost of implementing the new 
services, and negotiations around the incorporation of existing services, to be spread 
geographically and over time (see Figure 2-3).  
 
 
Figure 2-3: BRT implementation and paratransit assimilation 
Much hinges on the first phase: it serves as a demonstration to convince the operators situated 
in other parts of the city that those from their ranks who were incorporated into the first phase 
are benefitting both financially and in terms of working conditions. It also demonstrates to 
funding authorities – be it national transport departments, central treasuries, or other agencies 
– that investment in further phases would be warranted. Indeed a key argument advanced in 
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favour of what Browning (2009) refers to as “big bang” infrastructure-led approaches to 
public transport reform, compared to the more in situ approaches discussed later in this 
chapter, is that demonstrable service quality improvement is needed in the first phase to 
persuade political decision-makers to vote for additional funding for further phases (Wright 
2009).  
Stepped paratransit transition and upgrading 
A different approach to paratransit reform is that of a stepped transition to an improved or 
high-quality bus system that uses existing paratransit operations as a basis. This approach has 
been articulated by Browning (2001; 2006). It draws on Browning's observations of the South 
African paratransit sector and his involvement as consultant in the early years of IPTN 
implementation in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropole. The approach proposes a step-by-step 
implementation, leading to an improved public transport system; but in contrast to the phased 
roll-out of a comprehensive BRT system, it follows an engagement process with a more 
flexible outcome that does not rely on the implementation of BRT concurrent to paratransit 
restructuring. This approach can nonetheless be employed to achieve a full BRT system, but 
instead of following an engagement trajectory with a fixed outcome (i.e. absorption into BRT 
operations), it provides paratransit operators with a way out of the engagement process at 
multiple points. Browning argues that if such a ‘back door’ is not there, paratransit operators 
would find it difficult to commit to large-scale change and would be unlikely to abandon their 
previous operating practices. 
The stepped implementation programme comprises sequential steps that would span a number 
of years (see Figure 2-4). The first step of the process is that the authorities would support 
paratransit associations to form commercial entities (e.g. cooperatives or companies) with 
professional management to operate their existing vehicles. The costs of these operations 
would be covered through an interim vehicle management contract. In this step, paratransit 
owners would relinquish only the management of their vehicles and drivers to the 
management company. The aim of this initial step is to achieve a more orderly form of 
operations. This would involve negotiations to fairly allocate routes, vehicles and drivers to 
address differences between more and less lucrative routes and times of day. Up to this point 
vehicles remain the property of the original owners. Since the form of vehicle ownership is 
untouched, if the collective management scheme should collapse then owners could revert to 
their prior paratransit mode of operations. However, if collective management were 
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successful, the second step would be to introduce a cashless fare collection system. This 
separates cash from vehicle operations. Browning suggests that fare-box revenue should be 
handled by a separate company and disbursed to each operator, though it is also an option for 
the vehicle management company to collect fares. Regardless of the way in which fares are 
collected the transition must be handled transparently as it requires operators to remain 
convinced that their income is not being taken away from them.  
 
 
Figure 2-4: Stepped paratransit transition and upgrading 
This approach allows for more flexibility than that of a comprehensive BRT system. It could 
nevertheless result in the same outcome, in the form of a full specification BRT system, 
though this outcome would only be realised over a much longer timeframe. However, in a 
similar manner to the BRT-based approach, a stepped transition does not offer a guarantee of 
a successful reform programme. The assumptions that paratransit operators would necessarily 
be willing players throughout the reform process, and that the public implementing agency 
would have the requisite capacity to successfully complete all the steps of the upgrade 
process, may not reflect reality. Nevertheless, subdividing the transition into a sequence of 
more contained outcomes, and the fact that paratransit operators can opt out without having to 
surrender their businesses and vehicles simultaneously, reduce the risk of extensive 
investments in infrastructural or institutional reforms going to waste. It remains critical, 
though, that a positive relationship between government and paratransit is established, and 
that there is a long-term commitment to reform with the public authority as driving force. The 
possibility also exists that there could be a smaller scale of participation in collective 
management than would be required to achieve the economies of scale necessary to justify the 
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cost of change, and in turn, a reduced scope of improvements to the services offered to 
passengers.  
Paratransit competition regulation through contractual agreements  
Two of the most problematic characteristics of paratransit operations have been the target 
system, in which drivers compete for passengers on the road in order to secure their income, 
and the limited capacity that public authorities have to plan, introduce or enforce competition 
regulation systems at the individual route level. A third approach to paratransit reform entails 
public authorities regulating competition on an area-based level, rather than at route level. 
Where there is are existing or planned trunk transport services, this approach may also lend 
itself to the provision of feeder services to such trunk lines, but with a separate administration 
system. It is indeed not uncommon for paratransit to perform such a feeder function. 
Mechanisms of control that may achieve these aims include introducing franchises, 
concessions or even area-based net and gross cost agreements between the public authorities 
and paratransit associations. Barter (2008), Gwilliam (2002), Halcrow Fox (2000) and Meakin 
(2004) discuss the attributes of such contractual mechanisms of control in relation to public 
transport operations. Though Gwilliam, Halcrow Fox and Meakin point out that these 
mechanisms fall outside the “paratransit domain” (see Figure 2-1), there is value in discussing 
their application as potential alternative outcomes of paratransit reform.    
This body of literature agrees that there are two types of franchising: the provision of services 
on specific routes, or franchises covering an area-based “package” (Meakin 2004:27) of 
routes. The type would depend on the size of the geographical area, though Barter warns that 
franchising is a cumbersome mechanism to regulate individual routes and might stifle 
network development (2008:106). In the instance of route packages, individual route 
development is largely left to operators to maximise both operational needs and the efficiency 
of passenger service, while the role of the public authority is to institute and monitor 
particular over-arching service requirements. There need not necessarily be a transfer of funds 
between the public authority and the operator – the latter could feasibly take the risk of both 
service development and fare collection (Halcrow Fox, 2000). The role of the authority is 
largely detached: the public agency’s involvement would be limited to specifying the desired 
fare levels and service requirements, and then monitoring the degree to which the franchisee’s 
performance matches these requirements. Franchise agreements can allow for unremunerated 
services, i.e. those that provide for particular categories of passengers such as pensioners or 
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scholars to travel free of charge or at reduced rates, to be included in the service package 
without impinging on the income of the operator. (In the case of typical paratransit services I 
would suggest that unremunerated services would be difficult to implement as there is usually 
no pre-existing mechanism to provide for payments between the authority and paratransit 
operators, and as a result the latter cannot afford to, or are unwilling to, provide special fares.) 
A franchising agreement ultimately takes detailed control of service provision out of the 
hands of the public authority. It could also provide the conditions for the franchise-holder to 
provide fare and service integration on the routes within the franchise area. 
The term concession is used imprecisely in the literature, where it is at times equated to 
franchising or contracting. I follow the distinctions that Gwilliam (2002) and Halcrow Fox 
(2000) draw between franchises and concessions. In the case of a concession agreement, the 
operator is given the exclusive right to provide a service or set of services within a particular 
area, while different franchises may cover the same area. There is thus no competition on the 
road in a concession situation. Rather, the opportunity for competition arises only when 
operators can bid to be awarded an available concession. Under a concession agreement the 
operator takes complete financial responsibility for providing the concessioned services 
within the limits defined by the authority, with only a basic standard of service being imposed 
by the authority. These standards may include vehicle safety and livery standards and 
emission controls. In a franchise, the authority specifies the public transport service that is to 
be provided to a greater level of detail than in a concession, but must be prepared to cover the 
cost of such services. A concession arrangement removes the need for the public authority to 
intervene in technical, organisational and financial matters, though at the same time this limits 
its power to intervene in the service that is provided. The greater the influence that the public 
authority wants in terms of fares and the level of service that is to be provided – which is 
common in public transport reform programmes – the less effective a concession becomes 
and the more viable franchising becomes. 
As with franchising and concessions, net and gross cost contract agreements would contain 
specifications of the desired service and of the roles of the authority and of the operator. 
Service specifications and roles can be negotiated between the parties. Under a net cost 
contract the operator would bear the risk for collecting sufficient fares to cover operational 
cost, while in a gross cost contract the authority would bear this risk and collect fares with 
some specification of the operator’s cost targets. Due to these characteristics described by 
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Gwilliam (2002), Halcrow Fox (2000) and Meakin (2004), net and gross cost contracts would 
require more active authority participation in terms of detailed service planning and 
contractual monitoring than franchises and concessions. In view of public authority capacity 
limitations I thus focus on the prospects of franchises and concessions.  
Perhaps the most significant reason why franchises and concessions should be considerations 
in a reform programme is because they can match the existing territorial nature and internal 
structures of paratransit operations in South Africa. Paratransit operations in practice resemble 
de facto concession arrangements: public authorities take little or no direct responsibility for 
financial risk or specifying operations, and paratransit services are left to serve passenger 
demand and expand along with the city’s physical boundaries. The associations to which 
individual operators belong serve a mediating and coordinating role amongst their members’ 
businesses and routes, and in some cases also provide a degree of service quality monitoring. 
These collective organisations thus already perform roles at the operational, planning and 
regulatory levels; for example dispatching vehicles, maintaining ranking facilities, resolving 
conflicts, and developing routes (see, for instance, Cervero, 2000; Golub, 2005; Sohail, 
Maunder & Cavill, 2006).  
Associations and operators also have a detailed understanding of the operational requirements 
and passenger demand in the areas in which they are active. These roles might be informal, 
i.e. without official recognition, but they nonetheless fit within what might be required of a 
franchise- or concession-holder. With some degree of recognition and support from the public 
sector, and where there are little overlapping interests between operator organisations, these 
roles could be formalised under a contractual agreement. This would match typically limited 
public sector capacity to develop the public transport market, but also provide a formal 
arrangement that recognises the critical, and self-motivated, role that paratransit services play 
in the urban setting. This in turn could form the basis of a constructive working relationship 
between often-oppositional government and paratransit interests.  
The prospects of franchising agreements are perhaps more promising. The key appeal of 
franchising in the context of public transport reform in South Africa is that it is not wholesale 
change of the mode of operations; it matches the area-focussed structure of paratransit 
associations, yet it still allows for overlapping geographic responsibilities (see Figure 2-5). 
Overlap would, for instance, occur where different associations’ routes meet in a central 
commercial district. While defining basic service standards, franchising also opens the 
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possibility for formal channels of financial flows between authorities and operators to be 
established. These channels allow for targeted subsidies to be introduced into the paratransit 
system. For passengers such a subsidy could, for instance, make it possible for discounted 
fares to be offered to scholars or other particular categories of travellers. The financial 
stability and incentive value that an operational subsidy offers could also be used to convince 
owners to move away from the existing target payment system and towards paying drivers a 
regular salary. The administration of such subsidies would impose costs on the public sector 
and would have to be written into and monitored as part of the franchise agreement, but could 
allow for some of the fundamental problems with the present format of paratransit services to 




Figure 2-5: Paratransit competition regulation through franchising 
Franchises would require paratransit operator groupings to have the legal standing to enter 
into contractual agreements, but this could then be the focus of the reform programme rather 
than, for instance, infrastructural changes and the accompanying costs thereof. The need for 
monitoring of service standards would be critical to ensure that public funds are used 
effectively, which has implications for capacity in the responsible public sector authority. But 
this again could be a component of the reform programme and is, moreover, likely to be less 
onerous to administer than individual route licensing schemes or contracts. As with 
concessions, the political appeal of a franchise-based reform programme should be carefully 
considered as it focuses on behind-the-scenes changes that are not as visible as the 
introduction of a new mode of public transport. However, at the practical level both 
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franchising and concession systems limit the need to grow public sector capacity to the same 
extent as, for instance, the comprehensive BRT-based reform approach, and offer a 
potentially less intimidating option around which to engage paratransit operators in 
comparison with a comprehensive modal and ownership structure overhaul.  
In situ paratransit service and regulatory improvements 
A last approach to paratransit reform that I present is that of upgrading of existing operators. 
The starting point of this position is that paratransit operations are overly criticised, are more 
efficient and safe than generally suggested, and are minimally reliant on direct public funding. 
As such, paratransit should be supported and upgraded, rather than being replaced by new 
modes of public transport. Proponents of this position, such as Lomme (2008) in his analysis 
of paratransit regulation in South Africa, argue that market entry should preferably be 
deregulated to allow free competition between multiple operators, mediated by the ‘invisible 
hand of the market’. Such deregulation leads, amongst other benefits, to lower fares, reduced 
overall public expenditure, improved services, greater innovation, and a greater demand-
responsiveness.  
Cervero (2000), however, clearly acknowledges that paratransit services are not without 
problems. Aggressive on-the-road competition for passengers, dangerous driving behaviour, 
inefficient use of road space (particularly on longer distance routes), focussing mostly on 
lucrative routes (“cream-skimming”) and poor vehicle maintenance are all common features 
of paratransit operations. Cervero argues that such traits do not mean that authorities should 
regulate paratransit out of existence, but rather promote safety and fair competition, leaving 
matters of supply, service, and price to the market. Route associations have often come to fill 
the market entry regulation void, and thus serve a de facto regulatory function (as argued 
above). Despite the regulatory relief that this provides public authorities, there is still a role 
for governments to play in the setting and enforcing of requirements relating to operations, 
safety, vehicles and labour. From a public sector perspective, compliance with these 
requirements should be the only legal limitation to market entry (see Figure 2-6 for examples 
of policy aims, and the interventions that could lead to such aims being realised).  
In line with arguments in favour of market entry deregulation and limiting public intervention 
to improving service quality and safety, this position argues that service diversity and 
competition with fixed-route scheduled public transport systems is desirable. Cervero (2000)
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Figure 2-6: In situ paratransit service and regulatory improvements 
argues that urban passenger transport markets benefit from an array of service and price 
options, rather than an economy of scale. The inherent flexibility and profit motivations of 
competing and diverse paratransit services make them market-responsive and more likely 
than public authorities to develop new services in response to changes in demand patterns 
(e.g. increased suburb-to-suburb movements, off-peak travel, or peripheral informal 
settlement growth). He suggests that where paratransit competes directly with scheduled bus 
or train services, the policy objective should be simply to ensure that they do so fairly.  
Reform in context 
Each approach discussed above has a different focus, and similarly places different demands 
on institutional capacities, on available funding and on paratransit operators. I here refer back 
to the service, business and competition dimensions of reform mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, as well as to Cervero’s spectrum of policy positions on paratransit; that is acceptance, 
recognition, regulation, and prohibition. Comprehensive BRT and paratransit integration is 
included in the discussion because of its dominance in the discourse in South Africa and 
elsewhere, and where conditions allow it does provide significant improvements to the 
passenger experience. However, it is a complex approach as it requires concurrent changes 
along all three dimensions of public transport reform: the mode of service delivery, the 
competition regulatory system, and paratransit ownership structures. A common policy 
position is implicitly or explicitly to prohibit paratransit services where BRT will be 
introduced. One reason for prohibition is that paratransit operators are expected to transition 
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to becoming the operators of BRT services. Another reason for such a move is to ensure the 
viability of BRT services by reducing competition within the public transport sphere (Wright 
& Hook, 2007).  
A stepped approach to paratransit upgrading offers more flexibility than comprehensive BRT 
implementation, but may lead to a similarly high-quality bus system in the long run. It is 
nonetheless also an institutionally- and resource-intensive approach, and requires long-term 
political commitment for the full upgrading of paratransit to formal services. Similar to the 
BRT approach it requires changes in all dimensions of reform, though such changes would be 
in situ as opposed to concurrent. Ownership structures will be affected first and then 
increasingly formalised. Competition regulation will likewise change on a gradual and 
ongoing basis. Changes to services will, however, only be instituted later in the process. In 
effect the policy position on paratransit will start out being one of recognition, progressing 
through increasing regulation and, if full service formalisation is the aim as with the BRT 
approach, could ultimately lead to prohibition.  
In contrast to the BRT and incremental improvement approaches, neither the 
franchise/concession approach nor the in situ improvement approach aims to replace 
paratransit services or institute a new mode of public transport. As such they may more 
closely match limitations within the public sector to manage reform and amongst paratransit 
operators to accept or internalise change. The in situ improvement approach does not involve 
ownership restructuring. It only implies a modest change to competition regulation in that 
there would be some basic standards that an operator would have to meet in order to receive 
an operating permission. The main reform would involve changes to the service that a 
passenger receives – e.g. a more comfortable and safer trip due to better vehicles and 
increased law enforcement – though such changes would also be relatively modest. The 
policy position would at base be one of recognition, with a small shift in the direction of 
regulation. There would furthermore be little incentive to change service coverage or 
frequency, and there is no mechanism for the public sector to intervene effectively in fare 
levels.  
Franchising does offer a mechanism for public financial intervention and, though it is a form 
of formalisation, reflects much more closely the presence of, and role played by, paratransit 
operator associations. This approach has its limitations, especially in terms of monitoring the 
delivery of the services to which operators are contractually bound. Concessions are similar to 
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franchising in being a potential match for the structure of paratransit groupings, and also 
require a lesser level of involvement from the public authority in managing the day-to-day 
transport operations, though again likely not as low as that of the in situ improvement 
approach. Franchising and concessions present changes to all three dimensions of reform, 
though not as incisive as that of the BRT or stepped transition approaches. Passengers may 
benefit from increased frequency and quality of services, particularly if public financial 
support can be injected into operations. Competition regulation would arguably see the most 
in-depth change, moving from a free market or individual operating permissions to collective 
contractual obligations. These would most likely necessitate paratransit ownership structures 
undergoing some form of restructuring to ensure that they are able to enter into collective 
agreements, which would involve formalisation of intra-operator as well as operator-
association relationships. Within the policy spectrum this approach sits between the 
aforementioned approaches, firmly in the realm of recognition.  
None of these approaches are likely to remedy all of the problems common to paratransit 
services in their existing format. It may well be that a mixture of elements of each approach, 
matched to an in-depth understanding of local context and of the local practice of power, 
would offer the best chance of succeeding at improving or reforming paratransit services. 
However, this does not mean that nothing can be learnt from looking at international cases of 
public transport and paratransit reform in practice, particularly when assessed according to 
different reform dimensions. 
2.3 PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORM CASES IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
The approaches to, and dimensions of, public transport reform provide ways for 
understanding the complexity of reform processes. With these frameworks as background, the 
study of the implementation and effects of public transport reform in different contexts is 
instructive in understanding the process by which policy becomes practice, and by which the 
practice of power becomes evident. In this section I review a selection of seven cases in Latin 
American and Sub-Saharan African cities where there were attempts at public transport 
reform and where paratransit was involved implicitly or explicitly. These reforms aimed 
broadly to achieve two goals, both of which affected existing paratransit operations. The first 
goal typically was to introduce a new public transport service that incorporated, competed 
with or displaced paratransit, while the second was to improve existing paratransit services 
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either comprehensively or through addressing selective aspects of their operations. These two 
goals were not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some reform agendas coordinated efforts to 
achieve both, while in other instances concurrent but separate projects targeted these goals. 
The outcomes of the reforms in practice reflect the complexity of the ‘task of reform', the 
dimensions of public transport systems that the reforms sought to change, and the parties and 
individuals involved in the process.  
The cases are clustered according to the approach, or approaches, to public transport reform 
taken in that city. Bogota boasts arguably the best-known case of BRT implementation and 
paratransit assimilation; this case is still central in the BRT discourse, but I also include it as it 
was formative in policy-making in South Africa. Dar es Salaam followed a similar path to that 
of Bogota, though the project is as yet still largely incomplete. The factors that led to its 
delayed progress are instructive, as is the difference between its approach to paratransit 
assimilation and that taken in Bogota.  
Lagos lays claim to having the first operational BRT system in Sub-Saharan Africa, but as its 
‘BRT Lite’ name suggests, it is not a high-specification BRT system. This alternative 
application of BRT, as well as its reliance on former paratransit operators to run most of the 
system, warrants its inclusion. As in Lagos, the Santiago case deviates from the mainstream 
BRT approach, and its incumbent operators were small bus operators, though with a strong 
resemblance to paratransit businesses. Dedicated lanes – key to trunk BRT operations – were 
absent initially, and new operations were packaged as trunk-and-feeder concessions, but the 
main distinguishing feature in Santiago is that the changeover from the old to the new 
services took place overnight across the entire city.  
In the last decade and a half Mexico City has seen both an incremental paratransit 
improvement scheme unfolding and the first corridors of a BRT system reliant on existing bus 
and paratransit operations, with limited coordination between the two programmes. In all 
these aspects Mexico City has remarkable similarities to Cape Town, though closer inspection 
reveals an important difference in incumbent paratransit sector structure. Accra and Dakar, 
the last two cases that I present in this section, demonstrate elements of all of the approaches 
that I discussed above (bar the explicit mention of franchises or concessions in the case of 
Accra). In the case of Accra BRT services are but one of the desired outcomes of a multi-
faceted stepped reform process, with institutional change being one of the core aims. In Dakar 
BRT is a far more distant prospect; rather, it offers a concrete example of both a stepped 
transition process and of application of concessions amongst paratransit operators.  
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Bogota 
Bogotá is often acclaimed as the first city to demonstrate that public transport systems in 
developing world cities can, through reassigning road space and reorganising existing 
operations into BRT trunk and feeder services, be revived within a relatively short timeframe 
and with a lower cost than traditional heavy rail-based technologies. Ardila-Gomez (2004) 
provides a detailed account in his doctoral thesis on the planning processes leading to the 
“speedy bus” (Ardila-Gomez, 2004:293), and eventually BRT, systems in the cities of 
Curitiba (in the period 1955-1995) and Bogota (from 1986 to 2001). He makes a number of 
important contributions to the public transport reform literature. Amongst others, his analysis 
is foremost concerned with power relations – the role of planners in mediating between 
political leaders and vested interests takes centre stage. He also illustrates that Bogota’s 
reform process was inspired by that in Curitiba, and, importantly, that there was one key 
figure who had a direct hand in transferring the reform concept, shaping it into a more locally 
acceptable package, and driving the implementation process: the city’s mayor at the time, 
Enrique Penãlosa.  
In practice the Transmilénio BRT system nevertheless encountered, and is still plagued by, 
significant difficulties, including overcrowding, delays, pick pocketing, and political 
interference. In addition, Transmilénio seems not to have realised its initial aims of alleviating 
the plight of the poor, as core routes have been concentrated primarily in higher income areas 
(Gilbert, 2008; “¿Por qué colapsó Transmilénio?”, 2014). Critically, the continued presence 
of paratransit operations overshadowing Transmilénio, in terms of fleet size and number of 
routes, and the lack of integration between the two systems, must temper expectations around 
what it has achieved (Muñoz and Gschwender, 2008; Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota, 2011). 
While the two-year timeframe (Jan 1999 to Dec 2000) for the planning and construction for 
the first part of the first phase of the system is an attractive prospect for such a major 
intervention from a political point of view, the intensive processes of negotiations with the 
public and with operators that preceded Transmilénio implementation is not often publicised. 
Ardila-Gomez (2004) documented that there were more than 300 meetings with the public on 
the Transmilénio project alone; that the preliminary planning was in progress early in 1998, 
but that the complete first phase was only finished four years after that; and that negotiations 
and consultation with “bus” companies to implement busways had already been underway as 
early as 1990.  
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Before Transmilénio, paratransit operations provided public transport in the city. Rather than 
associations, the operating licences were held by 64 of these bus companies, who rented out 
rights to operate on routes to individual vehicle owners. These companies were the de facto 
regulators in their role as brokering agents for public transport services in the city. Once one 
company convinced some of the others to collectively bid for a Transmilénio concession, the 
others were soon to follow. In the end all except four of the bus companies merged into four 
bidding groups for the first phase Transmilénio operating contracts. After the first phase 
became operational, the promise of greater profits in the first phase have been realised, but 
Gilbert (2008) points out that the new bus companies, as with their paratransit predecessors, 
once again exhibit cartel-like practices. The new companies also exert political pressure to 
guard against change and prevent the total eradication of paratransit operations, whether legal 
or illegal, in which they still have a stake. 
Dar es Salaam 
The city council of the financial capital of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, commenced in 2003 with 
planning a BRT system. The World Bank committed funding for the first phase of the Dar es 
Salaam Rapid Transit (DART) project and the Institute of Transport Development Policy 
(ITDP) supported project planning. The first project phase was planned to comprise one trunk 
route with stations and to replace an estimated 48 paratransit routes and 1 500 vehicles, while 
the overall system was proposed to span multiple trunk and feeder routes totalling 130km of 
dedicated busways. Besides increasing the quality of the public transport offering, the project 
also planned gradually to replace paratransit services, which are seen as one of the main 
contributors to congestion on the city’s limited road capacity. Paratransit in the city is 
dominated by small buses with a capacity of 40 seated passengers, though prior to the 
introduction of a ban on buses with a seating capacity of less than 25 persons in the city centre 
the fleet was dominated by 17-seater minibuses (DART, 2014; Mfinanga, 2008). The DART 
project initially encouraged paratransit operators to form consortiums to bid for service 
contracts, with the proviso that international bidders must partner with local consortiums.  
Roll-out of the DART project has been slow – construction of the first phase only commenced 
in 2010 after a World Bank loan to fund construction was approved in 2008. Rizzo (2014) 
suggests a lack of political will on the part of the Tanzanian government as a contributing 
factor to the project’s difficulty in gaining traction. Also, the first publicly available project 
documentation that allowed insight into how paratransit operators would be affected and BRT 
 49  
operations be structured – the Phase 1 Project information memorandum (DART 2014) – was 
only released in 2014 after the appointment of Dutch consultants. As per that report, 
projections are that a 15km portion of first phase trunk route should have been ready to 
become operational by end-2014, while operations on the complete trunk route are planned to 
start running in 2015. Should this timeline materialise it will have taken 12 years from the 
initial project planning to the first services opening.  
The current proposal is that paratransit operating licences aligning with DART routes will be 
cancelled or issued for a non-renewable 12-month period, and that these operators will be 
given alternative routes. The official view is that the rapidly expanding suburbs will offer 
sufficient opportunity for most of these operators to continue to ply their trade. The 
expectation is that the remainder of affected operators will accept withdrawing entirely from 
the public transport sector: unlike many other parts of the world paratransit operators in Dar 
es Salaam are weakly organised (DART, 2014:38). With support from DART and the 
government transport authority operators are being strongly encouraged to form route 
associations, during which process they will be encouraged to build ties with local or 
international groupings that might bid for operating DART. Once the tendering process for 
operations opens it will encourage bids that include parties with local operating knowledge, 
but it has been made clear to paratransit operators that they will not be treated preferentially. 
Paratransit could thus foreseeably be side-lined completely by the reform project, or be 
included if they take collective action. Given the project history it is more likely that 
paratransit operators will be excluded.  
Moreover, despite expectations the impact of DART on present paratransit users may not 
necessarily be positive. Key features of existing paratransit operations, as the DART 
memorandum itself recognises, are that paratransit passengers typically do not have to 
transfer and that normal paratransit fares are extremely low. Paratransit fares in Dar es Salaam 
are rather uniquely set by the government, which includes a directive that scholars must travel 
for half of the standard (and already low) fare. In comparing the map of paratransit routes 
with that of the trunk and feeder BRT system in the memorandum, it seems likely that there 
will be an increased need for transfer, which inconveniences passengers. (The Santiago case 
that I described previously offered an extreme example of the impact that such a change can 
have on, and the backlash from, passengers). Also, while the 50% student discount will still 
apply, the indicated single trip fare on DART is 20% higher that the current paratransit base 
 50  
fare (TZS500 vs TZS400). Evidently passengers will have to pay for the increased standard of 
service. As the memorandum does not comment on how DART operating costs will be 
structured it is unclear if a public sector subsidy might alleviate the potential impact on 
passengers’ pockets. Taking into consideration the fact that the government borrowed from 
the World Bank to fund the capital outlay for DART, it is unlikely that operating subsidies 
will materialise.  
Lagos 
Lagos, the largest city in Sub-Saharan Africa and economically dominant in Nigeria, launched 
an enhanced bus system in 2008 under the auspices of the then newly established Lagos 
Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA). Mobereola (2009) traces the 
circumstances and process of the system’s introduction. The “BRT Lite” service, as it is 
called, can lay claim to being the first BRT-type enhanced bus service in Sub-Saharan Africa 
– much like Curitiba’s system is to Latin America. The system omitted level boarding, 
continuous exclusive rights-of-way, and enclosed stations, amongst other features commonly 
found in full-specification, or “gold standard” BRT systems; hence its name.  
As Mobereola notes, prior to its launch there was no mass transit system in the city, and 
familiar transport challenges such as limited road space, a large fleet of private vehicles, and 
high levels of traffic congestion were ubiquitous. Public transport service was dominated by 
fragmented paratransit operations. These included a fleet of around 75 000 minibuses 
(immense by any standard) as well as smaller fleets of midi-buses and shared taxis. The mini- 
and midi-bus services reflected many common paratransit ailments. Route development was 
driven by where the greatest profit could be derived, drivers competed aggressively on the 
road, and vehicles were in a poor state of repair, offering a low quality ride for passengers at 
volatile fares. Also not unusual was that a paratransit collective body, the National Union of 
Road Transport Workers (NURTW), held sway as the dominant regulator of urban public 
transport. The Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (RTEAN) was also a 
powerful player, though its constituency was drawn from the owners of large bus and inter-
urban operations.  
Following national and state elections in 1999, the Lagos Urban Transport Project was 
initiated with assistance from the World Bank. It led to the establishment of LAMATA, which 
assumed jurisdictional responsibility for major roads, public transport planning and 
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coordination, and subsequently initiated the BRT Lite project. The task of LAMATA was to 
intervene again in NURTW’s sphere of influence against the background of previous failed 
engagement with NURTW and RTEAN around formalising public transport. Fortuitously for 
LAMATA, the latter had already recognised the need to upgrade vehicles and satisfy unmet 
demand. LAMATA prepared regulations that would exclude all operations bar those of BRT 
Lite from the dedicated infrastructure that was to be built, and NURTW was drawn in to 
advise on suitable buses and ultimately to purchase the majority of the initial bus fleet (100 of 
125 buses). NURTW became the main operator in the system, with its members retraining to 
drive the new buses, while Lagbus, a Lagos State-regulated franchised bus system launched in 
2007 (Lagbus, 2014), became a minority operator running express services. The system 
proved so popular that the bus fleet was soon doubled with vehicles leased from Lagbus.  
In effect, the BRT Lite project provided the financial incentive for NURTW to entertain the 
change that LAMATA was proposing. No existing paratransit services had to be withdrawn; 
rather, they were only excluded from using the BRT Lite lanes. As such, BRT Lite provided 
NURTW with a new income stream. This resolved much of the political challenge that the 
project faced. Moreover, passenger demand on the corridor was such that a new service was 
warranted – forecasts at the time suggested that at least 300 buses would be needed. From a 
project planning point of view, a benefit of the basic specification of the bus system was that 
it led to a rapid implementation period of the pilot corridor. Due to the design of the 
infrastructure there have been operational problems – notably right-of-way conflicts and slow 
operating speeds – though it still offers travel-time savings. The basic level of specifications 
significantly reduced implementation costs, but there is a concomitant lower standard of 
service to passengers. 
Santiago 
As documented by Muñoz & Gschwender (2008), successive measures in the 20th century to 
formalise existing road-based public transport in Santiago, including the rationalisation of bus 
numbers and the introduction of a 10-year limit on the age of vehicles, failed to wrest control 
of bus routes from the industry’s owner cooperatives and led to demonstrations and blockades 
by the sector. However, high operating costs brought on by an oversupply of services and 
long, direct routes spurred public intervention in the form of the new Transantiago bus 
system. Transantiago intended to link into the rail system, with a modal shift from private to 
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public modes encouraged through specific travel limitations on private vehicles where 
necessary.  
The preliminary design of Transantiago envisaged a road-based trunk and feeder network 
with the Metro underground rail system as the backbone. It was anticipated that the total 
vehicle fleet would comprise 4,600 buses, a reduction of nearly 43% compared to the existing 
bus fleet. The fleet of primarily new buses was intended to replace all old buses across the 
city on a single day, with routes being bundled into trunk and feeder ‘packages’. For the 
feeder network the city was divided into 10 areas, with a new company to be formed that 
would operate services to the trunk and Metro lines in each of these areas. Trunk lines were to 
be on major corridors, grouped into five operational units each, also to be run by a new 
company and aligned with two of the feeder areas. Segregated bus corridors were initially 
planned, but in a widely criticised move the government postponed this step in favour of 
extending the Metro in the course of 2004-2006 and constructing four new urban highways in 
the same period. However, even without the segregated corridors, the plan was still ambitious: 
the entire new system was to become operational on a single day (as opposed to the more 
common phased approach).  
Despite the abrupt changeover in the service model, the business model for Transantiago 
relied on a mixture of new (foreign or local) and incumbent operators, allowing for the 
gradual replacement of the fleet, augmented by rented buses in the interim period. This model 
was also necessitated by the significant and concentrated demand for new buses, which could 
not be accommodated by the bus manufacturing capacity across the South American 
continent. It was the common expectation at the time that the trunk route concessions were 
being aimed at foreign operators, with feeder services falling to existing local operators. It is 
notable that the public were against the inclusion of operators from the small bus owner 
cooperatives, but no legal grounds could be found for excluding these operators. Successful 
operators were guaranteed a minimum income and a concession period of at least two years, 
with various determinations to stabilise fare levels and revenue. One of these determinations 
was an agreement to introduce measures to limit car use to increase ridership, which was 
curious in view of the new freeways that were being constructed during the implementation 
period.  
The changeover from direct routes to interchanging trunk and feeder routes occurred on  
10 February 2007, coinciding with a drop in public transport ridership demand during the 
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peak holiday season. This placed great demands on both local operators and public 
authorities. There was a lack of user information and smart card recharge points, and 
widespread confusion about the new route structure ensued. The absence of dedicated lanes 
also undermined the reliability of the system and reduced the potential for travel time 
improvements. It is notable that it is primarily negative sentiment from the travelling public, 
rather than from the operators, that shaped the poor image of this phase of the Transantiago 
project. The Metro system suffered in turn, due to overloading, a drop in operating speeds 
(passengers had difficulty in boarding and alighting), and consequent travel time increases. 
From the operators’ perspective, a positive outcome was that almost all objectives for 
improving drivers’ working conditions were achieved.  
From the public sector perspective, the reform proved that citywide cartels – the bus 
collectives – could be broken up through concerted effort. However, these changes came at a 
cost: even though operators were guaranteed their income level, Transantiago was initially 
running at a deficit of 35% due to low fares, a long free transfer period, the insufficient 
number of recharge points, and fare evasion amongst disgruntled passengers (Muñoz & 
Gschwender, 2008). The biggest problem, though, remains the so-called “big bang” approach 
of the planning authorities. The cost and risk of a single, system-wide transition requires 
large-scale institutional, technical and operator capacity and commitment. Widespread public 
disapproval had significant political implications, even at the national level, and the case of 
Santiago suggests that a more balanced, phased approach to reform is more desirable from a 
multitude of perspectives.  
Mexico City 
In Mexico City two public transport reform programmes have been underway since the 2000s. 
The first is a paratransit fleet renewal scheme initiated around 2000 and still in operation. 
Operators of the estimated fleet of 22 850 mostly obsolete minibuses (peseros) in the city 
could scrap their licensed, pre-1995 vehicle and receive a MXN100 000 (±USD7 500) 
allowance to purchase a government-approved larger bus (Flores & Zegras, 2012; Secretaria 
de Transportes y Vialidad [Setravi], 2014). Mexico City is well-known for its air pollution 
problems, and a key motivation behind the renewal scheme was to reduce paratransit’s 
contribution to these emissions. Other motivations included improving the service to and 
safety of passengers, and increasing operators’ regulatory adherence (Setravi, 2014). The 
scheme has been slow to get off the ground – by May 2013 only 4 000 vehicles had been 
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replaced (“Requieren continuar con …”, 2013). The reason behind the slow progress appears 
to relate both to the public sector’s difficulty in securing funding assistance for bus purchases, 
and to operator resistance to change.  
As reported by Lara (2014), in 2000, Setravi, the city’s transport and roads authority, 
approached the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American 
Development Bank to provide loans through which operators could finance the balance of the 
purchase price of a new bus. These agencies thought the risk of non-payment too great, as did 
three vehicle manufacturers subsequently approached by Setravi in 2002. As an alternative to 
outside funding, in 2001 the authority drew on public sources to create a dedicated fund to 
provide credit to operators. In 2012, the national development bank, NAFINSA, and the local 
government joined forces to draw up and fund a revitalisation project comprising four initial 
corridors on which only new buses would be allowed to operate (Lara, 2014). Setravi in 2013 
renewed its commitment to the scrapping programme, undertaking to scrap and replace at 
least 20 000 of the old paratransit minibuses in the 2013-2018 period, and link this scrapping 
with the corridor development plan that will eventually span 30 corridors in the city 
(“Programa Integral de …”, 2013).  
The second programme is that which led to the first corridor of Metrobús, Mexico City’s BRT 
system, being unveiled in 2005, and subsequently expanded to include two more corridors by 
2011. Flores & Zegras (2012) provide a detailed account and analysis of the process leading 
up to these corridors being established. Metrobús was inspired by Transmilénio in Bogotá, but 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, Mexico City’s mayor during the initial planning stages, was 
sceptical of its political feasibility. As it ostensibly required little public funding he 
nonetheless agreed to it being investigated. The proposal that was subsequently accepted was 
that incumbent paratransit operators would, in exchange for surrendering their operating 
permissions and the proceeds from the scrapping their old vehicles under the aforementioned 
programme, become the shareholders in a new company and be awarded the BRT operating 
contract. The scrapping proceeds would become the deposit for the new vehicles. The public 
bus company, RTP, also operated on the corridor, and would become a minor, if separate, 
operator in the scheme. The corridor was dominated by one route organisation (Ruta 2) that, 
though initially interested in participating, was not confident in the BRT scheme’s prospects 
for success. A dissident group within Ruta 2 subsequently engaged directly with government, 
overthrew the established leadership and, led by one well-educated paratransit operator 
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(formerly a government employee), mobilised support for BRT. This proved a decisive 
moment.  
Once the BRT service started running it was, however, very quickly apparent that the system 
would require operating subsidy even though this corridor had high passenger demand  
(250 900 daily passengers [Flores & Zegras, 2012:10]). Operational difficulties and scrapped 
vehicles supposedly reappearing on the roads added to not meeting financial expectations. In 
the later corridors, due to the larger number of operators and route organisations involved, 
negotiations became more complex as not all operators could be accommodated inside the 
project and profits were far more strained. As a result even more operating subsidy was 
required, which was partly covered by having the public bus company component of BRT 
operations run at a greater and greater deficit. In the third corridor the government had to 
force paratransit operators to partner with a private bus company to reduce public bus 
company’s exposure to absorbing operating losses. This caused an uproar amongst paratransit 
groupings, though the private bus company essentially offering to pay them to become 
sleeping partners overcame much of the resistance. This meant that there was no true reform 
to paratransit operations on the third corridor. Ultimately Flores & Zegras (2012) point out 
that Mexico City’s “fostering” approach to paratransit reform – bending to operators’ needs 
and demands, rather than more forceful strategies – has come at a cost. The operating subsidy 
bill essentially services the initial deals that were made to shield operators from financial 
harm. Moreover, the substantial effort and financial resources required to remove only 900 of 
the 22 850 – or just under 4% – of the city’s paratransit vehicles off the city’s roads over a 6-
year period raise concerns over the overall sustainability of the approach 
Accra 
Finn (2008) documented the history and processes of public transport reform involving 
paratransit in a number of cities around the world, including in Accra, the capital of Ghana. 
Paratransit operators in this city were historically self-regulating: minibus operators would 
join a union, and paratransit unions were organised at route level. The strongest of these 
unions was the national Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU), with regional and 
local branches. The remainder of public transport services were run by smaller paratransit 
associations and a few small bus companies. The latter were also structured under a union, the 
Ghana Road Transport Consultative Council (GRTCC). Distinguishing characteristics of 
paratransit operations in Accra, and Ghana in general, were that operations are generally 
 56  
point-to-point along fixed routes, with the majority of passengers having to board at terminals 
as vehicles depart only when full. Also, the sector was not plagued by violent internal 
territorial disputes. A further sign of a more stable than typical paratransit industry was that 
travel fares were negotiated between government and the unions. With such an unusually 
amicable relationship between government and paratransit, it came as no surprise that the 
introduction in 2006-2007 of a mandatory commercial vehicle roadworthy process was met 
with a noticeable overall improvement in the condition of paratransit vehicles. One bone of 
contention that arose was the introduction in the early 2000s of a partially government-owned 
scheduled bus service on the more popular routes in the city, which increasingly displaced 
paratransit operators on these routes. The government viewed the buses as serving a different 
passenger market, yet with the buses receiving public subsidy operators cried foul. 
Nonetheless, the significant urban growth in the city did offer such operators the opportunity 
to develop new services.  
In the period 2007 to 2012 the national government, with support from the World Bank, 
planned the Ghana Urban Transport Project (GUTP), a large-scale public transport reform 
programme to promote existing modes as well as BRT. This multi-pronged approach aimed to 
incorporate existing bus and paratransit operations in a comprehensive planning and licensing 
framework. Key to the approach was the strengthening of the regulatory capacity through the 
creation of a transport authority over Greater Accra. Services would be streamlined with 
demand, which would be achieved through encouraging paratransit operators to use larger 
buses on main arterials. A BRT demonstration corridor was also planned, which included 
support services by scheduled buses and paratransit vehicles. The options given to paratransit 
operators were to improve their vehicles and continue existing services, to develop feeder and 
local bus services, or to compete for core bus services by formalising operations. The 
expectation was that paratransit would eventually be replaced by formal services, much of 
which would be operated by former paratransit operators. 
The project has achieved moderate success, if with some delays (see Finn, 2012; World Bank 
2012; 2013, 2015). In 2011 registration and licencing of existing bus and paratransit 
operations commenced. Construction of the pilot corridor of the BRT service was initiated, 
but only two bridges were constructed by the planned end date of the project in December 
2012. Cost overruns meant that insufficient funds remained for the terminals, depots and 
feeder routes of the pilot BRT system to be constructed. While an interim planning and 
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regulating entity had been created, the fully-fledged transport authority was not established by 
end-2012, which in the view of the World Bank was critical to the success of the project, 
though far less costly than the physical infrastructure (World Bank 2012). As a result the 
project underwent significant restructuring. To allow additional time for the institutional 
changes to take place and the BRT corridor to be completed, the envisaged end date was 
pushed out by two years to December 2014. The transport authority, the Greater Accra Public 
Transport Executive, was established by this date, while construction on the BRT component 
was delayed due to heavy rains and the end date again revised. However, buses have been 
procured, and the corridor component is envisaged to become operational by December 2015 
(World Bank, 2015).  
Dakar 
Kumar & Diou (2010) reported in detail on the reform process in Dakar, and on the public 
transport situation in this city prior to reform. Public transport in Dakar, the capital of 
Senegal, was delivered by a mix of formal modes and paratransit service with a history 
similar to that of many other cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. By the end of the 20th century the 
state-owned bus company SOTRAC, with its roots in the colonial period, was forced to 
declare bankruptcy due to mismanagement and unsustainable fare levels. Paratransit 
increasingly filled the void left by scheduled services, which besides the aforementioned 
SOTRAC, included a small-scale state-owned suburban rail service (which is still in 
operation). However, a persistent issue with paratransit services was the vehicles’ poor state 
of repair and significantly out-of-date technology.  
Recognising the need to address the deteriorating public transport situation in the city, in 1997 
the national government established CETUD (the Dakar Urban Transport Executive Council), 
with a mandate to reorganise and improve the regulation of public transport. One outcome of 
the government’s renewed interest in public transport was the creation of a new majority 
state-owned bus company, Dakar Dem Dikk (DDD), and the transfer of SOTRAC’s assets to 
this new entity. The reinvention of the bus company has not been a success. Also, despite an 
operating subsidy that partially compensated for low fares, DDD has not wrested control of 
the market from paratransit. In 2004 its initial fleet of 60 buses had shrunk to 40, and out of 
an additional 409 new buses acquired in 2008, by 2010 only 300 were able to provide daily 
service. It was furthermore estimated that the number of paratransit vehicles on the road in 
Dakar – around 3 000 – was ten times that of DDD’s circulating buses in 2010. 
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Another outcome of government’s efforts since CETUD’s launch was a paratransit vehicle 
renewal scheme linked with route concessions. The renewal scheme, partly funded by the 
World Bank, involved a leasing facility through which paratransit owners could acquire new 
vehicles. Existing fragmented ownership proved a barrier to uptake of the programme, until 
CETUD started engaging operators in 2002 and assisted them to restructure their businesses. 
The resulting process led to the formation of 13 ‘economic groupings’, or collectives, 
involving a total of 245 individual operators. The collectives in turn formed a joint financing 
association. On behalf of the financing association the government procured 505 buses from 
India with the proviso that parts had to be available in Senegal and that the vehicles have a 5-
year or 200 000km warranty. The association owned these buses and leased them to the 
individual collectives. The collectives had to put forward a 25% deposit of the vehicle cost, 
and would be responsible for repaying the loans – provided by the World Bank – covering the 
remaining 75% of the cost of the vehicles over five years. The collectives furthermore had to 
undertake to maintain vehicles, and for each new bus an old minibus had to be surrendered for 
scrapping. In relation to competition regulation each collective was offered a formal route 
concession for five years, which specified fares and routes amongst other obligations, and 
received technical support and training to meet the concession requirements. 
The upgrade programme initially proceeded slowly as most operators had difficulty raising 
the deposits. To resolve this problem the financing association was assisted in initially 
obtaining credit from a local commercial bank, and later from a state-owned development 
bank, from which the collectives could borrow funds over four and a half years to cover the 
vehicle deposits. With this barrier also addressed, over the period 2005-2008 the full 505 new 
buses were delivered to the collectives. Overall the programme led to an improvement in 
service to passengers in terms of quality of service, safety and security, vehicle frequencies, 
and a decrease in pollution and congestion levels along the transformed routes. In addition, 
there were significant profit margins in the operations, and around 2 000 new employment 
positions were created (International Association for Public Transport [UITP], 2010).  
However, the fleet of new vehicles only represent a portion of the paratransit vehicles in the 
city and, despite the concession agreements, limited enforcement translated into continued 
competition on the road with other paratransit operators. This was indicative of a broader 
challenge: while on paper CETUD played a key role in the system, in reality its executive 
powers and ability to intervene in all areas of the transport arena in Dakar were limited. This 
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may yet change. Subsequent to leading the above reforms CETUD expressed interest in 
forming a formal bus company out of a larger portion of paratransit operations in the city, as 
well in inserting BRT services on high-density public transport corridors6.  
Drawing lessons from cases 
As with the different approaches to public transport and paratransit reform presented earlier in 
this chapter, the cases demonstrate that in practice there are a variety of forms that paratransit 
reform may take. The aims of the reform process in each case reflect a different position on 
service upgrading, competition regulation and ownership regimes, and the implementation 
and outcomes of these processes show that each approach places different demands on 
institutional capacities, available funding and operators. None of the cases offer an all-
encompassing remedy for all the problems common to paratransit services. The cases do, 
however, suggest conditions that might offer the greatest probability of improving or 
reforming paratransit services. These are that there must be a concerted engagement process 
between authorities and paratransit stakeholders, flexibility in terms of reform process, and an 
in-depth understanding of the local context and the limitation presented by this context. The 
Accra case is one example; even though BRT implementation has stalled, the multi-pronged 
approach to reform offers alternative avenues for improvement. Similarly, Mexico City offers 
passengers two improved travel options using upgraded minibuses and new BRT services; if 
one option lags the other still offers benefits.  
It is wishful to expect that a process at a city scale with many and diverse stakeholders would 
proceed smoothly and achieve all expected outcomes, yet in instances of failure, or near-
failure, there are also noteworthy lessons. An over-emphasis on infrastructure design and 
construction, and an under-emphasis on incumbent operator and public sector capacities and 
engagement, can lead to stalling or significant delays in reform processes. Dar es Salaam 
offers a prime example: in the absence of a context-informed understanding of institutional 
requirements the project showed very little tangible progress for many years. Moreover, it 
may indeed not be possible to accommodate all stakeholders within any one particular 
approach, as Bogota shows, and both this city and Santiago’s processes show that passengers 
                                                
6 During a study tour to South Africa in July 2010 a delegation from CETUD visited Johannesburg, 
Tshwane and Cape Town to gain greater insight into public transport financing, integration and 
construction, and to view progress with BRT implementation. The trip included a meeting at the 
Centre for Transport Studies, at which I was present. 
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may suffer from unintended consequences despite what on paper appeared to be win-win-win 
scenarios for passengers, operators and public authorities.  
The cases suggest that the organisational configuration of existing operators is an important 
contributor to the level of complexity of a transformational process. In Mexico City the 
paratransit operators affected by the Metrobús phases were already consolidated into two 
distinct federations, each of which operated on their own corridors. Similarly, even though the 
intervention in Bogotá was citywide, nearly all the bus companies in control of awarding 
operational licences to paratransit operators were aligned into four groupings. In both these 
cases, it is evident that operator engagement could thus proceed more rapidly to resolving 
contractual and operational details. A decisive moment in Lagos’s BRT Lite project was the 
agreement from the influential paratransit workers union to participate in the scheme. Dakar 
offers yet another perspective: even though operators were restructured into economic 
entities, they still struggled to gain access to finance. Thus, having an operator structure that is 
conducive to the aims of a reform programme is only one of many preconditions to effecting 
reforms. Ultimately any reform approach should necessarily have to take into account the 
needs and capacities of stakeholders as well as their surrounding operating, financial and 
regulatory environments, and set the pace of change in line with what these conditions allow 
for. Santiago serves as a powerful reminder of the pressures that an overly ambitious 
timeframe can impose on all stakeholders. Public authorities must furthermore invest 
substantial time and effort in developing a constructive relationship with the paratransit sector 
prior to infrastructural changes in order to obtain paratransit’s participation, and maintain this 
relationship after implementation. Key players within the paratransit sector may either 
overcome or incite resistance, and longer timeframes may allow these players to be identified 
and the leverage they have with the larger corps of operators to be better understood. Policy-
making may well be led by the public sector, but the figures exercising power are not 
necessarily located in government.  
The cases also show that large-scale formalisation is difficult to achieve, but in most instances 
do not provide sufficient insight into the scale of paratransit operations that remain outside the 
fold of reformed systems. This is one criticism of the documentation on transition processes; a 
further, and related, criticism is that reform processes are seldom cohesively documented. 
One of the benefits of having the World Bank involved in reform processes in the African 
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cases7 is that there is a built-in expectation that projects are documented. The disadvantage is 
that the World Bank is an infrastructure-funding agency, and that the infrastructure-led 
approach may well follow the bank’s presence. Beyond agency-specific considerations, case 
material typically seems to focus on capital or major cities. These cities commonly have a 
strong national government presence, political prominence and/or concentration of financial 
resources. This means that there is a lesser awareness of, learning from, or possibility for, 
reform processes in smaller locations. Two comments follow from this. The first is that the 
focus on major cities may well be related to the focus on big gestures of reform, i.e. large-
scale, visible projects and actions. The second is that the prominence of these cases may act 
against a more balanced view on the state of practice in, and range of possible approaches to, 
public transport reform. In comparison with cases where there are “big bangs”, extensive 
public works or major crises or conflicts, cases where less immediately visible or tangible 
approaches have been implemented (such as incremental operator upgrading) in all likelihood 
do not carry the same attraction for politicians, the press, and perhaps even academia. This is 
not to say that big bang cases do not provide a wealth of learning opportunities, but rather that 
they should be studied within context and with the proviso that they do not represent the 
entire universe of public transport reform possibilities or outcomes.  
2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO 
PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORM  
This chapter serves as a contextual backdrop for the next chapters. This chapter firstly 
investigated the concept of public transport reform and different dimensions in which reform 
impacts on public transport systems. A first dimension was that of modes and services, where 
reforms might introduce changes to infrastructure, vehicle types, scheduling structure and/or 
routes. A second dimension was that of competition regulation, which mediated the 
relationship between public authorities and operators. Reforms in this dimension might aim to 
change competition on the road to competition for the market by introducing some form of 
operating permission or service agreement. The last dimension drawn from the literature was 
that of the operator business structure. Reform in this dimension might aim to change whether 
operations are publicly or privately owned, the degree to which businesses are corporate 
enterprises, and the size of operators’ businesses.  
                                                
7 World Bank involvement was not a criterion in selecting case cities, but emerged incidentally. 
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Next the chapter presented four approaches that impose various changes in the different 
dimensions of reform. The BRT implementation and paratransit assimilation approach 
requires shifts in all three dimensions, typically taking place concurrently. It introduces a new 
mode and contracting regime, and aims to consolidate the typically atomised structure of 
operators. A stepped paratransit transition and upgrading approach may still lead to the 
introduction of a new mode, but that may be delayed until more consolidated operator 
business structures and competition regulation systems are in place. This approach introduces 
successive changes that may be more palatable to operators and better suited to public 
authority capacity limitations. An approach that focuses primarily on changes to the 
dimension of competition regulation would be to institute collective contractual agreements 
with paratransit associations as mediators to individual operators. The most promising of 
these contractual arrangements is shown to be franchising, which matches the area-focussed 
structure of paratransit associations and allows basic service standards to be defined. Changes 
in the business structure may still be necessitated depending on whether an operator 
association is a legally recognised business entity. The last discussed approach is that of 
incremental paratransit service and regulatory improvements. It proposes that paratransit 
operations are more efficient than generally suggested, and should be supported rather than 
replaced. The focus of this approach is on introducing and maintaining minimum service 
quality and safety standards, and enforcing fair competition. 
In the latter part of the chapter a selection of seven case cities were presented to demonstrate 
the impacts in practice of the different reform approaches in various combinations. In Bogota, 
Dar es Salaam, Lagos and Santiago variants of the BRT approach were employed. Mexico 
City saw a BRT system being introduced as well as incremental paratransit improvements. A 
three-pronged approach to reform was developed in Accra relying variously on introducing in 
situ paratransit upgrades, route contracts and BRT services. Collectively these three 
alternatives offered paratransit operators an incremental route to becoming part of the 
upgraded public transport system. In Dakar there was also a stepped transition process, with 
elements of incremental upgrades allied to operator consolidation and route concessions.  
The cases demonstrated that the reform process is highly dependent on the local public 
transport and urban context. Also, none of the approaches offer a panacea for paratransit 
reform. The different approaches to reform and the ways in which they were implemented in 
the international cases do, however, offer alternatives that can be investigated as potential 
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mechanisms for reform and ways of encouraging paratransit operators’ participation in reform 
in Cape Town. In order to study the relevance of alternative approaches it is first necessary to 
have a clear understanding of the aims of reform and how it was implemented in Cape Town. 
This is the subject of Chapter 3.   
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3 REFORM APPROACH AND IMPLEMENTATION IN CAPE TOWN 
From the international theoretical and practical perspectives that I presented in the previous 
chapter, in this chapter I focus on the contemporary reform approach in South Africa, its 
implementation in Cape Town, and its impact on paratransit in this city. This serves as a 
direct response to the first research question seeking to identify the approach that government 
followed in incorporating paratransit operators in public transport reform. Investigating 
reform implementation in Cape Town was a key procedure to contextualising operators’ 
attitudes to reform. One reason for it being key was that the evolution of the national public 
transport reform agenda and the ways in which operators participated in constructing this 
agenda were not apparent. Another reason was that the transition aspect of the reform process 
in Cape Town was poorly documented, making it difficult to understand the impact and extent 
of the reform process on operators in this city.  
The first part of the chapter focuses on key national policy developments with respect to 
paratransit reform in the two decades since the country’s transition to a democracy. In the 
second part of the chapter I provide a chronological account of the implementation of Cape 
Town’s reformed bus system, highlighting the roles and responses of key players in the 
implementation process. I subsequently reflect on why the public authority had to moderate 
its expectations of and approach to paratransit participation in reform. The chapter closes with 
a discussion of the Cape Town case in relation to the concepts and international cases 
presented in Chapter 2, and provides a motivation for engaging paratransit operators in depth 
around their business aspirations and attitudes to reform. 
3.1 EVOLUTION OF REFORM: THE NATIONAL CONTEXT AFTER 1994 
Urban public transport services across South Africa are typically rendered by three modes: 
surface rail, scheduled bus services, and paratransit in the form of minibus and sedan vehicles. 
A major challenge facing the public sector in the regulation of paratransit, and indeed public 
transport as a whole, is that service regulation, planning and infrastructure provision 
responsibilities have been, and remain, fragmented across national, provincial and local 
governments. Subsequently the planning for and provision of modal integration to improve 
passenger choice and service levels have been difficult to achieve.  
The South African paratransit industry has a history that is closely linked to urban 
development patterns established by the apartheid state, as documented by Khosa (1992), 
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Barrett (2003) and others. The creation of peripheral townships through forced removals in 
the 1960s increased the demand for transport for the township-based workforce to commercial 
and industrial centres. While the State provided government-owned, subsidised rail and bus 
services, these services proved expensive to subsidise and insufficient for the needs of 
township dwellers. This set the scene for the emergence of the paratransit industry in the 
1970s as an additional mode of transport, often in competition with the formal services. The 
initial response of government was to refuse carrier permits to these small-scale operators in 
order to protect existing monopolies, but successive relaxations in the official attitude towards 
paratransit led to the legalisation of the 16-seater ‘Kombi-taxis’ (now known as minibus-
taxis) for taxi use in 1986. The period 1986 to 1987 saw a turning point in the industry as the 
number of government-sanctioned minibus taxi permits issued in the country grew from 7 039 
to 34 378 (Khosa 1992:2). This explosive growth coincided with the release of the 1987 White 
Paper on Transport, which argued in favour of deregulating the paratransit industry, even 
though the South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA) advised against such a move and 
warned of destructive competition. The signs of over-saturation in the market were already 
visible in 1990 and manifested in the frequent fighting that erupted between owners 
competing for the same routes – the “taxi wars” that Khosa refers to (1992; 1995). 
Key moment: The National Taxi Task Team 
The move towards democratic governance in the country in 1994 saw increased efforts to 
produce passenger transport policy and strategy aimed at ameliorating the impact of 
segregated spatial planning on passenger transport patterns. The National Taxi Task Team 
(NTTT) was formed in April 1995 to investigate and analyse issues and problems in the 
paratransit sector, and to generate solutions and policy options that would ensure the 
industry’s short- and long-term sustainability and contribution to public transport systems. 
The NTTT held 36 public hearings between August 1995 and January 1996, and presented its 
conclusions in its report (NTTT, 1997). These conclusions included that the subsidy system 
did not reflect paratransit’s proportional contribution to public transport. Fragmentation of 
ownership and weak control structures in the industry also meant it could not adequately 
regulate itself, which manifested in violent territorial disputes and severe on-road 
competition. Moreover, the paratransit sector suffered from critical business management and 
administrative skills shortages. Poor driving skills and on-road behaviour impacted negatively 
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on passengers’ and general traffic safety, while a last conclusion (related to on-road 
behaviour) was that the sector made us of exploitative labour practices.  
The White Paper on National Transport Policy of 1996 (DoT, 1996) was the first key 
document produced post-1994 (see Figure 3-1 for a timeline of this and successive policy 
documents). The White Paper set out public policy to address the historic challenge of 
uncoordinated transport planning and implementation, and took into account the NTTT’s 
recommendations. It provided guidance on land, air and maritime transport of passengers and 
freight with the strategic aims of promoting modal, spatial, institutional and planning 
integration. The White Paper ushered in a “transitional period” in which transport policy 
implementation would take place in a phased, planned manner to address the fragmented 
transport system, and be effected by the lowest competent level of government. With respect 
to land passenger transport, the White Paper was pro-public transport, with a goal of 
achieving an 80:20 public to private transport ratio, and pro-passenger, i.e. transport services 
should be demand responsive, accessible and customer-focussed. Public transport was 
recognised as a basic need, although subject to the efficient utilisation of public funds. 
Competition between services was to be regulated, which required, amongst other 
considerations, that the paratransit industry be formalised and supported to enhance its 
economic viability and that paratransit services be properly licensed and legalised. 
Building on the policy direction established in the national White Paper, the White Paper on 
Western Cape Provincial Transport Policy (Provincial Government: Western Cape [PGWC], 
1997) was unveiled by the provincial Department of Transport and Public Works in 1997. 
While both documents dealt with a similar range of freight and passenger transport 
considerations, the purpose of the provincial paper was to provide greater detail on how the 
Province intended to respond to particular challenges and opportunities in the Western Cape. 
In terms of the transformation of road-based public transport services, the provincial policy 
outlined a gradual reform process to address the “considerable instability” evident in this 
sector (PGWC, 1997:23). The transformation was envisioned in three phases: firstly, to 
regularise operating permission but to maintain existing operation; secondly, to provide 
business and management training and support both to paratransit operators to enable them to 
tender for contracts, and to public agencies to build effective regulation and administration 
capacity; and lastly, to corporatise paratransit and to develop a public transport plan under
 




Figure 3-1: Evolving policy affecting public transport in Cape Town from 1994 
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which paratransit co-operatives and bus companies would bid either collectively or separately 
for contract packages. 
The national White Paper was followed by a 20-year strategic framework to give effect to 
national policy, in the form of the Moving South Africa Action Agenda (DoT, 1999). In terms 
of urban passenger transport, Moving South Africa focused on putting “public transport first”, 
while taking account of the shortcomings of existing public transport and a growing trend in 
car dependence. It called for strategic action on three fronts: halting urban sprawl and 
developing high-density transport corridors; investing in integrated, customer-based public 
transport systems and effective road space management to address congestion; and 
developing non-motorised transport. Regulation and enforcement were identified as key 
elements in countering destructive competition, which was recognised as a particular risk in 
the paratransit sector. Besides calling for more effective enforcement, Moving South Africa 
proposed that incentives be investigated that could encourage paratransit operators to 
formalise and that public authorities draw paratransit (and bus services) into formal 
partnership through competitive tendering to render improved services to passengers. 
Key moment: The Taxi Recapitalisation Programme 
The launch of Moving South Africa in 1999 was accompanied by the first announcement of 
the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP), which was approved by the Cabinet in October 
1999 under the leadership of the Department of Trade and Industry (Browning, 2009). The 
TRP initially was aimed at legalising paratransit operations, formalising business structures 
and labour practices, establishing a hierarchical representative structure from within the 
industry, and providing for the renewal of the vehicle fleet through a fixed scrapping 
allowance on surrender of old vehicles (Walters, 2008). In view of the difficulties in engaging 
paratransit around restructuring of the sector as reflected in the NTTT’s report, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the focus of the programme shifted to fleet renewal once it was actually 
rolled out in 2006. Vehicle renewal comprises owners turning over old minibuses to a 
government-appointed agency for scrapping, after which the owner is paid out a capital 
allowance either to leave the sector or to use towards the purchase of a new, safety-compliant 
minibus. The scrapping allowance was initially ZAR50 000 per minibus, but is adjusted 
annually and in 2014 equated to ZAR74 100 (±USD6 200). The owner has to fund the balance 
of the purchase from his or her own resources or by borrowing from a commercial bank or SA 
Taxi Finance, a private vehicle financier focussing on the paratransit sector. Scrapping could 
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only take place if the owner held a valid operating licence for the vehicle to be scrapped; thus 
the TRP was aimed not only at serving a public safety function, but it also had a regulatory 
function.  
A further result of the NTTT was the establishment with government support of the South 
African National Taxi Council (SANTACO) at a conference in Durban in 2001 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2002). In the constitution that resulted from that 
conference the organisation defined a broad set of aims and objectives covering representation 
and administration, regulation, business and economic transformation, and social 
responsibility (SANTACO, 2002). It saw its role as including: consulting and lobbying with 
government at all levels; coordinating the views of its members on paratransit industry issues 
and representing members’ interests; creating a more robust and effective paratransit 
regulatory regime; and participating in the development of policy on labour and training 
issues, safety and vehicle standards, and competition regulation. The organisational structure 
included provincial and regional councils, as well as a commercial arm. 
The National Land Transport Transition Act (NLTTA) (No. 22 of 2000) followed hard on the 
heels of the TRP launch as the legal framework to give effect to policy and facilitate a smooth 
transition to passenger transport systems as contemplated in the 1996 White Paper and 
Moving South Africa. The NLTTA imposed a demanding set of transport planning 
requirements reliant on extensive data collection, cascading down from five-year National 
Land Transport Strategic Frameworks (the first being that of 2002-2007 as referred to in DoT 
2002) to local-level municipal Integrated Transport Plans. Persistent institutional capacity 
shortages, along with unpredictable funding provisions and uncertainty around executive 
authority to enact cross-modal planning and integration, resulted in many of the planning 
requirements in the NLTTA either not being met or not being completed within the required 
timeframes. Moreover, the regulation of the industry remained to some extent in its own 
hands. Firstly, paratransit operating licences had to be applied for by individual operators 
belonging to, and with the support of, a registered association. Secondly, there typically were 
insufficient grounds for government authorities to refuse a license application due to a lack of 
reliable supply and demand data. Lastly, the indefinite validity of route-linked operating 
licences (resulting from the conversion of earlier permits) meant that in practice public 
authorities could only intervene in the market during the license awarding stage, over which 
they had little effective control. 
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Within Cape Town, two stalled initiatives involving proposals to incorporate paratransit in the 
formal provision of public transport services preceded the current engagement process to 
integrate the sector into a formal transport system. The first was a cooperative venture in 2003 
by the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Provincial Government as part of their joint 
mobility strategy for the city. It proposed investment in a BRT line replacing existing road-
based services along Klipfontein Road, a major arterial road traversing the city, linked with 
feeder services, non-motorised transport improvements and land-use intensification (PGWC, 
2004). The project reached a detailed level of design, but has yet to be implemented. In 2005 
the Provincial Government released a draft report for a second initiative to integrate road-
based services, the Transformation of Scheduled Subsidised Services in the City of Cape Town 
(PGWC, 2005), which expanded on its public transport reform policy as encapsulated in the 
1997 provincial White Paper. Although not strictly a BRT plan, it proposed the incorporation 
of road-based (i.e. formal bus and paratransit) services into a trunk and feeder system into 15 
contract “balloons” that cover the geographic area of the city. It appears as if the failure to 
implement this project resided primarily in the unresolved transport planning responsibilities 
between the spheres of government, as well as in a lack of cooperation between provincial 
and local governments. However, the scarcity of documentation on either of these initiatives 
hampers efforts to investigate in detail the reasons behind their lack of progress. 
Key moment: The 2007 Public Transport Strategy and Action Plan 
Despite national and local initiatives to improve public transport systems and integrate 
paratransit, of which the preceding serve as examples, by 2006 – a decade after the release of 
the White Paper – little progress had been made in corporatising paratransit business 
structures or addressing the poor standard of public transport services. However, a renewed 
thrust to revitalise public transport emerged in 2006, both in terms of planning and funding, 
coinciding with the announcement of South Africa as the host country for the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup. The same year witnessed the release of the NLTTA-mandated National Land 
Transport Strategic Framework (NLTSF) (DoT, 2006a) for 2006-2011, in which the World 
Cup was recognised as a catalyst in passenger transport development. Besides stadia 
construction, the event was identified as an opportunity to leverage funding to fast track 
investment in public and non-motorised transport infrastructure.  
The 2006-2011 NLTSF also paved the way for a cluster of national and local strategic 
planning and implementation documents emerging between 2006 and 2008. These documents 
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acknowledged the lack of implementation and set the scene for the National Department of 
Transport’s current programme supporting the development of Integrated Public Transport 
Networks (IPTNs), and Cape Town’s MyCiTi project. The Public Transport Strategy (PTS) 
(DoT, 2007a), proposed new large-scale multi-modal public transport networks, particularly 
in urban areas. These networks would be reliant on the phased implementation of BRT trunk 
and motorised and non-motorised feeder systems that would supplement existing core rail 
corridors and incorporate existing formal and informal road-based operations. The proposed 
IPTNs drew heavily on the management and operational model of the Transmilénio BRT 
system in Bogota, Columbia. The first phase of these IPTNs, as detailed in the Public 
Transport Action Plan (DoT, 2007b), focused on the large urban centres in the country and 
contributed towards 2010 FIFA World Cup transport commitments. At the same time a 
national Public Transport Infrastructure and Systems Grant (PTISG) was set up to provide 
capital funding particularly in support of introducing BRT systems in the World Cup host 
cities and elsewhere in the country.  
The national strategy, and what became official policy through political promises in the 
course of the following years (Paton, 2009; “Minibus-taxi industry to …”, 2010; Smook, 
2011), established some of the IPTN parameters. The new networks would in time replace 
existing road-based services and complement existing rail lines, and the replacement and 
upgrading would take place in a geographically phased manner. Existing operators would also 
be the preferred operators of the new services and thus would not be financially worse off in 
making the shift, and employment opportunities would not be lost. The Public Transport 
Action Plan (DoT, 2007b:11) envisaged that engagement with paratransit operators would be 
a priority by recommending that it be one of the actions to be addressed in the first PTS phase 
between 2007 and 2010 (see Figure 3-2 for a summary of the PTS timeline). However, the 
intention for such engagement appears not to have been on developing a dialogue on what 
form the future networks would take, as the Action Plan already specified the desired modes 
(BRT and rapid rail) and the paths for their implementation. Engagement rather seemed 
geared towards the sector’s incorporation in the proposed networks on the assumption that it 
would be a willing participant in a structured transition towards formal operations. 
The 2007 Public Transport Strategy envisaged that 12 cities and six of the more densely 
populated districts would have fully functioning IPTNs by 2020, and that by 2010 the first 
phases were to be in place for the World Cup. Progress was far slower than anticipated.
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Figure 3-2: Public Transport Strategy phasing 
Source: DoT, 2007b 
Figure 3-3 is a graphic interpretation of progress to date as reported in the annual BRT/IPTN 
workshop sessions of the Southern African Transport Conference. Of the targeted cities, only 
Cape Town and Johannesburg have trunk and feeder BRT systems in operation (though these 
did not meet the 2010 target date) and are moving to the second phases of their IPTNs. 
Ekurhuleni, Rustenburg and Tshwane have made strides in relation to construction and/or 
detailed system planning. The Nelson Mandela Bay Metropole has oscillated between 
progress and collapse for reasons related to, amongst others, operational inefficiency, 
restructuring paratransit, and financial mismanagement. Services and some infrastructure 
were in place during the World Cup; after a hiatus period pilot services launched again in 
2013, but early in 2014 these were withdrawn (see De Kock, 2013; Makunga, 2014; and 
“Pikoli blows lid…”, 20138). Polokwane is in the early stages of planning a BRT system, 
while there is little or no indication of tangible progress in Mangaung, Buffalo City, 
Msunduzi and Mbombela. Completing the 12 cities are George and eThekwini, which have 
                                                
8 This is one of many articles published as a Special Report in The Herald on 26 August 2013 on 
irregularities related to Nelson Mandela Bay’s Integrated Public Transport System (IPTS).  
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deliberately followed trajectories not aimed at BRT implementation, but rather at overall 
public transport system restructuring and service improvement. In view of the above it is fair 
to say that applying the BRT approach to public transport reform has not met policy 
expectations. The reasons for this are complex and related both to city-specific and national 
issues. In the next part of this chapter I will turn specifically to the case of Cape Town, which 
has arguably made greatest strides in implementing the policy by way of its BRT system, 
MyCiTi.  
 
Figure 3-3: Progress with BRT implementation in South Africa 
3.2 PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORM IN CAPE TOWN 
In March 2007 the City of Cape Town released its Public Transport Implementation 
Framework (CoCT, 2007b). This document presented the City’s proposal for implementing 
an improved citywide public transport network referred to as IRT (Integrated Rapid Transit). 
Besides actions for rail service improvement, it put forward installing BRT as the mechanism 
 75  
for improving road-based operations9. The decision to embark on BRT was modelled on the 
experience with implementing it in other cities such as Beijing, Bogotá, Curitiba, Guayaquil, 
Los Angeles, Ottawa, Paris, Pereira, Quito, and Seoul (CoCT, 2008; 2010). Hoped-for 
similarities included relatively limited construction cost and time, lack of direct subsidy 
requirements, profitability of operations, and short apparent timeframes for engaging and 
incorporating existing operators. Also, while the city’s extensive rail infrastructure was 
recognised as a key part of the IRT trunk network, rail-planning authority did not rest in the 
City. It is thus understandable from an institutional perspective that a road-based concept was 
given priority as the mechanism for improving the public transport network, as it appeared to 
be better suited to the City’s capacities and assigned responsibilities.  
Particularly the short reported BRT implementation timeframes would have held great appeal 
given the looming presence of the FIFA World Cup in mid-2010. A new stadium was being 
built in Green Point to host World Cup matches in Cape Town, and the City’s commitments 
(shared with the local organising committee) were that the stadiums would be adequately 
served by public and private transport, and that there would be dedicated shuttles to transport 
passengers to and from park-and-ride and public transport facilities. Public transport stations, 
stops and drop-off points had furthermore to be provided both at the stadium and at other 
strategic points (CoCT, 2008).  
In October 2007 an internal project office was formed in the City to make good on World Cup 
commitments and for MyCiTi to become a reality (see Figure 3-4 for the timeline of events as 
discussed in this section). In November 2007 an international advisor, Lloyd Wright, with 
extensive experience in BRT implementation in South America, was appointed to the project 
team. During the same month officials, councillors and technical consultants undertook a 
BRT study tour to Latin American cities (Wood [2014a, 2014b] documented such “policy 
tourism” and other means of BRT policy transfer from South America to South Africa in 
detail). 
                                                
9 In April 2010 “MyCiTi” was selected through a public competition as the brand name for all IRT 
services and infrastructure in Cape Town, whether motorised or non-motorised (CoCT, 2010). In 
practice “IRT”, “MyCiTi” and “BRT” have come to be used interchangeably and denote not only the 
newly installed trunk bus services but also the feeder services. For the sake of clarity I henceforth use 
the term “MyCiTi” to refer to all MyCiTi-branded bus services, and in line with local practice the 
definition of “BRT” as I use it includes both trunk and feeder elements of MyCiTi bus services. 
 
 76  
 
 
continues on next page … 
 
 77  




Figure 3-4: MyCiTi implementation timeline 
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In February 2008 the first PTISG allocation was awarded for the City’s BRT proposal to be 
constructed, and in the same period (January to May 2008) the preliminary engineering design 
for segments and the initial operational modelling and costing were completed. The project 
was approached in a phased manner, and the first phase routings focussed on both the 
requirements of the 2010 World Cup as well as the City’s long-term public transport needs. 
To enable this to happen the project was divided into four streams: system and operational 
planning; business planning (which included the transformation and incorporation of existing 
operators); infrastructure design and construction; and overall project coordination (CoCT, 
2009).  
Early engagement with paratransit operators 
In August of 2008, the City of Cape Town approved the implementation of Phase 1A of a 
BRT system. Phase 1A included the city centre, an airport service, a trunk corridor from the 
city centre to the West Coast suburbs (through the Table View area to Atlantis), and feeder 
routes linked to the latter (CoCT, 2009). In October 2008 the City held an open public 
information presentation in Bloubergstrand, envisaged as the first event in the general public 
engagement process. The purpose of the meeting was to present the MyCiTi system to the 
residents in the West Coast area of Phase 1A. Taking the podium after the technical officials’ 
presentation, a presiding City councillor was shouted down by paratransit operators who 
arrived during the presentation, and the meeting had to be stopped short (Orfanos, 2008). 
Further public meetings in other areas affected by the first phase of MyCiTi that were to 
follow this event were cancelled.  
Late in November 2008 the project team arranged an invitation-only summit in Century City. 
This was the first MyCiTi-related event aimed at engaging the broader paratransit industry in 
the city. Around 300 representatives from the industry were invited to attend this closed 
event10. It was disrupted by operators who could not gain access to the venue as they had not 
received invitations. These operators threatened violence and proceeded to storm the venue 
before the presentations could commence, forcing the summit to be abandoned. A number of 
the attendees indicated that the organisations to which the excluded operators belonged were, 
in fact, already represented in the summit. Shortly thereafter, in early December 2008, 
paratransit operators congregated at the Cape Town Civic Centre to hand over a memorandum 
of their grievances to the then mayor, Ms Helen Zille. This protest action again turned violent, 
                                                
10 I was able to secure an invitation to attend as an observer. 
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with participants disrupting public transport services in the area, injuring members of the 
public and other operators, and damaging property (“Commuters flee rampaging …”, 2008; 
Schoeman et al, 2008).  
During this tense situation there was another publicly funded study visit to Bogota and two 
other Colombian cities in December 2008. As with the November 2007 visit there were 
officials and project consultants on the tour, though this time they were accompanied by 
representatives of paratransit and bus operators affected by the proposed MyCiTi routes, as 
well as from SANTACO. Spending only a handful of days in each city within the space of 
less than two weeks, the visit served mainly to demonstrate to operators the elements of BRT 
such as dedicated lanes, operations, fleet design and vehicle maintenance in practice (Botha, 
personal communication 2014, 25 July). Shortly thereafter, in early 2009, the City issued the 
first draft of its “Prospectus”. This document was the basis for engagement with affected 
road-based operators (McLachlan, personal communication 2013, 15 November). These 
discussions continued on a regular basis over the course of 2009 (CoCT, 2009).  
Despite the discussions there were strong reactions in the broader industry, first of which was 
a citywide three-day strike and cessation of paratransit services over 11-13 February, 2009. 
The strike stranded many public transport users and was accompanied by widespread violence 
and injuries to bystanders and operators, leading to the military being placed on standby. 
Initially the cause of the strike was claimed to be discontent from within the paratransit 
industry in the city that its members would be excluded from, or marginalised by, MyCiTi. It 
was later claimed that the main cause was friction between the government-sanctioned 
SANTACO and the National Taxi Alliance (NTA), an unofficial national paratransit 
representative body that split off from SANTACO (“Taxi riots sow chaos”, 2009; “CT taxi 
strike …”, 2009; Pillay, 2009; Jooste, 2009). A few days later, on 18 February 2009, Ms Zille 
met with the NTA leadership, at which it unanimously agreed to listen to the MyCiTi 
proposal, while the mayor made a commitment that the City would meet with the NTA 
leadership on a monthly basis (“Taxi strike sent…”, 2009). However at a meeting the next 
month – on 2 March 2009 – between the City and the Western Cape NTA branch, at which a 
presentation on the MyCiTi was to be made, the NTA refused to hear the presentation, 
contrary to their 18 February commitment, and walked out of the meeting. The mayor stated 
that the NTA insisted they talk about the operating licence system instead, while the NTA 
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claimed that they wanted to discuss harassment of paratransit drivers by the Metro Police 
(“Zille, Taxi Association …”, 2009; Pressly, 2009).  
Towards more structured engagement 
On 14 March 2009 the City hosted a meeting at the Civic Centre with Cape Town-based 
paratransit industry representatives to discuss MyCiTi. Again NTA members disrupted the 
meeting and were removed by Metro Police, and they continued to protest outside the venue. 
Some attendees not aligned to the NTA left, reportedly due to intimidation and threats to their 
lives, though the remaining representatives were agreeable to the MyCiTi proposal, but 
requested details of the proposal’s business plan (Johns, 2009; Nicholson, Msutwana-Stemela 
& Johns 2009). Such was the extent of the political sensitivity around the BRT policy and its 
implementation that on 20 April 2009 a meeting was called at national level between the 
president of the ANC, Mr Jacob Zuma, (soon to become president of the country) and 
SANTACO. As a direct consequence Mr Zuma instructed that all engagement with the 
paratransit sector and operational planning on BRT systems be deferred until after the 22 
April national elections (“Zuma: BRT discussions …”, 2009).  
Engagement with operators was set to continue in June 2009. The City of Cape Town 
subsequently published a revised second draft of the Prospectus to affected operators in 
August 2009. The City procured the services of facilitators to lead the process of establishing 
the two envisaged BRT Vehicle Operating Companies (VOCs), though operators were 
consulted to identify their preferred candidates (McLachlan, personal communication 2013, 
15 November). The VOCs would consist of paratransit and scheduled bus operators whose 
services would be replaced. The VOCs would be contracted on a gross cost basis by the City 
to run MyCiTi services for a 12-year period – the maximum period allowed for under 
legislation (NLTA, No. 5 of 2009, 2009:s41). From the City’s point of view the 12-year 
timespan was important as it would offer sufficient stability and financial incentive to existing 
operators to move over to MyCiTi and to incentivise them to maintain the buses that the City 
had purchased (Herron, 2013). It would also allow sufficient time for paratransit operators in 
particular to become established as formal VOCs and be familiar with the BRT operating 
environment such that at the end of the first 12-year cycle they would not be at a disadvantage 
in open bidding for service provision (McLachlan, personal communication 2014, 4 July). 
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In February 2010 the City concluded an agreement for transport services during and 
immediately after the FIFA World Cup – from February 2010 until 31 October 2010 – with 
TransPeninsula. This company represented three of the paratransit associations affected by the 
planned longer term MyCiTi routes. After the World Cup the expectation was that the full 12-
year service contracts with vehicle operators would be in place. However, the business plan 
for Phase 1A (CoCT, 2010) had first to be in place before contract negotiations could start. 
The City only adopted the business plan on 27 October 2010, delaying the negotiations until 
after the World Cup (McLachlan, personal communication 2013, 5 February). At the time 
eight paratransit associations were identified as having members affected by the planned 
routes. Despite the World Cup services falling in the geographic area of the three inner city 
associations it was a cause of disgruntlement amongst other associations in Cape Town that 
they were not involved in such interim services. From these associations’ point of view it 
seemed that TransPeninsula was making money from being involved in the contract. 
However, it proved to the associations not yet involved in the contract that there was financial 
reward in participating in MyCiTi. Moreover, unlike TransPeninsula, these operators were not 
yet ready to operate and enter into contracts, and they could learn through observing the 
project unfolding in front of them without any risk in it to them (McLachlan, personal 
communication 2013, 15 November). 
Focal shift to public transport after the World Cup  
Once the World Cup was over in mid-July 2010 the pressures of event-based planning and 
operations were relieved. The City’s focus and the negotiation process with operators could 
turn towards the long-term public transport services that MyCiTi might provide. While the 
timeline was not as truncated as before the World Cup, the project scope expanded 
significantly. The City extended the agreement with TransPeninsula to provide interim 
services in the inner city and to the airport. When the MyCiTi Phase 1A business plan was 
approved the City intended to negotiate the longer-term routes with the envisaged two 
operating companies that would be created to provide these services (McLachlan, personal 
communication 2013, 5 February). These companies were referred to as Company A and 
Company B at that stage. As before and during the World Cup, Company A (TransPeninsula) 
would continue to operate the routes serving the inner city and the airport from the southern 
hub at the Civic Centre (see Figure 3-5 fold-out). Feeder services from the northern hub of the 
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trunk route at Table View were intended to be contracted to Company B. On the trunk route 
between these two hubs Company B would share operations with Company A. 
In April 2011 the Company B grouping, now formally constituted as Kidrogen, objected 
when the City intended to extend the airport and inner city contract running since the World 
Cup with Company A (TransPeninsula) without extending the interim route agreement to the 
West Coast area where Company B would be involved in running them. Company B at that 
point comprised five affected paratransit associations and the bus operator Sibanye (in which 
Golden Arrow Bus Services [GABS] is a shareholder), all of whose routes were affected. 
GABS raised separate objections, which it followed with litigation, related to the way in 
which the City determined its market share (McLachlan, personal communication 2013, 5 
February). On 1 May 2011 the City entered into two interim vehicle operating contracts. This 
step enabled the project to move from World Cup-period routes to the Phase 1A longer-term 
routes, and allowed the fleet of buses that the City had procured for the World Cup to be put 
into service. Many of these buses were standing unused at this time. However, the initial 
policy intention of amalgamating bus and paratransit operations under a unified umbrella was 
not realised. As a reflection of the rift between bus and paratransit operators, the City had to 
accept a proposal from the paratransit shareholders in Kidrogen that they buy out Sibanye’s 
shareholding (CoCT, 2012a). Sibanye’s market share was subsequently amalgamated with 
that of GABS in a third operating company, Table Bay Rapid Transit (TBRT). 
From interim to long-term contract Phase 1 services and the Phase 2 pilot 
On 9 May 2011 the first of the new long-term routes opened (as shown in Figure 3-5), though 
as yet still under interim contracts. This was the trunk route operated exclusively by TBRT, 
followed later in the month by a number of feeder routes on the northern end of the trunk 
route, run by Kidrogen. The airport and inner city routes operated by TransPeninsula since the 
World Cup were maintained. The interim contracts were extended in May 2012, October 
2012 and yet again in May 2013 as the negotiation process with the three companies 
regarding the 12-year contracts dragged on (McLachlan, personal communication 2013, 15 
November). A key reason why the conclusion of the 12-year contracts was critical was that 
the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) (No. 56 of 2003) and not the transport-
specific NLTA governed the interim services. The MFMA limited service contracts that the 
City entered into to a maximum of three years. The interim services that started during the 
World Cup could thus not be extended further.   
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On 28 August 2013 the negotiation process was finally concluded between the City and the 
now fully established MyCiTi VOCs, and the vehicle operating contracts signed and ratified 
by the municipality (Herron, 2013). These contracts were with the former paratransit entities 
TransPeninsula (Company A) and Kidrogen (Company B), and with the GABS-owned TBRT 
(Company C). As of the end of 2014 most of the Phase 1 project milestones have been met, 
with only a few routes still to be opened. Figure 3-6 (above) shows routes operational as of 
November 2014. 
Once all Phase 1 routes are operational, a total of 661 paratransit operating licences will have 
been surrendered and the license-holders taken up compensation, and the majority of such 
proceeds invested as shareholding in the VOCs. The routes shown in Figure 3-6 also include 
the two “N2 Express” pilot routes for MyCiTi Phase 2 that were launched in July 2014. These 
second phase routes run along the N2 freeway and connect Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain in 
the southeast directly with the Civic Centre hub in the city centre.  
The relationship between MyCiTi’s phasing and Cape Town’s demographic patterns is an 
important aspect of the reform project and its impact on urban equity (as per the discussion on 
the role of public transport in South African cities in the opening chapter). As in the case of 
Atlantis in the north, Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain are large planned suburbs constructed 
by the apartheid regime under the Group Areas Act (No. 41 of 1950). Non-white city 
residents were forcibly relocated to these areas from centrally located suburbs and the city 
centre, which were reserved for white residents under the Act. Though the first phase reached 
a wide demography, including forcibly removed residents, the second phase is set to focus 
even more closely on the equity issue (I return to the equity issue in Chapter 6). Below is a 
summary of the different project phases and their demographic reach. 
• Interim first phase. The northern route package of the interim first phase served the 
largely white, middle-class area of Table View and adjacent coastal suburbs. It also 
served Parklands and Blouberg Sands, a mixed working- to middle-class area 
expanding the city’s northern built edge. The southern routes served the affluent, 
largely white inner city. The trunk route passed through a nature reserve, 
predominantly white suburbs and a light industrial area. 
• Full first phase. This phase expanded on the interim routes. Trunk routes were 
extended to serve Atlantis outside the city’s built edge, the Du Noon township that 
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emerged shortly after 1994, and the large commercial and residential Century City 
development launched in the late 1990s. More inner city feeder routes were launched 
and extended south-westwards to include the predominantly white and wealthy 
Atlantic suburbs, as well as the Hout Bay valley, where the formerly white town has 
seen the rapid development of a new township over the last decade.  
• Second phase pilot. Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain fall in what it the city’s densely 
populated and predominantly non-white working class sector, commonly termed the 
“Metro Southeast”. Unlike the first phase area of MyCiTi, the Metro Southeast is 
served by suburban rail services in addition to paratransit and subsidised buses. The 
existing public transport offering and demographics in the second phase area are thus 
different to those of the first project phase. However, to date only the pilot N2 Express 
services have been launched; permanent operations are still some years away.  
Moderating public authority expectations of paratransit reform 
The signing of the long-term first phase vehicle operating contracts in October 2013 was a 
major achievement for MyCiTi’s paratransit transformation process. This was, however, not 
the final moment in the first phase process. Once the final two routes are opened in 2015, the 
related contractual obligations are met, and affected paratransit services withdrawn, the full 
first phase envisaged in 2007 and refined in 2008 will be complete (CoCT, 2007b, 2008; 
McLachlan, personal communication 2014, 26 August). In contrast to an initial transition 
timeline for this project phase spanning just under two years over 2007-2009, in practice the 
process started late in 2008 with an estimated conclusion in 2015 – a period of more than six 
years. 
There are a number of factors that could explain this more than threefold increase in 
timeframe. That the concept of BRT was untested in the South African context would 
certainly have played a part. As a result many of the reform principles of the national Public 
Transport Strategy had to be transferred from experience in other contexts, drawing heavily 
on the Bogota model (as described in Chapter 2). Also, the looming World Cup curtailed the 
time for investigating options and framing the reform programme’s direction. The financial 
mechanisms subsequently had to be put in place and institutional capacity had to be 
developed at local municipal level to implement the programme. In short, the local 
implementation process was subject to national policy and external event pressures. At the 
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practical level the actual transformation plan also had to be designed and hammered out 
around the negotiation table with operators. These negotiations were complicated by national 
government promises made in the face of resistance from paratransit operators early on in the 
transition process – these promises being that operators would not be worse off after the 
transition and that legitimate employment opportunities would be retained. By 2010 it was 
clear that operating the MyCiTi system would be far more costly than originally envisaged 
(CoCT, 2010), and MyCiTi’s profitability would not match that of existing operators. It fell to 
the municipality to make good on the national promise of operators not being worse off, 
adding to the financial burden and impacting on the municipality’s leverage during 
negotiations. Ultimately paratransit operators’ business rights, vested in their operating 
licences, had to be bought out in a process of “compensation”. The transformation model 
furthermore had to meet legal requirements, notably:  
• the National Land Transport Act (No. 5 of 2009) governing, amongst others, the long-
term IPTN vehicle operating contracts and the cancellation options for existing 
operating licences; 
• the Municipal Finance Management Act (No. 56 of 2003), directing municipal 
contracts and financial agreements, including the interim MyCiTi operating contracts;  
• the Companies Act (No. 71 of 2008, Regulations as amended 2011) stipulating the 
manner in which shareholding in the new VOCs was agreed on; and 
• the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (No. 3 of 2000), under which the 
municipality was obliged to make it clear to operators how the MyCiTi contract 
regime and the cancellation of the operating licences would impact them. 
The aforementioned factors made for a multifaceted and difficult situation in which to reach 
agreement on the transformation model. The resulting model was itself complex (as described 
in CoCT, 2010, 2012; supplemented by McLachlan [2013] and personal communication with 
McLachlan in the course of 2011-2014), and ironing out its details was a substantial 
undertaking that hinged on a multitude of individual operators being able to understand and 
accept the offer made to them. The basis for operators being incorporated in MyCiTi was the 
market share by revenue of their existing public transport services that would be affected by 
the new MyCiTi routes. Such revenue was established by a one-day survey in 2008. Operators 
disputed this survey’s results, as it did not capture daily fluctuations in vehicles that were on 
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the road. In October to December 2010 and in late January 2011 a more representative survey 
was undertaken in different weeks and on four different days (Monday, Wednesday, Friday 
and Saturday). Operators again did not accept these results, and a review period ensued 
spanning later months in 2011. This review period was followed by on-board spot checks 
(“dipstick surveys”) on all affected routes, and finally agreement was reached on the results.  
The survey results served three primary purposes. Firstly, it allowed affected associations and 
operators as well as their affected routes to be identified. Secondly, the market share by 
revenue could be equated directly to shareholding in the VOCs and profit sharing in the 
MyCiTi operating contracts. Lastly, the surveys allowed income from existing operations to 
be calculated; these calculations served as the basis for determining compensation. In relation 
to market share, in accordance with Section 79 of the NLTA the municipality could not 
summarily withdraw valid operating licences, and either had to wait for the validity period to 
run out or offer operators an alternative. The alternative – becoming MyCiTi operators – 
proved insufficiently attractive on its own. Thus, the municipality negotiated with operators to 
buy out their businesses, in return for which operators would surrender their licenses. 
Operators who did not want to surrender their licenses in return for compensation could run 
their operations until the expiration date, after which their licences would not be renewed and 
they would not be allowed to re-enter the public transport market.  
In determining compensation three categories of license-holders were identified: operators 
holding definite operating licences, holders of indefinite licenses not yet converted under the 
NLTA or through vehicle scrapping, and “semi-legal” operators. Semi-legal operations were 
those whose vehicles were not in operation and their licenses deemed dormant, or whose 
license applications were submitted but not yet approved. In the survey review period the 
status of semi-legal operators was finalised: the applications in process were expedited and 
the status of dormant or inactive licenses clarified. Indefinite licenses were deemed to have a 
validity period of seven years, the maximum allowed for under the NLTA. Definite licenses 
(including those from the semi-legal group that had been established as being fully valid) 
were assigned a five-year timespan – the average validity period remaining on all such 
affected licenses. To calculate the future profit that operators would lose due to the 
withdrawal of their licenses the municipality subtracted legitimate existing operating expenses 
(e.g. fuel, maintenance, wages and insurance) from the surveyed revenue. The resulting profit 
was then multiplied by the respective five- and seven-year period and discounted to net 
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present value. This was the compensation amount that was offered as a collective pot to each 
association. A proportion of the pot went to the association as a collective (for the good of all 
members) while the majority of proceeds were distributed to affected members.  
Some operators held multiple operating licences, and for each affected license they were 
compensated; their vehicles tied to licenses that were not affected by MyCiTi routes could 
continue operating unchanged. Compensation in the case of paratransit vehicles operating on 
routes only partially overlapping with MyCiTi routes was proportional to the extent of 
overlap. Such affected portions of the route would be struck from the operating licence. With 
the withdrawal of an operating licence the vehicle tied to such a license had to be surrendered 
to the municipality for scrapping. The municipality offered amounts for such vehicles 
depending, amongst other criteria, on market value, age, mileage and condition. From this 
point operators receiving compensation had two options. They could either take compensation 
and a vehicle scrapping pay as a lump sum cash amount and retire from the public transport 
sector, or invest such proceeds in the VOC. Compensation amounts were in the order of 
hundreds of thousands of rands per license, while the scrapping allowance was equivalent to 
the TRP amount.  
In principle the compensation value of one operating licence equated to one share in the VOC. 
The capital from each such share was collected in an association-based holdings company. 
The associations’ holdings companies were in turn the shareholders in the VOC (see Figure 
3-7). The existing bus companies, GABS and Sibanye, were initially envisaged to become 
shareholders at this level, though with the formation of Company C (TBRT) and the 
consolidation of the bus market share in this company the VOCs were either bus-based or 
paratransit-based. Also, though the national and regional paratransit representative bodies that 
initially claimed an interest in the transition process still existed, they held no stake in the 
MyCiTi system. By moving their affected operations across to MyCiTi VOCs, paratransit 
operators left the paratransit industry (either completely or in part) and entered bus operations, 
which fell outside the mandate of these representative bodies. 
Compensation and shareholding in the VOCs attended in large part to the first national 
promise: that of operators not being worse off. The second promise – the retention of 
legitimate employment opportunities – led to a process running parallel to the market share 
surveys in which the municipality and affected operators and associations created an 
employment register. All employees directly employed by paratransit operators (primarily
 





Figure 3-7: Compensation and operating company formation 
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drivers and conductors) were to be placed on the register and as the different Phase 1 routes 
opened would be placed in positions in VOCs and the stations, though these would not 
necessarily be similar to their pre-transition positions. 
In 2012 the municipality made it clear that the introduction of MyCiTi would not impact 
adversely on the overall employment situation in the transition from paratransit to MyCiTi 
services (CoCT, 2012a), and indeed where necessary employees were trained for their new 
duties be it to work on the buses, in stations or at depots. It has, however, proven difficult in 
practice to create enough sustainable opportunities within the MyCiTi system to 
accommodate all affected paratransit employees. Paratransit drivers’ low skill levels have in 
particular made it difficult for them to be trained as bus drivers, and a number of drivers thus 
retrained have already had to be dismissed (McLachlan, personal communication 2014, 15 
August). 
3.3 MOTIVATING FOR GREATER INSIGHT INTO PARATRANSIT 
OPERATORS’ VIEWS 
In conceptual terms the dimensions of public transport reform described in Chapter 2 was an 
attempt to describe the complexity of reform. Such complexity may in part explain the delay 
in implementation of Cape Town’s IPTN. In the case of the MyCiTi project all three axes of 
paratransit operations – business, service and competition regulation – saw change. As the 
Cape Town case showed, it was a difficult path to get paratransit operators to consolidate and 
become shareholders in MyCiTi VOCs. Government’s sustained efforts and significant funds 
injected into the project in the form of transformation stimulus had a clear role to play in 
achieving the outcomes to date. Though it may thus superficially seem that the complexity of 
the task of reform is to blame for slower than anticipated progress – placing significant strain 
on all parties involved in the process – I would suggest that there are subtler motivations 
behind paratransit’s resistance, or lack of enthusiasm, for taking up MyCiTi’s transformation 
offer.  
Paratransit representative bodies above the level of local associations have been left out of the 
reform “deal”. The NTA entered the fray as a voice of dissent around the time of the World 
Cup preparations and registered its opposition to the national policy position. It did not argue 
against the country playing host to the World Cup, but rather that the national government 
took for granted paratransit incorporation into the reformed public transport systems. The 
NTA’s reactions pointed to what appeared to be the national government’s stance that 
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paratransit was inherently bad and had to be eradicated, and that BRT was the mechanism to 
do this. Much of this initial resistance against BRT, in which SANTACO also played a role, 
can probably be ascribed to it becoming a symbol for paratransit reform. With BRT being a 
new concept in South Africa at the time, it would have seemed threatening to large 
representative bodies such as the NTA and SANTACO, and not only to their member 
operators.  
While the local voices of dissent do not seem to have had much impact on policy – but rather 
on the manner in which the municipality engaged with operators – when SANTACO and the 
NTA took up the cause nationally it seems that government took note of paratransit’s voice. 
The labour retention and profitability promises were subsequently made at national level, and 
became part of policy. These promises in turn had to be upheld by the local municipality, 
which impacted on negotiations by placing more power in the hands of paratransit operators. 
Regardless of these later developments, there is little evidence to suggest that operators or any 
of their representative bodies were involved in initial policy formulation. Indeed, the first 
MyCiTi project report (CoCT, 2009:22) confirmed that “broad industry consultation” only 
came well after the municipality penned the project principles in 2007, with the choice of 
wording (my emphasis) suggesting a one-sidedness to such consultation with respect to 
individual associations:  
The process of formal[ly] engaging the broader transport industry started in November 2008. 
Meetings were convened with the Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council (WCPTC) [a branch 
of SANTACO] representing the broader minibus taxi industry. This council has been positive 
about the IRT, although it has reserved its rights and continues its discussions with the City.  
An IRT Summit was arranged on the 27 November 2008 at Ratanga Junction to which two 
representatives from all minibus taxi associations in the Western Cape were invited [to] hear a 
presentation on IRT and to hear views and discuss the project. However, this gathering was 
disrupted and could not continue.  
It was mainly by way of protest that the paratransit operators moved from being listeners to 
having their voices inserted in the policy implementation process. On Arnstein’s (1969) 
ladder of different forms of participation this informing approach is the highest degrees of 
tokenism (see the related discussion in section 1.3). From an initially public sector-imposed 
policy, in practice the reform process became a partnership by necessity, and in some 
instances even collaborative (e.g. in compiling the employee registers). It took time for this 
shift in relationship to emerge, which was not allowed for in the original project planning. It 
also required resolution around the financial principles and cash sums that operators would 
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receive, which, once settled, paved the way for the contractual details to be finalised. It is 
noteworthy that with the emergence of this more constructive engagement process between 
the Cape Town municipality and paratransit operators that emerged after the World Cup, the 
voices of higher-level representative bodies disappeared from the reform policy discourse. 
The reasons behind the delay in TRP implementation are different to those that impacted on 
Cape Town’s IPTN project. In relation to the dimensions of reform, the TRP did not 
necessitate far-reaching changes to paratransit business structures. It focussed rather on the 
individual vehicle and owner and aimed to improve service quality by facilitating access to 
newer, safer vehicles. In these terms the TRP was thus a less complex undertaking than the 
IPTN programme. The TRP was furthermore the direct result of the NTTT’s efforts, which 
captured the voice of paratransit in a national consultative process. It would thus be inaccurate 
to claim that it was a policy formulated solely by the public sector. As Van Schalkwyk (2009) 
notes, one of the key factors behind the failure of the TRP to be widely taken up is the large 
gap between the scrapping allowance and the price of a new approved minibus. However, the 
national government is hardly forcing operators to sign up for scrapping their old minibuses, 
yet there has been a continuous trickle of paratransit owners making use of the upgrade 
facility. Clearly there are different dynamics at play, though unlike in the case of the IPTN 
project, the TRP does not seem to be a site of a power struggle. The TRP in its first six years 
has had a broader geographic reach than the PTS achieved in its first six years, and has 
arguably had a similar wider impact on the quality of service. The differences between the 
two policy programmes, and how they do or do not respond to the views and interests of 
paratransit operators, thus deserve further investigation. 
3.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: REFORM APPROACH AND 
IMPLEMENTATION IN CAPE TOWN 
The first part of the chapter presented three key moments in the evolution of government’s 
approach to paratransit reform since 1994. The first key moment was the formation of the 
National Taxi Task Team (NTTT). The team engaged extensively with paratransit operators, 
and its recommendations informed national transport policy and ultimately led to the creation 
of a comprehensive paratransit representative structure. The NTTT’s findings also led to the 
next key moment in reform evolution: the launch of the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme, 
and its roll-out nationally from 2006. The third and last key moment was the release of the 
DoT’s Public Transport Strategy and associated Action Plan in 2007. This programme sought 
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to install new public transport systems (termed Integrated Public Transport Networks, or 
IPTNs) in major urban areas around the country. These IPTNs would in a phased manner 
consolidate paratransit operators into bus operating companies.  
The second part of the chapter documented the process in which paratransit operators in Cape 
Town were incorporated into this city’s IPTN, the BRT-focussed MyCiTi system. Starting in 
2008 there was relatively unstructured interaction between the municipality and paratransit 
operators. Operator protests and the contractual commitments for public transport service 
improvements for the 2010 FIFA World Cup led to more focussed negotiations with 
operators, particularly with those whose existing routes would be affected by the proposed 
MyCiTi routes. After the World Cup the municipality’s focus turned towards the long-term 
public transport services and the establishment of commercial entities to operators the system. 
At first negotiations centred on interim contracts until these vehicle operating companies 
(VOCs) could be formally constituted. Negotiations were drawn-out and complex, leading to 
the interim regime being extended until 2013. A legal challenge by a subsidised bus operator 
also led to an increase in the number of VOCs in the first-phase system from two to three 
companies. The 12-year negotiated gross cost contracts with these VOCs were concluded in 
2013, and the number of routes expanded since then.  
The TRP and PTS programmes have taken different approaches to public transport reform. 
Reflecting on the conceptual discussion in Chapter 2, the TRP is an in situ paratransit service 
and regulatory improvement approach, while the PTS followed a BRT implementation and 
paratransit assimilation approach. A number of the lessons from international cases presented 
in Chapter 2 also apply to the South African and Cape Town contexts. Public authorities had 
to invest substantial time and effort in developing a constructive relationship with the 
paratransit sector in order to attain their buy-in to an infrastructure-led PTS programme. 
Large-scale formalisation has been difficult to achieve, and the great majority of paratransit 
operators remain outside the IPTN fold in Cape Town. This majority has been largely 
excluded from engagement and their potential reactions are thus untested. The reform 
implementation process has shown that regulatory transitions are more achievable if these are 
developed with due consideration to paratransit businesses’ operating and socio-economic 
environment – the aligned NTTT and TRP process is a case in point. Crucially, while reform 
programme formulation has been led by the public sector, paratransit operators and 
collectives have shown that they hold the power to block change or to force the reform agenda 
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to be amended. The actual motivations of paratransit operators and collectives, and how these 
may correlate or clash with policies of reform, remain poorly understood.  
In order to better understand how paratransit operators could be drivers of change, and how 
the reform programmes could be refocused to facilitate such change, I conducted qualitative, 
semi-structured interviews with a selection of these operators in Cape Town. In Chapter 4 I 
present the method that I followed in selecting and engaging respondents around public 
transport reform and on their business needs and aspirations. In Chapter 5 I present the 
outcomes of these interviews.   
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4 INVESTIGATING PARATRANSIT OPERATORS’ VIEWS: 
INTERVIEW PREPARATION AND PROCESS 
Thus far I illustrated alternative approaches to public transport reform, how the approach in 
Cape Town evolved to focus on the assimilation of paratransit operators into a new BRT 
system, and that paratransit operators have largely been co-opted into participating in reform. 
These outcomes are as yet only a partial response to the research aims, and do not provide 
sufficient guidance to understand ways in which the reform process could be adjusted to 
secure greater cooperation from this crucial group of public transport stakeholders. In this 
chapter I describe how I set out to directly solicit paratransit operators’ views to gain insight 
into their attitudes to reform and into ways in which the current approach to reform might be 
adjusted to capitalise on their business needs and aspirations. I aimed to engage operators on a 
voluntary, open-ended basis with the hope that it would be more constructive and insightful.  
This chapter starts with a description of the research population and the sample of this 
population that I aimed to interview, followed by my framing of the interviews. I then 
describe the way in which I gained access to the sample and how this process impacted on my 
expectations. Subsequent to this I report on the pilot process, how it changed my approach to 
the main interviews, and the process of conducting the main interviews. The chapter closes 
with a description of the actual sample of respondents that I was able to interview, and 
reflecting on this sample, differences between my expectations and experience in practice. 
4.1 POPULATION AND PROPOSED SAMPLE 
MyCiTi’s impact on operators in practice was limited to those whose operating rights were 
affected by new bus routes within a project phase area, and to the associations to which these 
operators belonged. Negotiations were conducted at association level, and the Vehicle 
Operating Companies (VOCs) were defined according to associational divisions. Though it 
was not spelled out, the municipality’s decision to focus engagement at association level was 
likely to have been pragmatic. Associations serve as de facto regulators of market entry, and 
as a result hold significant decision-making power. The number of individuals around the 
negotiating table would also be smaller if only the leaderships (who are operators themselves) 
of affected associations, rather than all affected members, were involved. The Public 
Transport Strategy (PTS) furthermore placed a strong emphasis on a phased approach to the 
roll-out of the public transport reform programme. This approach relied on geographic 
segmentation. The municipality divided the Cape Town urban area into four project phases 
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(see Figure 1-2 in Chapter 1), with the first phase covering the city centre and the coastal belts 
to the north and south. The second planned phase spread into the high-density south-eastern 
sector, and the last two phases were projected to reach the remaining north-eastern and eastern 
sectors. Direct engagement between the municipality and paratransit operators on the MyCiTi 
project did not involve operators below association leadership level. The MyCiTi engagement 
process thus did not provide insight into the attitudes of the majority of paratransit operators 
in Cape Town: not only were the views of member operators (i.e. non-leadership) in the first 
phase area obscure, but also of operators and associations in the other project phase areas.  
My aim was to gain insight into the views on reform and the aspirations of associations’ 
leaders and individual member operators across MyCiTi project areas. Where leaders were 
involved in MyCiTi engagement, dialogue with them could shed light on their views and 
aspirations for their association as a collective that has been affected by reform, as well as for 
their individual businesses. Member operators affected by MyCiTi could again reveal 
attitudes around MyCiTi’s impact on their businesses, but also their views on how they were 
being represented by their leadership in the MyCiTi negotiations. In contrast to association 
leaders and operators affected by the first phase of MyCiTi, for leaders and operators outside 
this project phase, MyCiTi engagement and its impacts on their businesses were still only 
prospects. Their attitudes to reform and their aspirations for their own businesses were 
unlikely to have been shaped as closely by MyCiTi as were those of leaders and operators 
whose associations and businesses were involved in the formation of first-phase MyCiTi 
VOCs.  
The MyCiTi project, as an example of PTS implementation, was not the only reform 
impacting on paratransit operators in Cape Town. Understanding operators’ attitudes to 
reform also involved testing their views on the TRP. While all paratransit operators had 
access to the TRP vehicle replacement mechanism, it was possible that operators in the first 
phase of MyCiTi might focus more on concerns related to MyCiTi’s reshaping of their entire 
business environment, and less on the more moderate changes heralded by the TRP (as per the 
dimensions of reform discussed in Chapter 2). Operators outside the first phase of MyCiTi 
might offer more insight into the TRP as the MyCiTi project did not yet impact directly on 
their businesses.   
The research population was thus all paratransit operators in Cape Town. In order to draw 
comparisons between attitudes in the different project phases and across different 
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associations, I initially proposed to select a sample of operators along the lines of the project 
phases and the associations in each such phase. At the time, in 2011, the City of Cape Town’s 
2007 Operating licences strategy (CoCT, 2007a) was the latest available record of the 
associations operating locally in the city, and it indicated that there were 104 such 
associations. I matched the associations against the project phase within which they fell (see 
Appendix A: Associations by MyCiTi project phase). The result was nine associations based 
in the first phase region, 67 in the second phase, four in third phase, and 24 in the last project 
phase. Due to the qualitative approach to interviewing operators (as discussed in Chapter 1) I 
had to conduct and record all interviews, and for time and resource reasons I limited the 
selection to 15 associations, preceded by a pilot amongst two more associations. 
Proportionally this translated into one association in Phase 1, 10 in Phase 2, one in Phase 3 
and three in Phase 4. For the purposes of comparability between associations within the same 
project phase I increased the sub-sample in Phase 1 and 3 from one to two associations each 
(and reduced that of Phase 2 to eight). Because it was not possible to know at that time which 
associations would allow access, or be reachable in the first instance, I accepted that it might 
be necessary to adjust the number and proportional distribution of associations later on. 
Within the phase-based delineation my aim was to interview a sample of operators in each 
association to cover different conditions under which they might typically ply their trade. 
Some operators might not have been registered for income tax purposes nor hold operating 
licences, which from the regulatory point of view would be informal ownership and privately 
regulated competition (or “pirates” in colloquial terms), while others might have operated 
under a formal business structure and with full fleets of publicly licensed vehicles. It was not 
possible at the outset to say what range of operators between the ‘formal’ and informal’ 
extremes could be engaged, but my intention was to interview at least one operator with a 
large fleet of vehicles and one operator with only one vehicle in each association. The 
minimum sample of respondents that I aimed to interview would thus amount to 30 
individuals, or 30 separate interviews. In addition there would be the four pilot interviews. I 
would elicit respondents’ views on the associations to which they belonged, and then gauge 
what would be feasible or necessary in terms of engaging further operators between the 
large/small fleet extremes and/or specifically target those holding leadership positions.  
The purpose of interviewing a spectrum of operator respondents was to shed light on the 
degree to which there was a diversity of needs and aspirations within the paratransit sector 
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and between operators and their associations. This in turn could provide insight into the 
appropriateness of the current reform programmes that offered all operators the same options 
(incorporation in a IPTN VOC and/or vehicle recapitalisation) and into the method followed 
in the MyCiTi project of engaging operators indirectly through their associations. By way of a 
hypothetical example, a small fleet owner might have concerns primarily at a day-to-day 
subsistence level and be of the opinion that his or her voice carried no weight in the 
association, whereas a large fleet owner might be more concerned about longer-term fleet 
renewal and financing costs and have in mind a future in the formal sector. Association 
leaders’ concerns may altogether be different, and may centre on maintaining their funding 
streams and influence over operators. Targeting across the spectrum of respondents might 
reveal if and under what conditions heterogeneous policy, regulatory and engagement 
approaches would be more appropriate.  
4.2 INTERVIEW FRAMING 
To understand operators’ reactions to the imposition, impact and fit of reform policies 
required investigating not only their attitudes towards these policies, but also the context 
shaping these attitudes. In effect it required sketching a before-and-after picture of what 
changed, and then capturing operators’ views on such change. As a guide I referred to the 
dimensions of reform as discussed in Chapter 2 and the description of the reform proposals 
and implementation process from Chapter 3. Table 4-1 shows the result. The column on the 
left covers the main aspects of each of the dimensions of reform that underwent some form of 
change, while the remaining columns compare these aspects across the pre-reform, TRP and 
MyCiTi contexts. A change in shading represents a shift from the pre-reform state. 
As a next step I compiled a four-part interview schedule that could capture operators’ and 
associations’ views on the various changes that the reform programmes imposed, whether 
there were needs not met by the reform programmes, as well as details on the specific context 
of the respective associations and operators. The schedule was divided into two sections each 
for association leaders and for operators (see Appendix B: Pilot interview schedule). Section 
A contained questions that would characterise the association (its structure, business interests, 
membership and routes), followed by qualitative questions in section B on competitiveness 
with other modes, regulation, the two policy programmes and the association’s aspirations 
and needs. Section C was a similar characterisation to section A, except that it focussed on the 
operator’s individual business – its history, size, labour and financial aspects, and relationship 
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to the association. This would allow me to place each operator respondent in the sampling 
spectrum. The qualitative questions in section D were the same as those in section B.  
Table 4-1: Operators' context before and after reform 
 pre-reform TRP and NLTTA MyCiTi / IPTN and NLTA 
competition    
regulatory 
mechanism 
radius-based, indefinite or 
definite operating licence 
all operating licences 
converted to definite 
negotiated 12-year contract, 
definite operating licence 
competition type in the market in the market for the market 
rights holder paratransit operator paratransit operator VOC 
market entry 
control 
public authority and  
operator association 
public authority and  
operator association 
public authority 
business    
ownership 
structure 







shareholder in VOC 
management 
structure 
operator and association  operators and association  VOC board 
income 
cash income from 
target/commission system 
cash income from 
target/commission system 
compensation and dividends 
from contract profit  
financial 
resources 
personal, lending institutions 
personal, lending institutions, 
scrapping allowance 
public sector subsidy, lending 
institutions, share capital 
service    
unit of service 
(legal) 
vehicle with seating capacity 
as specified by various Acts 
DoT-specified mini- or midi-
bus 
public authority-specified bus 
schedule unscheduled unscheduled scheduled 
routes 
radius-based or origin and 
destination points 
origin and destination points, 
route sometimes defined 




major ranks, some time-
restricted rights-of-way 
major ranks, some time-
restricted rights-of-way 
stations, stops, depots, 
permanent trunk rights-of-way 
    
The purpose of this two-part structure was to ease respondents into the interview process 
(O’Leary [2005] notes the importance of doing so). I expected that views around policy, 
regulation and reform were likely to be strong and might lead to ‘venting’ on the part of 
respondents – I was conscious of the possibility of outbursts similar to those against the 
municipality reported on in Chapter 3. The first part of the interview would thus explore 
arguably less controversial and more matter-of-fact elements. The purpose of these shorter, 
 102  
non-qualitative exchanges was not only to establish rapport with the respondents prior to 
moving on to more difficult subjects explored in the second part of the interview, but also to 
gain key information that would allow respondents to be located within the sampling frame. 
The second part was also strategically planned. It opened with prompts that could lead 
respondents to consider external or broader points of view – that of passengers and of the 
paratransit industry as a whole – before delving into the more complex arena of policy and 
regulatory transformation. It was a concern that the first part of the interview might take 
longer than expected to complete, thus compromising the time available for discussing the 
second part and leading to respondent fatigue. However, if the interview commenced with 
what I foresaw to be the most controversial matter first it could be difficult for me to direct 
the course of the interview thereafter. The only way in which I would know if these fears 
were founded was to conduct pilot interviews, but to do so first required gaining access to the 
research population.  
4.3 ACCESS  
I planned to pilot the interview process with two associations and their operators, to be drawn 
from amongst the eight associations that had already been engaged by the municipality in the 
first phase of the MyCiTi project. My motivation for piloting with this group was that access 
had already been established, if not directly at operator level, then at least with the relevant 
associations. There were many uncertainties prior to embarking on the interviews that could 
only be dealt with in actually conducting them. Amongst other concerns I did not know how 
many or which operators or associations I would be able to access, whether they would be 
willing or able to reflect on their relationship with their associations and operator colleagues, 
or to what extent I would encounter difficulties in running the interviews in practice. The 
greatest challenge was access. In the course of 2009 and 2010 I explored many opportunities 
to find an “informant” – an insider who is part of the research population (Fontana & Frey, 
2000) – or alternatively a public sector official or consultant with existing contact with 
paratransit operators or associations who could facilitate access.  
It was through a meeting with a World Bank-funded delegation from Dakar in mid-2010 that I 
was fortuitously introduced to the transition facilitator for MyCiTi’s Company B, Mr Nico 
McLachlan. I subsequently established a good rapport with him, and in a discussion early in 
January 2011 he offered to assist in arranging access to these operators. I was aware that, 
because of the group of prospective MyCiTi Phase 1 operators’ prior exposure to the policy 
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programme, their responses – especially around the mechanisms of reform – might be 
different to those of operators in other parts of the city who remained as yet unengaged. 
Responses from the pilot group would nevertheless remain valid as these would still fall 
within the aims of the research, i.e. to test paratransit associations’ and operators’ attitudes 
towards regulation and reform.  
A further potential difficulty that I foresaw was gaining access to operators outside the first 
phase area as these operators were hard to reach (see the research approach discussion on this 
in Chapter 1). However, pre-existing links between operators inside and beyond the first 
phase divide could allow for a snowballing approach to establish contact. What I also hoped 
for was that the pilot interviews would prove my credibility and independence from 
government-led processes and that this would ease access to operators outside Phase 1. Mr 
McLachlan mentioned that he was supported in the transition negotiations by Mr Thabiso 
Botha, who had inside connections to associations and the broader paratransit industry 
structures in Cape Town. Mr Botha was also fluent in all three of the regional languages – 
Afrikaans, English and isiXhosa. Mr Botha was not strictly speaking an informant as he was 
not part of the research population, but at the very least he could open doors to a greater 
segment of the research population than only operators in the first MyCiTi phase. He could 
also assist in case language proved to be a barrier. 
I was able to establish contact with Mr Botha in June 2011 and he agreed to assist me in 
conducting the interviews. We met that same month, on 20 June, to discuss his role and how 
we would go about arranging the pilot interviews. I also asked him for his advice on the 
interview process, on the content of the interview schedule, and on issues related to the 
paratransit industry that I was unclear on but did not want to explore during the interview 
process. I was concerned about my personal safety during the interviews and on how I would 
be received by operators. I was not proficient in interviewing as a research method and I 
expected that operators’ hostile reactions to the MyCiTi project and IPTN programme would 
carry through into the interviews and into the way that respondents saw me. Mr Botha allayed 
these fears by confirming that my approach of using an intermediary familiar to operators was 
appropriate as a way in and would build the foundation for operators to trust me. My 
independence from any form of government entity would also count in my favour. The 
response to my question on how I should record interviews was not to use an audio recording 
device as it would likely undermine trust. Regardless of any reassurance of confidentiality I 
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could give, respondents might not want to have their voices “on record”. I thus had to record 
interviews using handwritten notes (this is the reason for the brevity of illustrative quotations 
in the next chapter as there were no recordings that could be transcribed). 
In relation to the interview schedule he suggested that I steer clear of direct questions about 
operators’ business finances, as this was a sensitive topic. MyCiTi compensation package 
values were directly related to paratransit businesses' profits, and thus were a sensitive issue 
during negotiations between the municipality and affected operators. Mr Botha did, however, 
provide me with an overview of operators’ typical cash flows and generally how operators 
manage their businesses, which was informed by his involvement in the MyCiTi operator 
transition process and prior work in the paratransit sector. It furthermore seemed that my 
ambition of targeting a spectrum of operators was wishful. In Mr Botha’s view smaller 
operators were unlikely to express their individual points of view or be accessible for 
interviewing, nor would operators be willing to speak out about association-related issues that 
irked them. Associations would be gatekeepers to individual operators, not unexpected given 
my prior understanding of their unofficial role as regulators. It was unlikely that operators 
would step over this boundary out of fear of displeasing the larger more powerful operators or 
association leaders and of potential reprisal. As a result I accepted that I would have to access 
both leaders’ and operators’ attitudes during the same interview. I amended the interview 
schedule by omitting the original Part B; I would ask about the characteristics of the 
association, followed by those of the businesses of each of the respondents, and last gather 
their collective views on the industry and on reform.  
I not only had to revise my ambitions of directly accessing individual operators. It also 
quickly became evident that the associations that I could access depended on those that Mr 
Botha had ties with11, and that my proportional allocation across project phases was 
unrealistic. His contacts were concentrated in the first project phase, understandably so due to 
his involvement in the industry transition process in this phase. Across other project phases 
his connections were uneven and limited. As a first step we agreed on conducting only one 
pilot interview with an association outside the first project phase, after which we would 
decide how best to proceed based on both his and my impressions of what would be feasible 
and adequate to cover my research needs. We could always fall back on the Phase 1 operators 
                                                
11 Despite exhaustive efforts I could not identify a similarly positioned individual who had direct 
access to paratransit associations in Cape Town and who had insight into the paratransit business 
model, the MyCiTi industry transition process and the TRP programme.  
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if those in the other phase areas could not be accessed, since the views of those in the first 
phase were better known than in other areas as they had already been exposed to the industry 
transition process. We also agreed that we would wait until after the pilot to discuss the terms 
under which I would engage his intermediary services. 
4.4 INTERVIEW PILOTING 
For the pilot Mr Botha and I selected an association operating in Gugulethu, falling in the 
second project phase. The respondents’ first language was isiXhosa, so it was likely that we 
would also be able to test how translation, interpretation, and note taking worked during the 
interview. Mr Botha contacted the association and arranged a meeting venue at the Civic 
Centre in central Cape Town – where his office was at the time – for an interview in July 
2011. The association was not averse to meeting at Mr Botha’s office despite it being at the 
municipality headquarters, which I did not perceive to be a neutral venue. We did not know 
before the interview started how many respondents from the association would attend. In the 
end three respondents arrived for the interview, all serving on the association’s executive 
board. Mr Botha introduced me and my research, after which I gave an overview of the 
interview process. This covered points such as confidentiality, record-keeping and 
respondents’ option to end the interview at any time. I also handed out a hard copy 
introductory letter from the Centre for Transport Studies (Appendix C: Introductory letter). 
The respondents were from the outset receptive to being interviewed. I started by posing the 
short questions in Sections A of the interview schedule in English, and the respondents 
answered in isiXhosa followed by Mr Botha translating back to English. I then noted the 
question number, which respondent was speaking, and what the response was as succinctly as 
possible. The respondents appeared to understand most of what I was saying, asking only for 
specific translations every now and then, but only responded in isiXhosa. Section B of the 
interview, on operators’ own businesses, followed in a similar manner. The short question-
and-answer format seemed overly mechanical. It was only when we got to the open-ended, 
qualitative questions in Section C that the respondents became more animated and my role in 
the interview changed from what felt to me like being an interrogator to being a discussion 
prompter.  
After the interview I completed the response column in the interview schedule, typed up my 
handwritten notes, added recalled details to responses as well as my comments that I did not 
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capture in writing during the interview, and noted my personal reflection on the interview. My 
sense was that this first pilot interview had been a success, but it did prompt me to consider 
focussing less on the short questions as they took up time, especially in having to be 
translated. Interview time would be better utilised in exploring the topics of industry 
connections, regulation and reform in more depth. Moreover, with having to shift my 
expectations around accessing different types of operators it became less important to try to 
characterise respondents and associations, and more important to allow individual 
respondents within the group setting to express their opinions and identify issues that were 
important to them at both individual and collective levels. The pilot did not highlight any 
other serious issues in my approach to conducting interviews. Handwritten note-taking with 
recall shortly after could work as a recording method; the intermediary’s presence and 
capacity to translate were essential; and I could access attitudes relating both to collective 
(association and industry) and individual (operator’s history and business) concerns.  
4.5 MAIN INTERVIEWS 
Subsequent to the pilot interview I prepared a revised sampling strategy and made some 
adjustments to the interview schedule (see Appendix D: Main interview schedule). On a map 
of Cape Town I marked out the MyCiTi project phases and the main suburbs in each phase. 
When Mr Botha and I met again we marked on this map which associations he had contact 
with. The purpose of the map was to maintain a balance across the city’s geographic area as 
well as across project phases. We identified four associations that he would approach after our 
meeting for potential interviews – one in each project phase – and four more to be contacted 
at a later stage12. It thus seemed that the potential sample would be limited to eight 
associations, plus the completed first pilot interview. In view of this limited access there 
seemed to be no purpose in conducting further pilot interviews, and given that the pilot had 
been mostly successful the priority was rather to conduct as many interviews as possible.  
Mr Botha agreed to arrange interview times and venues, either at the associations’ offices or 
at the Cape Town Civic Centre. In preparing for the first set of interviews I prompted him 
with times and dates that I would be available over the following two to three weeks, and he 
contacted the associations. Practice yet again proved different to my expectations. In February 
                                                
12 The chairperson of the Western Cape Provincial Taxi Council (the regional branch of SANTACO) 
had close ties to one of these associations, and if he could have been interviewed it might have brought 
a regional perspective to my interviews. In the end the interview did not materialise. 
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2012 we conducted two interviews, and in May 2012 a further three. The gap between 
interviews was the result of operators’ and Mr Botha’s limited availability: all the interviews 
had to take place during off-peak paratransit operating hours in the late morning or early 
afternoon, and Mr Botha had on-going and often clashing work and travel commitments. With 
the intermediary’s time not being under my direct control it took far more effort to arrange 
and conclude each interview. This was contrary to my initial assumption that interviews 
would be hampered primarily by paratransit associations’ and owners’ resistance to being 
interviewed by a person outside of their own industry and culture.  
Drawing on my experience with the pilot interview, I adjusted the structure of the interview. 
At the beginning of each interview Mr Botha would introduce me and the aims of my 
research, followed by an outline by him of the City of Cape Town’s MyCiTi project and of 
his role during the interview as facilitator. After this I took the lead for the remainder of the 
interview. First I specified the key (qualitative) topics that I hoped to gain respondents’ views 
on: public sector regulation, operators’ business needs and aspirations, and the two reform 
programmes. Thereafter I quickly covered the characterisation questions. In some of the 
interviews operators were in any case reticent to give details of the fleets that they operated or 
of their broader business interests.  
Including the pilot interview, three of the interviews took place at a meeting room at the Civic 
Centre, and three at the associations’ own offices. The duration of the interviews did not vary 
significantly: four of the interviews lasted an hour and a half, one two hours and one an hour 
and a quarter. The duration was determined by respondents’ available time and fatigue, which 
appeared to set in after about an hour and a half. Of greatest concern to nearly all respondents 
was their anonymity, and in the case of two of the interviews it took some time to overcome 
respondents’ resistance to the interview being conducted once they learnt what the subject of 
the interview was. In one of the latter cases respondents’ initial reaction verged on being 
openly hostile, but after some minutes of frankly presenting the motivations behind my 
research and my express aim of not being partisan, the interview proceeded and in fact proved 
very insightful. The decision not to use an audio recording device, but rather only hand-
written notes taken during the interview (see Appendix E: Interview notes example), seemed 
to have been significant to gaining respondents’ trust. A further factor that appeared to impact 
positively on respondents’ willingness to be interviewed was my affiliation with a university 
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rather than a government agency. My attempt not to gain access to associations via a 
government contact may also have played a role in confirming my ‘independent’ status. 
Unexpectedly, it was the question on the way in which respondents entered the paratransit 
industry that gave significant momentum in many of the interviews. Particularly older 
respondents would expound on this topic, after which the interview flow turned to the key 
topics that I wished to explore with minimal prompting from me. In an organic manner all the 
key topics invariably came up in each interview, though not always in the same order. 
Ultimately the interview schedule served mostly as an aid to my recall after the interview, 
rather than as a structuring tool during the interview (see Appendix F: Interview records). By 
the last of these interviews little new information was emerging even though by this point I 
had interviewed respondents from three of the four MyCiTi projects phases, and I was 
therefore no longer concerned about not reaching my initial target of 15 associations or about 
covering all the project phases. Moreover, the only missing project phase was the fourth one, 
which lay furthest into the future.  
By 2013 my focus had turned to analysing the interviews, and starting to draw lessons across 
the different narratives of my thesis. In May 2013 a representative from a non-governmental 
organisation acting on behalf of the two mother bodies13 in Cape Town contacted the Centre 
for Transport Studies at UCT. Engagement around MyCiTi Phase 2 had just started, and the 
operations of these mother bodies were centred in this project phase area. Additionally, one of 
the mother bodies was to be involved in the MyCiTi pilot service in this project area, the N2 
Express, which was aimed to be launched by late 2013. The representative, Ms Siwe Coka, 
approached CfTS as she was unclear on the municipality’s intentions and was looking for 
guidance from an independent party on what MyCiTi entailed and how operators should 
prepare themselves for it. Her enquiry was forwarded to me, subsequent to which we met in 
my office. I suggested to her the possibility of interviewing members from these two grouping 
as a first step to understanding their concerns, which was taken up enthusiastically by both her 
and the leadership of the two mother bodies. In June 2013 the mother bodies arranged three 
groups of respondents to be interviewed by me. The first group of eight respondents was from 
the upper leadership of the mother bodies themselves, the second involved five individual 
                                                
13 Prior to conducting the interviews I was unclear on what the mother bodies were other than the 
generic “umbrella organisations” that the City of Cape Town’s Operating licences strategy (CoCT, 
2007b:37) refers to. The interview findings allowed me to detail the structure of the paratransit 
industry in Cape Town – see a graphic representation of this in Figure 5-1 in Chapter 5. 
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route managers, and the third was a group of eight minibus drivers. Though the latter fell 
outside the target population of my research, it offered an unexpected opportunity to gain 
additional insight into the broader industry.  
Ms Coka was present at each of these interviews, and played a similar intermediary role to Mr 
Botha. However, though she facilitated access to the respondents and translated from isiXhosa 
to English where necessary, she did not have the intimate knowledge of the MyCiTi industry 
transition process that Mr Botha had. Prior to and between these interviews Ms Coka and I 
met at her request, during which she posed various questions of her own or that the operators 
she represented had asked her. These questions centred on public transport regulation in South 
Africa and in Cape Town, the aims of the national reform programmes, what the MyCiTi 
project comprised, and the details of MyCiTi approach to industry transition. I responded by 
offering her insights that I had gained into these topics as described in Chapter 3. 
In conducting the last three interviews with Ms Coka as intermediary I used the same method 
as with the previous interviews. There were some differences, as noted hereafter, but none of 
these made the findings less insightful or useful:  
• the respondent body approached me, as opposed to the other way around, and 
resistance to being interviewed was not an issue; 
• the mother bodies’ representative filled the role of intermediary and translator, and 
was not remunerated;  
• the interviews took place on the UCT campus, which respondents reportedly saw as a 
neutral space;  
• the respondents were open to being recorded on an audio device, though I took 
handwritten notes in the same manner as with previous interviews for the sake of 
consistency; and 
• I omitted the ownership-related questions when I interviewed the drivers, instead 
adding a prompting question on the driver’s work relationship with the vehicle owner. 
As with the earlier interviews, responses converged around public sector regulation, business 
needs and aspirations (except in the case of drivers), and the TRP and MyCiTi programmes.  
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4.6 ACTUAL SAMPLE 
In total there were 30 operator and eight driver respondents across the nine interviews, 
although the number of respondents varied widely from one association to the next, as did the 
position of each respondent within the association structure and the number of minibuses 
owned by each. Responses to the characterisation questions allowed me to capture these 
differences (see Table 4-2). The respondents present at each interview were determined by 
who from the association’s board was available or by whom the association board chose to 
have present. Of specific note is that the chairman of TA414 stated that the association’s board 
had selected particular interview respondents to offer varied points of view. The board’s 
resulting selection included two members who were not on the board, one of whom was male 
and one female. By the association’s admission female owners were a small minority in the 
paratransit sector (this is also evident from casual observations at paratransit ranks and on the 
road). Both of these non-board member respondents participated in the interview exchange as 
opposed to being merely observers. They were the only non-board member operators across 
all interviews, and the male respondent was furthermore the only owner-driver respondent. He 
was also the only respondent to own only one vehicle. The remainder of respondents reported 
owning a diverse numbers of vehicles – all minibuses – many of which were at the national 
average fleet size estimate of two vehicles per owner (Barrett 2003). The largest reported 
fleets of 12 minibuses were owned by a respondent from TA6, all in his personal capacity, 
and one from TA2. In the case of the latter, two minibuses were owned personally and 10 by a 
company registered to him.  
                                                
14  In South Africa paratransit associations are commonly called “taxi associations”, which I 
abbreviated to “TAs” in documenting the interviews. 
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Table 4-2: Respondents by operator association 
 
 TA1 TA2 TA3 TA4 TA5 TA6 TA7&8a TA7&8b TA7&8c total 
MyCiTi project phase  2 2 2, 1a 3 2 1 2 2 2  
Number of respondents  3 2 3b 8 1 1 7 5c,d 8 38 
Position in association Board leadershipe & operator 1 1  3 1 1 7   14 
  Board member & operator 2 1 3 2    5  13 
  Board member & non-operator    1      1 
 Operator only    2      2 
  Driver only         8 8 
Minibuses per respondent Owned in personal capacity 2 2f 5g 2h 4 12 < 6i 1 or 3 n/a  
 Owned in corporate capacity  10f         
 
Notes: 
a One respondent operated paratransit services in both the first and second MyCiTi project phases 
b One respondent left the interview for an unknown reason three-quarters of the way into the interview 
c These respondents were managers of routes on which the associations’ members operated 
d One of these respondents was also in interview TA7&8a, though in this instance he was a respondent in relation to his capacity as route manager 
e Chairman, vice-chairman or deputy vice-chairman of the association’s board 
f One respondent owned two vehicles in a personal capacity; both owned 10 vehicles in a corporate capacity 
g None of the respondents wanted to reveal the actual number of minibuses they owned, but stated that five minibuses each would be a fair estimate 
h Average number across the entire association as reported as agreed by the respondents during the interview 
i The respondents only reported owning multiple vehicles; the limit within the association is six per owner as stated by a TA7&8b respondent 
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4.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: INTERVIEW PREPARATION AND 
PROCESS 
As set out in Chapter 1 paratransit operators indeed proved to be a hard-to-reach research 
population. My initial expectations around the process that I would follow in engaging this 
group had to be amended to suit the complex environment that they occupy, as did the way in 
which I conducted the interviews. Three considerations arising from my experience of 
expectations and practice as discussed above deserve particular mention. The first centres on 
the intermediary. It was difficult to find a suitably skilled individual to fill this role, but it was 
absolutely essential to do so. The intermediary’s key contribution was to facilitate the 
interviews, but an additional role that I did not initially foresee was to serve as a sounding 
board for me before and after the interviews. The second consideration is that I had to learn 
on an ongoing basis. As the process that I described in this chapter illustrates, there were a 
number of obstacles that arose in the course of preparing for and conducting the interviews 
that I could not have dealt with before actually embarking on the process, nor that any 
qualitative research textbook would have adequately prepared me for. This demonstrates one 
of the core strengths of the qualitative approach allied to semi-structured interviewing – that it 
allows for flexibility in the face of uncertainty. This is the third consideration: I had to accept 
that unpredictability was part of the research context and of the research population. I was not 
only testing the attitudes of respondents, but also testing my own ability to deal with 
uncertainty in the research process; I could not be rigid in my expectations of the respondents 
or of the research technique.  
From having thus far only reported on the preparation and process aspects of the interviews 
that I conducted, in the Chapter 5 I turn to the interview results and my observations on 
applying this research method in practice. It would be somewhat premature to draw further 
conclusions on the research technique – that is, semi-structured interviewing – before a 
discussion of the results that my application of this technique yielded.   
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5 INVESTIGATING PARATRANSIT OPERATORS’ VIEWS: 
INTERVIEW RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
Whereas in Chapter 4 I documented my preparations for, and the process of, conducting 
interviews with paratransit operators, in this chapter I discuss the results that my application 
of the qualitative semi-structured interview method yielded. The purpose of this research 
procedure was to gain first-hand insight into the needs and aspirations of paratransit operators, 
as well as into their attitudes towards public transport reform in Cape Town. This was a 
partial response to the second research question, which aimed to match paratransit 
respondents’ views to the existing approach to reform (Chapter 6 completes the response to 
this question). The views of paratransit respondents could then provide guidance in reflecting 
on the prospects of the current reform approach in this city and guide ways in which the 
current reform approach might be adjusted to secure more effective paratransit participation in 
reform (which is also discussed in Chapter 6).  
This chapter has two main parts. In the first part I discuss the attitudes, aspirations and needs 
that respondents voiced during the interviews. This discussion is structured according to four 
themes that emerged from the interview responses, which were again linked to the research 
questions. The first two themes inform the first research question on government’s approach 
to reform. These themes are the paratransit organisational context, and attitudes to 
government-led reform programmes. The third theme is individual and collective business 
needs, which relates directly to the second research question. The fourth theme is operators’ 
aspirations and alternative reform strategies, which again relates directly to the second 
research question as well as to the third research question on potential adjustments to the 
approach to reform. In the second part of the chapter I discuss my observations on the non-
verbal outcomes of the interviews. These observations centre on the issues of trust and on the 
hierarchical structure of the paratransit industry, which is connected to all three research 
questions.   
5.1 RESPONSES 
The handwritten notes that I took during interviews included verbatim quotations of responses 
(or translated responses) that were relevant to the research questions or further illustrated 
respondents’ attitudes. Since audio recording was not possible during most interviews (as 
described in Chapter 4) I had to limit the number and length of these quotations as capturing 
them diverted my attention away from what respondents said immediately afterwards. In a 
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small number of instances I failed to note the speaker, especially when multiple respondents 
spoke at once while I was taking notes and following the discussion thread. These are marked 
as such below; where noted I assigned a respondent (“R”) number, e.g. R3 from TA4. In the 
previous chapter I noted that there were some differences between the first six and the last 
three interviews, notably that the latter involved respondents from two associations in the 
same interview. To be clear on which group of respondents I cite I refer to the interview with 
the mother body leadership as TA7&8a, with the route managers as TA7&8b, and with the 
drivers as TA7&8c.  
The lack of audio recordings meant that it was not possible to have a complete set of 
transcripts to analyse for keywords or trends using qualitative data analysis software such as 
NVivo or RQDA. As reflected later in this chapter, lack of trust and scepticism of outside 
intervention proved to be a major issue amongst respondents. After conducting the interviews 
I felt vindicated in the decision not to use audio recordings as it would have undermined my 
ability to build trust with respondents and to explore in detail the sensitive topics of the inner 
workings of the paratransit industry and of respondents’ own businesses (see also the 
discussion on the hard-to-reach nature of paratransit operators in Chapter 1). I thus had to 
accept the compromise of not having a set of complete transcripts but at least being able to 
conduct interviews.  
The respective intermediaries and I had a brief discussion after each interview, if their time 
allowed, to reflect on the attitudes of the respondents particularly in relation to how such 
views were aligned or opposed to the national and local public transport reform approaches. 
Once I had conducted all the interviews I searched my typed interview records for common 
threads, informed by the discussions with the intermediaries and my research questions. I 
subsequently created a spreadsheet to sort responses and related quotations according to the 
aforementioned threads and by the interview to which the response or quotation belonged (see 
Appendix G: Interview results analysis). I linked these threads to the themes captured in the 
research questions, which I consolidated into a four-part discussion.  
The first part is the organisational context of respondents and their relationship with public 
authorities. If government agencies want to engage operators around reform it is important to 
know if paratransit representative organisations such as SANTACO are an effective conduit 
for information and access to operators. If operators are hostile to one another and to 
government agencies it would also impact on paratransit operators’ willingness to participate 
 115  
in reform. The second part focuses on respondents’ attitudes to the two reform programmes, 
how they have been engaged around the programmes (if at all), and what their views are 
around the prospects of these programmes. The third part centres on respondents’ perceptions 
of current individual business needs and collective industry needs. If these needs could be 
better met by reform it could secure greater operator participation in reform. Conversely, if 
current reform programmes do not meet these needs it could offer insight into operators’ 
resistance to these programmes. The last part discusses respondents’ aspirations for their own 
businesses and the paratransit industry, and their internal attempts at reforming their 
operations. If the government reform programmes were to be reviewed, the programmes 
might obtain greater participation from paratransit operators if the revisions reflected 
operators’ aspirations and their own reform attempts where possible. 
Paratransit organisational context and relationship with public authorities 
Attitudes towards the present regulatory system centred on the institutions and rules 
governing paratransit operations. There were two streams of responses: the first related to the 
institutions and rules within the paratransit sector, the second to public sector agencies. 
Paratransit institutions 
The higher levels of the paratransit hierarchy – i.e. regional and national representative 
structures – were perceived to be withholding information received from the national 
government. The information appeared to relate to changes to policy and regulatory systems 
affecting paratransit operations, although concrete examples were not mentioned. In the eyes 
of some respondents reasons for the lack of information flow were corruption and power 
struggles between factions and individuals within those structures, particularly within 
SANTACO. Respondents in TA2 and TA3 were previously on the boards of SANTACO and 
the allied WCPTC, and their views may have been influenced by the circumstances of their 
departure from these entities; indeed, two of these respondents intimated that they were forced 
out of SANTACO in recent years. With respect to the opinion that SANTACO was not 
fulfilling its mandate in return for the government funding and membership fees that it 
received, one respondent (R7) from TA4 spoke on behalf of his association:  
We have little love for those people [at SANTACO] – they are stealing from us. 
In relation to operations on the ground, and contrary to my expectations that saturation within 
the paratransit market would be one of the issues raised during the interviews, two respondent 
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groups stated that such over-trading was in fact not a problem. However, in general when 
respondents were asked whether they believed there were too many paratransit businesses and 
vehicles in the city, the question went unanswered. There are a few possible reasons or 
combinations of reasons for this reticence to answer. In general, responses in the different 
interviews revealed that by and large respondents appear to view their paratransit businesses 
within a limited timeframe (i.e. daily, weekly or at most monthly) and limited scale (i.e. only 
on their own routes or routes within their association). There could thus have been an outright 
inability or unwillingness to believe that saturation was a problem – it requires a longer-term 
view to observe its cumulative effects. A further reason could be resistance to any argument 
that the paratransit operating model was flawed and in need of reform, since from the 
individual or association perspective the model might be seen to function well enough. 
Another reason could be that it was easier to shift the blame for saturation on competitors in a 
bid to protect the association’s own “right” of operating. In support of this latter motivation, 
there were concerns that associations were undermining one another, as well as a common 
view that that territoriality was characteristic of the paratransit industry. Nonetheless, TA7 
and TA8 members were allowed a maximum fleet size of six vehicles; it could be argued that 
this could at least in part be an attempt to counteract saturation, though it could also serve to 
balance power within the association.  
Relationship with public sector agencies 
There was a common perception that government officials were hostile to paratransit 
operators. This applied particularly in the case of traffic law enforcement officers, who were 
seen to be targeting paratransit drivers more than other road users. Moreover, where 
paratransit operators had access to dedicated infrastructure, in the form of lanes reserved for 
public transport vehicles, these were perceived not to be properly policed. There were not 
only problems reported in relation to law enforcement. The general attitude amongst 
government officials when dealing with paratransit interests was seen to be unfavourable. In 
the words of R1 from TA5:  
You know, the taxi industry is not being taken seriously … our problems just get bigger and 
bigger. 
Nonetheless, the same respondent was of the view that the agency tasked with awarding 
paratransit operating licences (at the time known as the Provincial Operating Licensing 
Board, latterly called the Provincial Regulatory Entity) was performing adequately. This was 
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not a common view: many other respondents reported problems in the license application and 
awarding processes. R1 from TA5 continued by stating that the issue was not the number of 
vehicles on the road, but rather that vehicles were not keeping to their routes and thus 
infringing on the rights of competitors. The latter comment might point to difficulties in 
enforcing operating permissions on the roads due to inadequate information on licensed and 
actual routes travelled. This respondent’s comment therefore contradicts previously reported 
responses that competition amongst paratransit vehicles was not problematic, but corroborates 
the view that inter-association competition was an issue. Indeed, respondents suggested that 
law enforcement efforts should focus their efforts on ensuring that operating rights are 
adhered to, rather than setting roadblocks to inspect vehicles for roadworthiness and licences. 
Attitudes to government-led reform programmes 
Responses on the MyCiTi project in Cape Town clustered around two broad topics, one of 
which was the manner in which public authorities were engaging and providing information 
to operators, and the other being the prospects and impacts of the project on operators. Before 
turning to such discussion I present responses in relation to the reform programme that 
preceded MyCiTi, the TRP. As the results indicate, responses to the TRP were of a more 
specific nature, which reflects this temporal gap.  
Though my probing on the subject of reform focussed on the TRP and MyCiTi, respondents 
were in general distrustful of government intervention. R2 from TA3 observed that the change 
to democratic governance in 1994 had not altered the public sector’s attitude towards 
paratransit:  
Our businesses were not supported by the previous [apartheid] government, and they are not 
being supported by the present government. 
The topic of distrust of government intentions would surface again in relation to both reform 
programmes.  
Taxi Recapitalisation Programme 
The TRP elicited strong and mostly negative responses. Disgruntlement centred on three 
specific issues: the limited range of approved vehicles; the gap between the scrapping 
allowance and the cost of new vehicles; and difficulties in financing this gap. A statement by 
R1 from TA5 illustrates a common frustration with the scrapping allowance: 
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The [scrapping allowance] money, you can’t do anything with that money … We’re in [the 
paratransit business] to make money. 
These words also illustrate the impact that the TRP seems to have had on the cash flows of 
operators. It was mentioned in a number of the interviews that financing the most popular pre-
TRP vehicle (a Toyota 16-seater minibus) cost around ZAR4 000 (±USD 330) per month, 
while the most desirable of the TRP-approved vehicles (a more recent Toyota 14-/15-seater 
model) cost ZAR10 000 (±USD830) per month. The reduced seating capacity, increased 
maintenance cost due to its greater technological complexity, and reportedly heavier fuel 
consumption, reportedly added to the burden on profits that the TRP imposed. Respondents 
who were drivers (TA7&8c) commented that owners’ financial hardship also impacted on 
their income. Compounding pressure on cash flows were the high interest rates that financial 
institutions levied on vehicle financing agreements with operators, although all the major 
banks as well as SA Taxi Finance were reported to extend loans. The latter was established to 
aid in financing the vehicle replacement gap, with the national government acting as the 
guarantor. However, SA Taxi Finance was viewed as an undesirable option, with respondents 
stating that it applied the maximum allowable compound interest rate of 27% per year, and 
did not hesitate to repossess vehicles when owners fell behind in paying their monthly 
instalments. R1 from TA5 concluded: 
Maybe [the TRP is] a government scheme to root people out, to kill the industry.  
In the interview with leaders from TA7 and TA8 (TA7&8a) R6 phrased it in stronger terms: 
The plan is to get rid of us. 
In a similar vein, R2 and R3 from TA3 saw the government’s imposition of the scheme to 
remove all old vehicles from the roads as a form of “oppression”. Respondents frequently 
commented on, and in some instances referred fondly to, the reliability and ease of 
maintenance of the ubiquitous pre-TRP Toyota minibus. Besides R1 from TA5 admitting that 
paratransit vehicles in general did not offer passengers “the best ride quality”, in his view 
there seemed to be little motivation to take up the scrapping offer:  
[Owners would] rather stick with their old vehicle. 
R6 (TA7&8a) provided a critical insight on the issue: getting to work and keeping their jobs 
was far more important to passengers than the kind of vehicle in which they were being 
transported.  
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MyCiTi engagement process 
While most respondents had heard about the MyCiTi programme, particularly through the 
paratransit hierarchy, many did not have a clear understanding of what the proposed reforms 
were and how these would affect them. TA2, TA5 and TA6 respondents gained their insights 
by participating in publicly funded visits to Bogota in Columbia to study the BRT system 
there, although one (not noted) from TA1 felt that the trip had little value as they did not hear 
from Bogota’s paratransit operators about their experiences of that city’s public transport 
reform process. The history of public sector “promises” in South Africa around programmes 
that were intended to benefit paratransit operators that had not translated into visible benefits 
also seemed to play a role in their scepticism of the MyCiTi system. An example was the 
TRP’s goal of improving operations, but that in doing so operators had to become indebted to 
financial institutions to fund the bulk of the purchase price of new vehicles.  
R1 from TA2 believed that government was using a “divide and rule” approach by only 
dealing with associations and their members that were directly affected by MyCiTi routes. 
The latter respondent’s association was located in the upcoming, second MyCiTi project 
phase. R1 from TA5, also part of the second MyCiTi phase, said:  
We hear in 2013 that IRT is coming this way; we have nobody come to us. 
Uncertainty seemed also to be present in the current project phase, with R1 from TA6, which 
is part of the Phase 1 corporatisation negotiations, asserting: 
We are walking into the unknown. 
There were also strong criticisms of the engagement approach, which reportedly used 
SANTACO and association channels to reach individual operators rather than engaging them 
directly. Two respondents, from separate associations, had unambiguous views on how the 
authorities should approach them. R2 from TA2 was adamant: 
When you negotiate here [in the Phase 2 area] you talk to me, 
while R2 from TA3 stated unequivocally:  
I would never allow another person to negotiate on my behalf around my future without me 
being present. 
Respondents evidently wanted to be engaged directly, which called into question the role of 
the association as a collective mediator. This attitude was understandable, given the 
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uncertainty around the extent to which the MyCiTi system could affect respondents’ 
businesses. R1 from TA6 enquired directly:  
How are we not going to be worse off? 
The desire for direct engagement was understandable in view of the uncertainty that 
respondents expressed, and the lack of input from the authorities, around the extent to which 
MyCiTi might affect their businesses. There were also suggestions of disempowerment and 
exclusion. This might signify that the gap between policy-making and implementation 
processes and the parties these are intended to serve – operators, passengers, the public at 
large – was too wide. Three comments from TA7&8a respondents illustrate this point: 
Government doesn’t consult. [R1] 
Government treats us as small boys. [R5] 
We are very insecure [about what BRT/MyCiTi entails]. [R7] 
One respondent (not noted) from TA2 asserted that MyCiTi “should belong to the people” but 
that his experience was that it was only the government’s agenda that was on the table. This 
could be an indication that policy-making was not well matched to parties the policy was 
intended to serve, in this case operators. R7 from TA4 succinctly captured the means by 
which this gap should be overcome:  
Give us someone who can come show us how [MyCiTi] works. 
Prospects of the IPTN programme 
Responses around whether there was a willingness to accept the offer of corporatisation were 
both positive and negative, with the lack of information around what the MyCiTi proposal 
entailed playing a role in the latter. R2 from TA1 expressed powerlessness against the reform 
process:  
A [minibus-]taxi cannot compete with those [MyCiTi] buses. 
Also, in the TA6 interview R1 voiced his concern that there were not enough employment 
opportunities and ownership positions for all present paratransit operations to be included in 
the MyCiTi system. The latter sentiment was echoed in the TA1, TA2 and TA3 interviews. 
TAs 7 and 8 arranged their own study visit – not to Bogota, but to Nelson Mandela Bay to 
investigate its IPTN system. Unlike their colleagues who went to Columbia they had the 
benefit of interacting with affected paratransit operators. The operators in Nelson Mandela 
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Bay reported that the BRT system in their city was not working for them, which raised 
concerns amongst TA7 and TA8 members that MyCiTi might impact negatively on them.  
Opposition to corporatisation appeared also to be informed largely by the lack of clarity on 
how MyCiTi would affect respondent’s paratransit businesses, and by a perceived lack of 
employment opportunities and ownership positions that would enable current paratransit 
operations to be fully absorbed in the new system. Some respondents expressed a willingness 
to change, but that they did not want to be coerced into doing so. There was furthermore an 
indication from R1 from TA5 that attitudes to the MyCiTi project were not static:  
We [the association] were all for it at one stage, at the beginning stage. 
This comment suggested that this attitude changed later on. R1 from TA6 provided some 
insight into why attitudes might change. Members of his association did not want to be part of 
the MyCiTi system because “there’s too much uncertainty.”  
A further obstacle to acceptance of MyCiTi was operators’ ability to interpret the formal 
sector business vocabulary and practices in which MyCiTi was being presented to them. As 
R1 from TA6 pointed out, operators might not be properly equipped to participate effectively 
in the MyCiTi engagement process due to limited business literacy levels:  
We never used to be in the corporate world [which MyCiTi was heralding] … we do not have 
the educational background. 
As a commentary on the expectation that the MyCiTi programme would in a short space of 
time address all current problematic aspects of the paratransit sector, R1 from TA2 
commented:  
It’s going to take another 30 years for them [paratransit owners] to see the bigger picture [of 
corporatisation]. 
He suggested that paratransit operators and the industry as a whole lacked “intellect” and that 
it was “in-fighting” amongst operators – i.e. territorial disputes and factional politics – that 
was preventing the sector from driving restructuring and reform from within.  
Perceptions of individual and collective business needs  
A surprising finding across the majority of interviews was the significant degree to which 
respondents associated with a collective “minibus-taxi” identity. This appeared to have been 
informed by the number of years the respondents, or their older relatives from who they had 
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inherited the businesses, had spent in the paratransit sector, and illustrated by this comment by 
R1 from TA2: 
We are proud of [the paratransit industry]; it’s a legacy to our children. 
In cases where businesses had not been inherited, respondents had often worked their way up 
from being a minibus mechanic or driver to being the owner of one or a fleet of minibuses. R8 
from TA4 had left the formal sector and used a severance pay-out to purchase a minibus. This 
respondent seemed to prefer the self-determination of running and owning a paratransit 
business as opposed to working in a corporate structure, stating: 
I can’t go back to any other job. 
Many respondents had entered the industry in the 1980s in the years when the apartheid 
regime in South Africa embarked on its final concerted attempts to enforce segregation, and 
associated their involvement in the paratransit industry with the drive to overcome state-
imposed restrictions on freedom of movement. The connection between paratransit operator 
and paratransit industry thus not only appeared to relate to supporting the livelihoods of 
operators, but also to political expression.  
There was some variance in the degree to which respondents reported being involved in their 
business finances and had insight into the profitability and viability of their operations. In 
TA7 and TA8 respondents reported playing an active role in managing their businesses, and 
kept financial records to calculate their monthly profit and to record driver payments. 
Moreover, at the route association level (interview TA7&8b) respondents focussed solely on 
paratransit operations. In R1’s words:  
You cannot worship two masters; who’ll be looking after your business at the [paratransit] rank 
if you’re elsewhere?  
In the interviews with respondents from TA1 and TA4 they reported that they did not keep 
records of their income and expenditure. The only amount that these respondents knew with 
certainty was the monthly instalment amount that they had to repay on loans for their 
recapitalised minibuses, which was ZAR10 000 (or USD830). TA4’s respondents highlighted 
one of the problems with not keeping more detailed records. They suspected that their drivers 
under-reported farebox income and kept the difference between the reported and the actual 
amounts, but since these were all unreceipted cash transactions – as is typical of paratransit 
operations – it was difficult for these owners to establish the scale of unreported income. R1 
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from TA6, operating in one of the established and wealthier parts of Cape Town, did however 
confirm that there was profit to be made in certain areas of the city:  
This routes of ours is a goldmine. 
The same respondent nonetheless confirmed that operators often existed at a subsistence level 
and did not necessarily benefit from said ‘goldmine’: 
Most of our people run from hand to mouth. 
Beyond the day-to-day aspects of running their businesses, many respondents viewed their 
connection with the paratransit sector, as well as its contribution to the public transport 
system, in a positive light. There were also indications that the industry did not fully capitalise 
on its present human resources and opportunities to expand. The following statements 
illustrate these points: 
We can proudly say that we are living from this [paratransit] business. [R1 from TA2] 
[Minibus-]taxis are our tool. [R1 from TA5] 
We don’t realise what we have in our hands. [R1 from TA4] 
Some respondents suggested that the paratransit industry was well aligned to benefit from 
government’s policies to empower small businesses and to diminish the polarisation of 
business ownership under the segregationist policies of the past. Three comments illustrate 
the point:  
The taxi industry is the only industry that is completely owned by black people. [R2 from TA3] 
This business of the taxi is for the coloured and the blacks. [TA1, respondent not noted] 
Black people do not own mines, do not own malls, do not own farms; black people own 
shebeens [township bars] and we own taxis. [R1 from TA3] 
Respondents nevertheless expressed their concern that the government did not seem to 
recognise and act on this alignment. There was also a sense that it was not only government 
that was holding back the industry’s growth, but also that the industry was its own enemy. In 
the words of R1 from TA6,  
We create our own problems … It always goes back to the culture [of focussing on short-term 
gain] … We’re really not getting anywhere [as an industry and as an association]. 
One of these “problems” that emerged in a number of interviews was that the paratransit 
sector employed mafia-like practices in terms of territorial battles, drug trading and money 
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laundering. R1 from TA6 stated bluntly that “the taxi industry is a mafia” and that a number 
of people from the sector had lost their lives “because of asking about money”. In many of the 
interviews when the subject of finances and profit was broached, respondents became 
uncomfortable and did not want to respond. In order to counter infiltration by such mafia-type 
“elements”, TA5 did not allow known drug dealers to become members. This was the only 
instance during any of the interviews that such a countermeasure was mentioned. 
Aspirations and alternative reform strategies 
I prompted respondents to reflect on ways in which they thought their own businesses and the 
paratransit sector in general could be more successful. My intention was to gain insight into 
what ownership, regulatory or infrastructural mechanisms operators might consider in order to 
improve their businesses in future, and in so doing reveal aspirations that could be 
incorporated in government-led policies of reform. Unexpectedly, the exchanges that ensued 
revealed a number of mechanisms that respondents’ associations had already tested. This 
suggested that there were positive prospects for broader reform.  
Operators’ aspirations 
Prompting respondents to consider what circumstances or mechanisms might best address 
their current business needs did not yield insight far beyond day-to-day considerations such as 
more efficient types of vehicles, driver training (supported by driver respondents in the 
TA7&8c group) or a general desire for increased financial support from government15. In 
relation to the latter, R5 (in interview TA7&8b) specifically suggested that the TRP scrapping 
allowance should be raised to 50% of the purchase price of a new vehicle as existing tight 
profit margins compromised affordability. As with exchanges around the MyCiTi project, 
respondents did not appear to be comfortable with, or be able to assess the benefits and 
drawbacks of, hypothetical propositions within the context of the interview. However, a 
number of respondents were at least aware of the need to promote better management 
practices, which would necessarily involve acquiring or drawing in skills to plan for, and 
project, future scenarios. R1 from TA6 captured it succinctly:  
We need expertise in the industry, we need skills, we need outsiders [professional advisors]. 
                                                
15 This correlates to some extent with Jakoet’s (2001) study findings (discussed in Chapter 1). She 
found that paratransit operators did not respond to a question asking what problems they foresaw in 
moving to a different regulatory regime.  
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Probing around whether respondents aspired to exit the paratransit and/or public transport 
sector did not reveal strong desires to do so. However, in the case of TA2, R1 indicated:  
If the government comes to us with a reasonable offer [to buy out the business to make way for 
MyCiTi services] we will accept it; we want to retire.  
If the lack of consistent financial record-keeping and long-term business planning skills 
proves to be ubiquitous it will be difficult for any agency to establish what that “reasonable 
offer” would be in the eyes of a paratransit business owner. 
Internal reforms as potential alternatives 
All but one of the interviewed associations had within their own association attempted or 
succeeded with schemes to strengthen their members’ businesses. TA4 in particular had 
explored a number of options. These included an attempt to manage the entire association’s 
fleet of vehicles collectively for better efficiency, although the scheme failed because, in the 
words of R7 from this association:  
We [the association’s members] don’t trust one another.  
The association achieved greater success with a pension scheme for its members, as well as a 
prepaid paper-based fare voucher system for trips in the local area. The association entered 
into agreements with local shops to sell these vouchers to passengers and handle the cash on 
their behalf. Passengers would redeem the vouchers on minibuses instead of paying cash. The 
driver could collect payment only once he hands the vouchers to the vehicle owner at the end 
of the day. In the words of respondents the intention with this system was to enable owners to 
manage their business finances better as the vouchers offered a paper trail, and to reduce the 
incidence of drivers under-reporting farebox revenue. Both the pension scheme and the 
voucher system were still running at the time of the interview, in addition to which 
respondents in this association were selling advertising space on and in their vehicles to 
supplement their income. 
Strategies employed in other interviewed associations to bolster their businesses included 
keeping fares low to attract more passengers (though this could well be counter-productive if 
not managed carefully) and using minibuses for long distance trips and shuttle services during 
off-peak hours and over weekends. Of particular note was that two associations had attempted 
to enter into the formal transport service environment, one successfully (TA5) and the other 
(TA2) not so. The former arrangement entailed a contract arrangement with the University of 
 126  
Cape Town to provide peak-hour transport services for students, while the latter took the form 
of a proposal to the local government to start a scheduled bus service between the 
association’s home base and Cape Town’s city centre. The proposal was rejected, but the 
reason for rejection was unclear. Similar to the latter, though not at the level of a proposal, R2 
from TA8 questioned why paratransit operators were not being allowed to purchase large 
buses individually and operate them within the MyCiTi system, rather than having to be 
bought out and consolidate their operations under the MyCiTi VOCs.  
5.2 OBSERVATIONS 
At a few points during the interviews respondents mentioned that collapses in trust amongst 
operators, or between operators and public sector agencies, stood in the way of different or 
new modes of conducting business. This was particularly relevant to the internal attempts at 
reforming paratransit operations, for instance by moving to the early stages of a stepped 
transition (e.g. TA4’s paper-based fare vouchers and collective fleet management) or more 
incisive shift to formal transport operations (as achieved by TA5 and attempted in TA2). 
However, this discussion of trust focuses on the immediately evident verbal dimension that 
interviewing can access. Through my initial reading of Fontana & Frey (2000), Gillham 
(2000) and O’Leary (2005) I was aware that the interview technique could also capture non-
verbal information.  
It was, however, only in conducting the interviews that I formed a more complete 
understanding of the verbal/non-verbal distinction. In conducting interviews I was not a 
dispassionate participant, or as Fontana & Frey put it, an “invisible researcher” (2000:661). 
By being present in the interview setting my presence and that of an intermediary, and even 
the setting itself, would have had an influence on respondents. Though I had to take verbal 
responses at face value, what interviewees revealed through non-verbal means illuminated 
both their verbal responses and the relations of power amongst respondents and between them 
and me. Such instances included who spoke most often, who was present in the interview, 
interaction between respondents, physical attitudes, and choice of language. In capturing my 
own observations during and after each interview and holding discussions with the 
intermediaries I had documented such non-verbal responses. These observations revealed my 
unmet or realised expectations, suggested ways in which respondents perceived me and my 
intentions, and informed my process of making sense of verbal responses.  
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In this part of the chapter I discuss my observations of both subject and researcher, no longer 
invisible or faceless, according to two themes that impact on the manner in which operators 
are engaged if the reform programmes are to be revised. This responds to the third research 
question. The first theme is that of trust, which was already identified as a key issue in 
studying paratransit operators as a research population (Chapter 1), in government efforts to 
secure operators participation in reform (Chapter 3), and through the responses reported 
earlier in this chapter. The second theme is that of the paratransit industry’s structure, which I 
could only clearly describe after conducting the interviews and with subsequent discussions 
with the interview intermediaries. 
Trust  
For the interviews to take place I had first to overcome the hurdle of establishing contact with 
operators. This was one of the key frustrations in the early stages of my research: that I was 
not able to simply contact the intended research sample and proceed with collecting data. It 
was, however, not only the intermediary that was critical in providing access; the associations 
themselves played a role, as did the transition facilitator who brought me in touch with the 
intermediary. Thus, if access were likened to a chain, there were three intermediate links 
between respondents and me: from me via the facilitator (Mr McLachlan) to the intermediary 
(Mr Botha), and from there via the association to the respondents. In the latter three 
interviews the chain was built from the side of the association, which led to the intermediary 
(Ms Coka) contacting me. In place of the facilitator in this latter chain was the Centre for 
Transport Studies, which in the facilitator’s view (as stated by her) was a trusted and neutral 
entity due to its association with the University of Cape Town.  
Regardless of which way the chain developed, in each of the links there was an element of 
trust. Without such trust it was unlikely that I, as outsider, would have gained access to the 
inside world of operators. Ultimately the number of respondents I could draw from the 
population of paratransit operators depended on the number of links that the intermediaries 
had with associations, and subsequently to the number of individual members to which the 
associations granted, or provided, access. Another key factor limiting the number of 
respondents was time. It took a long time to identify an intermediary with the requisite links 
to associations. Actually establishing a connection with the two intermediaries ultimately 
happened coincidentally. In the first instance it was due to my presence in a meeting with the 
CETUD delegation from Dakar at which I met the transition facilitator, and in the second 
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instance it was because the intermediary sought out the academic unit within which I was 
active. Once I reached the critical milestone of having contact with intermediaries, my 
progress in conducting interviews was again limited by the intermediary’s and the 
respondents’ available time.  
The importance of an intermediary’s skills, and the scarcity of individuals with such skills, 
should not be underestimated. Not only were the intermediary’s links to actors in the 
paratransit industry important, but also the intermediary’s role in building trust within the 
interview space. Accompanying me to and within the interview setting, and introducing me 
and my research, were part of a door-opener role. The intermediary not only had to be fluent 
in the respondents’ languages, he also had to be familiar with respondents’ and my 
vocabularies. On the part of respondents this centred on sector-specific terminology and 
colloquialisms, e.g. the various names for vehicles, such as “arkie” and “ncula-ncula” being 
the respective Afrikaans and isiXhosa names for a specific model of Toyota minibus from the 
early 1980s. In relation to my requirements this amounted to a relatively detailed 
understanding of the topics that I wanted to explore. These topics included the TRP, PTS, 
MyCiTi’s phasing, and the competition regulation and legislative context. In Chapter 4 I 
mentioned that Ms Coka was not well versed in these topics, and that we arranged sessions 
for me to brief her.  
However, I found that both intermediaries required some coaching on how to approach their 
introduction of the reform programmes to respondents, especially the MyCiTi project, so as 
not bring respondents under the erroneous impression that I had a direct channel to influence 
MyCiTi’s implementation or that my wanting to interview them was a precursor to MyCiTi 
coming to their part of the city. Such guidance from me was mostly necessary in early 
interviews; the intermediaries were quickly able to adjust their approaches to be more neutral. 
It seemed in hindsight that the intermediaries’ wanting to make claims around the reform 
programmes was a good-natured attempt at getting respondents interested in the interview 
subject and to be at ease in the interview setting. Intermediaries’ combination of subject 
knowledge (though uneven amongst the two individuals) and language skills allowed them to 
be interpreters, and not only translators. In the ‘debrief’ sessions that we had after interviews, 
this allowed me to clarify responses and non-verbal cues that I suspected I might have 
misunderstood and – significantly, in view of the absence of audio recordings – added to my 
recall capacity.  
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There were different degrees to which I believe respondents did or could open up during 
interviews. There would likely have been a large number of factors involved, of which I 
mention salient ones here. The group setting in the majority of interviews meant that there 
was a measure of peer-pressure to reveal or not to reveal particular details. One prominent 
instance is the number of vehicles that respondents owned. In some interviews once one 
respondent had stated the size of his or her vehicle fleet, other respondents followed suit. In 
other interviews if my question on fleet size was greeted with silence I had to move to another 
line of enquiry to elicit respondents’ participation. Some respondent groups’ also chose to 
speak in their mother tongue, even though some in the group demonstrated that they could 
speak English. This enabled everyone in the group to follow what the speaker was saying, at 
the same time forcing the speaker only to say what would have been acceptable to the group. 
In addition, in some of these groups the presence of one or more respondents occupying 
higher positions within the associations’ hierarchy impacted on the degree of openness. It was 
evident that the higher-ranking respondent – often corresponding to apparent age – would 
respond first on a new topic that I introduced, which would then set the tone of subsequent 
respondents contributions. In the two interviews with only one respondent present the 
dynamics were different, though in one of those I still observed a measure of censorship. This 
respondent did not even want me to take handwritten notes of some of his responses (which I 
duly complied with).  
There was only one interview where my being independent of government or commercial 
interests did not appear to play a role in facilitating respondents’ openness. At the end of the 
interview with TA1 the respondents wanted to know about the ways in which my research 
results would reach policy- and decision-makers in government. They had previously been 
approached by researchers investigating their businesses and had not seen any positive impact 
from those studies. I spent some time addressing this concern by explaining how academic 
research results are typically disseminated. The respondents did not seem convinced that such 
dissemination (as opposed to direct advocacy, for instance) could benefit them, but I 
nonetheless did not detect reticence on their part to participate in the interview. My 
experience with TA2 was very different. After providing the introductory overview of my 
research there was not a lengthy discussion about my motivations or how my data would be 
used; indeed, I was taken aback by the lack of suspicion of my research aims and the 
respondents’ keenness to express their views and share information. I had a similar experience 
with the respondents from TA4. In relation to the TA3 interview it took some effort on my 
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part to convince respondents that I did not represent government or their paratransit 
competitors, and that my intention was not to portray paratransit in a negative light. Once my 
independent credentials had been established the interview was productive, even though the 
respondents still seemed somewhat guarded, particularly in relation to the details of their own 
businesses, though this was by no means unique to this interview.  
Though the choice of setting for each interview was largely out of my hands in practice, it 
seems that interviewing in the familiar context of an association’s base of operations made a 
positive impact on my reception and respondents’ openness. In the case of TA5 the 
respondent made specific mention of his being gratified that I had come to “ground level”. In 
the aforementioned TA2 and TA4 interviews, which also took place at their offices rather 
than in unfamiliar surroundings, I also found an immediately receptive atmosphere to the 
interview. It may well be worth exploring the potential of my original intention to conduct 
interviews only at associations’ offices to increase willingness to engage with the topics that I 
explored. Allied to such considerations, and equally opaque, are the reasons behind the other 
associations choosing venues outside of their typical day-to-day environments.  
Paratransit industry structure 
Whereas my previous observations captured some of the nature of interaction between 
respondents, the intermediaries and me, the other major theme in my observations on the 
interviews was how respondents’ verbal and non-verbal responses highlighted the actors and 
power relations in the paratransit industry. Chapter 3 demonstrated that paratransit interests in 
the reform process were vested not only in local operators and associations (i.e. my research 
population), but also in broader paratransit entities. These included SANTACO and its 
WCPTC branch as officially recognised policy representatives, as well as the NTA splinter 
group. Chapter 3 also illustrated that as MyCiTi’s implementation progressed these broader 
organisations appeared to be less and less involved in the shaping of the reform process in 
Cape Town. However, my thesis is concerned with the overarching reform process, which 
includes both the PTS and TRP programmes. Though the case that I defined was the public 
transport reform process in Cape Town, the context of the case included the national aspect of 
policy formulation and the role that national players played in the process. The main actors 
thus included not only the local operators and the associations to which they belonged, but 
also these wider representative structures. Particularly from the point of view of relationships 
between actors, these dualities – the two programmes, their national/local implementation 
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processes, and the national/local paratransit actors that were involved – were part of the 
context of the research.  
The case procedure investigating the reform programmes’ implementation in Cape Town in 
Chapter 3 provided some pointers to local and broader actors in the paratransit industry, and 
what their relationships were, but it did not capture what the “industry” looked like in Cape 
Town. Completing the picture of who the paratransit actors were in this city was an important 
step in defining the research population that I was investigating, and latterly in contextualising 
responses garnered in the actual interviews. Previous diagrammatic representations (see, for 
instance, Grey [2006]) were notional, focussed on formal structures and the degree to which 
the two overlapped was not immediately evident. The NTA was absent, yet it seemed as if 
mother bodies or “supra associations” (CATA, the Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association, and 
CODETA, the Congress of Democratic Taxi Associations) were key structures that filled the 
role of local or regional councils.  
I sought a more detailed schematic of the actors of the paratransit industry in practice. 
Through the interviews that I conducted I had sources whose existence was within, or closely 
related to, such practice. In the interviews respondents had identified many of these actors, 
and through their responses characterised some of the relationships between actors. In the 
course of preparing for the interviews, and in our joint reflections afterwards, I asked the two 
intermediaries to fill in some of the missing details. The result of these efforts was the 
schematic in Figure 5-1. It illustrates the relative positions of actors across different levels in 
the paratransit hierarchy, be it national, provincial/regional, local area or individual. The 
connecting lines in the figure demonstrate where there was evidence of an existing, 
functioning relationship between actors in practice (as opposed to a nominal relationship).  
At the national level sat SANTACO, paralleled by the unofficial National Taxi Alliance 
(NTA). Barrett (2003) noted a minority of drivers’ belonging to the South African Transport 
and Allied Workers’ Union (SATAWU), affiliated to the umbrella Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), though the union did not appear to be an active actor in reform 
negotiations. Representing the two national councils at regional level were the Western Cape 
Provincial Taxi Council (WCPTC) and the provincial NTA, respectively. The NTA did not 
seem to be an active role-player after the World Cup in 2010, nor did the sources identify the 
WCPTC as being an influential actor in Cape Town’s public transport reform arena.  
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Figure 5-1: Paratransit industry structure 
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The majority of respondents’ associations were not part of MyCiTi Phase 1 (and the pilot 
second phase) engagement processes. These respondents often referred to the MyCiTi system 
by its “IRT” name, which supports some respondents’ views that they were not properly in the 
loop with the project’s development or that the information they had access to was outdated. 
This would support the view that SANTACO was not effective as the official go-between 
between government and local paratransit concerns in relation to the IPTN programme. It 
might also, more tenuously, suggest that the information that operators had received about the 
MyCiTi project dated back to before the introduction of the MyCiTi name in 2010.  
In relation to the next level, that of local areas, the City of Cape Town’s most recent Integrated 
transport plan (CoCT, 2013d) indicated that there were 102 paratransit associations in the city, 
two less than the 104 associations that I identified in the earlier Operating license strategy 
(CoCT, 2007a). These associations were either represented by what appeared to be a defunct 
WCPTC, directly by SANTACO (referred to as “independent associations”), or were nominally 
represented by SANTACO but in practice affiliated to the mother bodies (CATA and 
CODETA).  
The mother bodies were altogether separate to the official hierarchy of provincial bodies and 
national entities. Though not depicted in Figure 5-1, their presence spans beyond Cape Town 
and reportedly even into adjacent provinces. The mother bodies are active both at regional level 
and locally through their member “affiliated associations”. These associations operated specific 
routes, all of which originate at the mother bodies’ respective bases of operations. The 
respondents in interview TA7&8b were the route managers in charge of these various routes.  
At the individual level were the operators – the owners and license holders of paratransit 
services. The Integrated transport plan provided 2012 figures for active and pending operating 
licences, numbering 7 258 and 357, respectively. The fleet size that these licenses were linked 
to was estimated at 7 600, as each license was unique to a particular vehicle. The number of 
employment positions related to these operations was one driver per vehicle, i.e. ±7 600 
drivers, and more than 5 000 support staff across the entire fleet, including conductors, rank 
marshals and administrative and service staff (e.g. vehicle washers). In practice there are 
numerous unlicensed vehicles, although the quantum of such operations is not known. This 
unknown number includes sedan vehicle paratransit operators referred to as “amaphela”, 
isiXhosa for cockroaches – descriptive of the way that such operators scamper around local 
neighbourhood roads looking for passengers without wanting to be detected. The affiliation of 
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the latter to any larger bodies was unclear, and they were moreover perceived as a threat to 
established minibus-based paratransit operations. 
When viewed together with the MyCiTi operator transition process (see Chapter 3) the 
interview results suggest that the locus of power in the paratransit industry in Cape Town was 
concentrated predominantly in three places: a number of powerful individual operators who 
direct what happens in the associations that they lead; associations headed by groups of 
established and prosperous operators; and by the mother bodies. There was a “power bloc’ in 
these associations formed by the association’s chairman and board, or “executive”, made up of 
influential member operators or those with the largest fleet. This power bloc seemed to draw on 
an older generation of owners who became operators in the apartheid years (a number of whom 
expressed their desire to exit or retire from the industry, or build as large as possible a 
paratransit empire to be handed down to their progeny). These power blocs were threatened by 
hostile “young ones” with no understanding of the struggle that older operators had to make a 
success of their paratransit operations, or gradually being displaced by a savvy younger 
generation, or in the words of R1 from TA6, the “new guys with better education”. Members of 
this old guard seemed trapped in the paradigm of paratransit operations, finding it difficult to 
come up with alternatives to the current reforms. However, operators should not be judged on 
their lack of a formal business vocabulary; many respondents demonstrated the same business 
acumen as found in other (and more formal) sectors of the economy.  
5.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
In the first part of this chapter I discussed the attitudes, aspirations and needs that respondents 
voiced during the interviews. Responses suggested that the national paratransit representative 
structure that government helped to set up was not effective in representing respondents. There 
was, however, a need for such a structure to mediate in conflicts between competing operator 
associations needs, to disseminate information to operators around reforms, and to promote 
paratransit sector’s voice at national government level. The latter was important as the 
relationship with government agencies was not reported to be constructive. Respondents were 
proud of their businesses and wanted to improve the viability of their services, but it was 
suggested that public authorities were either not offering support or that such support (by way 
of the reform programmes) was insufficient to operators’ needs. Though there were 
respondents who saw some benefit particularly in the MyCiTi project, they were distrustful of 
government’s motivations and were concerned about not having been consulted in the 
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formulation of the BRT-led approach to reform. This was a significant obstacle to respondents’ 
participation in reform, yet that some respondents had been involved in associations- or 
individually-led attempts to better organise their operations and bolster their finances indicated 
that there was latitude for reform.   
The second part of the chapter presented observations that I made during and after conducting 
the interviews. These observations focussed on the issues of trust and on the hierarchical 
structure of the paratransit industry. Trust was a crucial issue both in conducting the interviews 
and in the engagement process that the municipality had followed in implementing the first 
phase of the MyCiTi system. Both these processes hinged on the involvement of skilled 
intermediaries to provide communication channels with operators and to serve as interpreters 
during engagement. Trust amongst respondents, and between them and other levels of the 
paratransit hierarchy, was also an issue relevant to reform. In order to better disseminate a 
revised reform agenda, and to increase paratransit’s participation, it would be important to 
engage at the level of the hierarchy where the power to drive change was vested. Reform 
implementation in Cape Town had highlighted that there were competing interests within the 
paratransit organisational hierarchy, but that the associations were central to the engagement 
process. My engagement with respondents and intermediaries allowed me to trace the 
relationships between the different structures in the hierarchy in detail, which supported the 
view that the leaderships of the local associations and, where applicable, regional associations 
(the “mother bodies”), were key to driving change. 
This chapter has provided insight into the locus of power in the paratransit industry, the 
concerns, expectations and desires of a selection of operators, and challenges of engaging this 
group of respondents. When viewed against the aims and implementation of the reform 
programmes (discussed in Chapter 3) the needs and aspirations of operators coincide with the 
reform approach only to a limited extent. Until the correct incentives are identified and 
negotiated, paratransit participation in reform is likely to remain limited. Some respondents 
pointed to their own attempts at reforming their businesses, and policy would do well to heed, 
and government to support, these attempts, particularly where they have been to consolidate 
ownership or vehicle fleets. In Chapter 6 I will reflect on these attempts as well as on the 
potential alternative approaches to reform discussed in Chapter 2 to draw propositions around 
the prospects of the current reform approach in Cape Town, and around how such an approach 
may be adjusted to serve both the interests of paratransit operators and of public transport 
improvement.  
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6 PROSPECTS FOR PARATRANSIT OPERATOR PARTICIPATION 
IN REFORM IN CAPE TOWN  
The previous chapters of this thesis presented alternative approaches to public transport reform 
in relation to paratransit operations, the approach to reforming public transport as it unfolded in 
Cape Town in recent years and impacted on paratransit, and paratransit operators’ responses to 
reform. The interviews that I conducted with a selection of paratransit operators in Cape Town 
also captured a variety of their business needs and aspirations. In this chapter I reflect 
cumulatively on all of these research outcomes to generate propositions around the approach to 
reform. These propositions centre on the impacts and prospects of the current approach to 
reform, and motivate for revisions to this approach that might increase the opportunity for 
paratransit operators to participate and thus strengthen reform’s contribution to urban transport 
improvement in this city.  
The research questions were key to drawing the propositions presented in this chapter. The 
research questions focussed on three inter-linked issues. These were: government’s approach to 
and role in reform, the needs and aspirations of paratransit operators in relation to reform, and 
the opportunities to adjust the reform approach to facilitate a greater overlap between the 
reform process and the needs and aspirations of operators. In drawing the propositions I 
reflected on the key themes and issues that operators raised during interviews and how these 
corresponded with the aims, process and outcomes of the government reform process reform. I 
also reflected on potential alternative reform approaches. Where operators’ needs and 
aspirations might continue to lead to their limited participation in reform, I proposed that 
aspects of the existing reform approach be reviewed or that alternative approaches be 
considered. Where there were opportunities for greater participation, I proposed that the aspects 
of the existing reform approach that provided such opportunities be strengthened to facilitate 
such participation.  
The propositions synthesise the responses to all three research questions, thus enabling a better 
understanding of paratransit participation in reform in Cape Town and serving as a starting 
point for a revised approach to reform in Cape Town and in the national programmes that 
impact on reform in this city. This is the theory generation that Punch (2005) referred to (see 
Chapter 1). The propositions also enable generalisation (as per Yin, 1994) by informing further 
research on similar cases, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
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6.1 PUBLIC SECTOR ROLE IN REFORM  
Four propositions are discussed in this section focussing of the public sector’s role in reform. 
The first is that PTS programme implementation has been led by infrastructure construction 
and not by operator transformation. The second is that the reform approach demonstrated 
significant institutional capacity limitations, while the related third proposition is that reform 
programme formulation and implementation are subject to political imperatives. A last 
proposition is that there is scope to explore mechanisms of reform other that new BRT systems. 
The Public Transport Strategy is a top-down, infrastructure-led approach to 
reform  
The remarks of paratransit operators and their representative structures reported in the popular 
press during and shortly after the launch of the PTS programme and the MyCiTi project 
suggest that they were not involved in drawing up or providing input to the PTS or the City of 
Cape Town’s 2007 implementation framework (CoCT, 2007b). It might be possible to cast 
doubt on these remarks, but only to a limited degree. In its introduction the PTS states that a 
draft was “circulated among a wide range of stakeholders” followed by a two-day discussion 
session (DoT, 2007a:3), though who the involved stakeholders were is not specified. These 
may have involved paratransit representative bodies. However, the PTS’s Action Plan (DoT, 
2007b) only lays claim to consultation with “with 6 metropolitan cities16 and 6 secondary cities 
as well as the SA Rail Commuter Corporation (SARCC) [now Prasa]” in preparing for first 
phase IPTNs (DoT, 2007b:4). Cape Town’s 2007 implementation framework for its IPTN was 
the product of four consultants’ efforts, with input from municipal officials and politicians 
(CoCT 2007b:i). During the interviews that I conducted with operators I could not unearth 
evidence to contradict the accusation of failure to consult paratransit interests particularly at 
IPTN level in Cape Town.  
It would be difficult to claim the same lack of consultation for the TRP as it was closely linked 
to the efforts of the NTTT in the mid-1990s. The NTTT directly engaged a large number of 
interested and affected parties and individuals, especially amongst the paratransit corps, across 
the country. However, it would be hard to argue that the TRP lies at the centre of the current 
debate and interest, as public sector efforts and general discourse focus far more on the PTS.  
                                                
16 The term “cities” is used as a synonym for “municipalities” in the context of the quoted text. These 
terms and the term “local government” are used interchangeably here and elsewhere in the cited 
document. 
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The government’s key considerations in terms of public transport reform appear to have 
become how and where BRT infrastructure could and can be built in South African cities. A 
less evident secondary focus, primarily with local implications, has been on thinking around 
how such BRT systems will replace or incorporate paratransit operations. The PTS ostensibly 
focussed on integrating public transport modes; hence the ‘IPTN’ nomenclature. In practice, 
though, there has been such a focus on installing upgraded bus systems in cities that the chair 
of the PTS/IPTN session of the 2014 Southern Africa Transport Conference declared at the 
opening of the session that IPTNs are BRT systems. At the same session, as well as in 2011 
and 2012, there were at least questions emerging around the high cost of BRT implementation 
and paratransit business buy-outs, and there should be more investigation of alternatives to the 
existing approach.  
It would ultimately be difficult to argue that the PTS and Cape Town’s IPTN have not followed 
a top-down, infrastructure-led approach to reform. The discussion of IPTN implementation in 
Cape Town in Chapter 3 demonstrated that route planning and construction preceded the 
substance of the operator engagement process by some margin. The national debate has centred 
on modal technology – BRT – and not on a bottom-up view that aims to meet operators’ needs 
and capture their aspirations. The contents of the PTS (DoT, 2007a), its action plan (DoT, 
2007b), Cape Town’s implementation framework (CoCT, 2007b), and the monthly MyCiTi 
project reports released between 2009 and 2013 support this. Their contents are biased heavily 
towards infrastructural and operational concerns; where paratransit is discussed it is in relation 
to how such operations could be included in the IPTN and not on the basis of paratransit being 
partners in public transport reform.  
The current reform approach disregards institutional capacity limitations  
Though it is the case in hindsight that expectations of what could be achieved with the PTS and 
MyCiTi system now appear unrealistic, it is not to say that the ailments of present public 
transport systems in Cape Town and around the country cannot, or should not, be addressed. 
Elements of such a transformation include its physical extent, cost, timeframes, and operator 
transition process. Such a transformation was indeed the point with the BRT-led reform 
programme as initially envisaged: a partnership between government and public transport 
operators and employees to improve the service to current and prospective passengers (DoT, 
2007a). This motivation cannot be faulted. The PTS programme has brought public transport, 
and particularly its upgrading, to the fore in the public eye. Nonetheless, as the National 
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Household Travel Survey and similar investigations show, the daily reality of public transport 
users is far from optimal, and there is a multitude of reasons to attend to, and scope for 
improvement of, the public transport service offering to both current and potential passengers.  
In terms of South Africa’s post-apartheid socioeconomic development needs, increased 
investment in public transport infrastructure stimulates the economy through formal 
employment opportunities created during and after construction, while at the same time 
offering improved travel options and access to employment. The investment also assists in 
overcoming physical distances imposed by apartheid city development. This is an item of the 
reform agenda that can roundly justify the infrastructural subsidy that the Public Transport 
Infrastructure and Systems Grant (PTISG) provides, and in particular cases also warrants the 
operational subsidies flowing from the Public Transport Network Operating Grant (PTNOG). 
Residents of settlements that resulted from the implementation of the Group Areas Act (No. 41 
of 1950), such as Atlantis north of Cape Town, should not rightly be uprooted again, nor should 
they be expected to bear the full cost of travelling to the economic hubs of Cape Town. It 
would be difficult to argue against public intervention in such instances, and aligning the first 
MyCiTi phase along the West Coast all the way to Atlantis has a strong restitution dimension.  
While increased levels of state expenditure on public transport systems resonates with the 
principle of social redress in the South African context, selecting a modal technology as a 
reform mechanism without understanding passenger demand is not justifiable, whether in 
financial terms or in order to achieve social aims. Neither the PTS (DoT, 2007a) nor the City’s 
implementation framework (CoCT, 2007b) use existing local passenger demand along the 
corridors on which BRT systems were proposed to justify the selection of BRT as the mode of 
choice for the reform process. These documents also do not mention the possibility for 
upgrading existing modes as the main thrust of upgrading public transport. BRT was untested 
locally, and thus was an unknown entity upon which to build a reform strategy.  
Passenger demand and system capacity are measurable and highly context-specific, and thus a 
sound basis upon which to root an ambitious and costly programme such as the PTS. Planners 
have resources to assist in such decision-making. Vuchic (2007), for example, provides 
comprehensive guidance on the theoretical and practical capacities of major public transport 
modes. The International Association for Public Transport (UITP) also provides support for 
decision-makers by listing the capacity spectrum of a variety of urban transport modes (see 
Dauby et al, 2009, and an excerpt thereof in Figure 6-1). A number of public and private 
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agencies in South Africa are members of the UITP and thus have access to such information. 
Even the BRT planning guide (Wright & Hook, 2007), which was widely circulated in hard 
copy in South Africa by the DoT after the launch of the PTS, provides guidance on the 
suitability of different modes to meet different passenger demand levels. It is notable that these 
guides differ in their positioning of different modes to meet demand, signalling that this is 
contested terrain. This motivates even further for context-specific investigations that would 




Figure 6-1: Public transport modes and passenger capacities 
 
Source: Dauby et al, 2009 
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Rather than suggesting that the chain of decisions that led to the South American BRT model 
being imported as an approach to reform was unsound and reckless, an analysis of the reasons 
leading to BRT being implemented would be better served if it were viewed within the 
framework of government processes and institutions in the broader arena of urban development 
and transport planning in South Africa. This is a complex discussion, sufficiently so that Wood 
(2014a; 2014b) elaborated it into a PhD thesis. In a publication summarising her findings she 
asserts that:  
… policy circulation is never a rational survey of best practices but a political process through 
which policymakers select their sites of learning in accordance with wider aspirations, ideologies 
and positioning. (2014a) 
Many governance structures in South Africa are still in flux, reflecting the as yet unsettled post-
apartheid state. The infrastructure-led mindset so predominant in the 20th century has not had 
time to be adequately challenged or overturned by an informed and mature political and civil 
service establishment. In other words, a major challenge facing urban reform is institutional 
capacity at multiple levels that is not ready for taking on the task of comprehensively reshaping 
the urban and transport landscape in all its complexity. A pragmatic point from which to start 
adjusting the present reform process would therefore be to mould it around existing and nearer 
term institutional realities and limitations. 
Reform is not a clinical process divorced from public political imperatives 
There is as yet little indication of what approach to reform future MyCiTi phases would take in 
terms of operations and operator reorganisation. However, a broader component of the reform 
process that has to date seen little attention, but which is critical to the longer term growth of 
public transport services and systemic modal integration, is the devolution of metropolitan 
transport infrastructure and operational decision-making functions to the municipal sphere of 
government. There are tentative indications of such a move in Cape Town, which in October 
2012 launched its municipal transport authority, Transport for Cape Town (TCT). The 
municipality has since commenced with the legal steps to consolidate a multitude of urban 
transport functions both within and outside its remit under this umbrella, but institutional 
change processes are complex and slow. There is, however, little reason to believe that the 
complex process of the devolution of the many authorities and functions that would make TCT 
an effective tool in the governance of public transport in Cape Town would be completed in the 
near term. Yet the timing of the launch of TCT may have as much to do with political 
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imperatives as it does with public transport reform. Inter-party political tensions have become 
quite pronounced since the Democratic Alliance (DA) party assumed the leadership of the Cape 
Town municipality in 2011 and of the Western Cape province in 2009 – a de facto “bastion” 
against the ruling party’s hegemony elsewhere in the country. There may be some pressure on 
the DA to continue to demonstrate to its electorate and to the opposition that it is serving its 
residents, thus the TCT launch and its continued commitment to expanding the MyCiTi system.  
The strong public finance management standing of the City in comparison with other 
metropolitan municipalities in the country certainly gives the party a strong base from which to 
bolster its position and forge ahead with its MyCiTi programme. It has the longest track record 
with 10 consecutive years of unqualified audits (Neilson, 2014). Indeed, the mayor’s 
pronouncement on 31 December 2012 that MyCiTi would be extended into the working class 
Metro Southeast and start operating in that area in 2013 is not difficult to link with the prospect 
of a national election in the first part of 2014. The mayor’s declaration that “heads will roll if 
Mitchells Plain [and] Khayelitsha service isn’t rolled out” (Coetzee, 2012) is certainly related 
to the political dynamics in the area. The N2 Express service spearheaded the mayor’s promise, 
but it was only launched in June 2014, and not at the end of 2013 as the mayor promised. This 
illustrates both the disconnect between political ambitions and the reality of public transport 
system upgrading, and that public transport can be, and is, used to further political aims.  
Political considerations may also have influenced the decision to adopt BRT as the mechanism 
for transforming public transport at city level. Every phase of such a project provides an 
opportunity for a ‘ribbon-cutting’ event. Some of the tenets on which BRT has been promoted 
would doubtlessly appeal to a politician standing for re-election and keen to impress a 
prospective constituency. These tenets include that BRT is self-financing (Hook, 2005) and, 
importantly in the South African context, that it provides an opportunity for ‘quick’ reforms to 
existing modes and operators that can serve political advancement (Wright, 2004; Wright & 
Hook, 2007). In the end the role that politics plays in a project as large as a citywide BRT 
scheme or even a single BRT corridor is a powerful reminder to civil servants, practitioners and 
researchers alike that decision-making at the urban scale is not a clinical, neat or rational 
process. 
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There is scope to explore and implement alternative reform approaches  
Elected politicians lead public transport planning and regulation, and the human resources 
dedicated to these activities. It is indeed in the design of the country’s governance system that 
the municipal administration takes its cue from politicians (Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, as amended, 2009:s160). The public transport reform process has, 
however, highlighted that there is a time lag between the political and administrative processes 
that has the potential to place additional, if unintended, strain on already stretched public 
authorities. One pertinent instance of this is the connection between the strategic focus of the 
PTS programme and the NLTA. The first two phases of the PTS were envisaged to be 
completed by 2014. These first two phases would have led to the basic public transport 
networks in the primary 12 cities and six districts in the country being in place, and all existing 
operators would have been restructured to be in a position to provide services on these 
networks. In other words, paratransit businesses in these 18 locations would have been 
corporatised by 2014. This was the planned flow of activities when the policy was put forward 
in 2006-7. During the period that the policy was being developed the replacement of the 
NLTTA (of 2000) was also in the pipeline, and in 2009 the NLTA was promulgated. In the 
NLTA provision is made for the rationalisation of paratransit services that would pave the way 
for a new order to be established. Section 49 (3) stipulates that: 
Any permit or operating licence authorising minibus taxi-type services issued for an indefinite 
period, or issued for a definite period that has not yet expired, must lapse seven years after the 
date of commencement of this Act. 
In a meeting with one of the authors of the Act, Mr Neville Dingle, we discussed the 
motivation behind, and implications of, the Act’s provisions around paratransit regulatory 
reforms and the PTS (Dingle, personal communication 2013, 10 July). One of the aims of the 
TRP was to eliminate the permit system inherited from the apartheid regime, which allowed 
indefinite validity of operating permissions and radius-based, rather than route-based, 
operations (discussed in detail in Chapter 3). To qualify for a scrapping allowance under the 
TRP an operator first had to convert the older radius-based permit to a route-based operating 
licence. Route-based licences allow for a clearer assessment of supply and demand as well as 
clearer indications of the geographic location of operating rights. The scrapping allowance was 
the incentive for operators to convert their permissions. Delays in launching the TRP and in the 
conversion administration process led to 2016 (i.e. seven years after the commencement of the 
Act in 2009) being deemed a feasible horizon date for completing this process.  
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Section 52 of the Act dictates that operating licences may remain valid for a maximum of seven 
years (except in the case of the 12-year negotiated BRT services), and that all awarded licences 
must be granted for a fixed period. Together with the 2016 time horizon this also allowed 
municipalities to make longer-term plans for public transport reform, knowing that paratransit 
operators could not automatically lay claim to valid operating rights after 2016, or for a 
maximum of seven years thereafter. Where cities have IPTN plans in place the affected 
paratransit operating licences would thus not have to be renewed after 2016. These license-
holders had then to be drawn into contract negotiations, be compensated for the loss of business 
through the cancellation of their licences, or be given an alternative operating opportunity. In 
the absence of an IPTN plan, in practice operating licences would in all likelihood be renewed 
automatically. Moreover, there are provisions in the Act protecting paratransit operators against 
unmotivated cancellation of their operating licences. 
The NLTA makes allowance for a relatively fair regulatory regime change that would not leave 
paratransit operators stranded. At the same time it places a significant responsibility on city 
authorities who opt to commence with negotiations around establishing IPTN contracts (e.g. 
Cape Town and Johannesburg) to engage existing operators around, and include them in, their 
reformed systems. Section 41 (1) states that:  
Contracting authorities may enter into negotiated contracts with operators in their areas, once 
only, with a view to (a) integrating services forming part of integrated public transport networks 
in terms of their integrated transport plans … 
Once authorities commence with such negotiations, section 41 (2) adds that such negotiations 
must, as appropriate: 
… include operators in the area subject to interim contracts, subsidised service contracts [e.g. 
GABS], commercial service contracts, existing negotiated contracts and operators of unscheduled 
services and non-contracted services [i.e. paratransit]. 
It appears to be the case that cities’ agendas are, rather ubiquitously, to build BRT systems. The 
Act does not specify which operating technology needs to be used, but rather the way in which 
existing operators should be engaged. There is thus scope for municipalities to explore 
alternative reform mechanisms.  
Even in the two cities with IPTN plans that are furthest ahead in terms of construction and 
operations it is highly unlikely that the majority of their geographic areas will be served by 
reformed services. Paratransit will in all likelihood continue to transport significant numbers of 
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passengers. These cities will require dual regulatory systems: one dealing with IPTN services, 
the other with existing paratransit operating permissions. In the remainder of the 18 cities and 
districts, IPTN roll-out has been much slower, or non-existent, and the first concerted efforts at 
operator corporatisation and contracting have yet to commence. In these cases paratransit 
services are likely to continue to be the mainstay of public transport operations. In these cities 
there will also have to be two regulatory regimes where allowance is made for the IPTN 
services to the extent that they materialise, as well as for paratransit operations in their present 
form. In the remaining scenario, that of municipalities in the country where no IPTNs are 
envisaged, only one regime may have to be put in place, i.e. for paratransit regulation, which 
could well take the form of a continuation of the current licencing system.  
There are, at least at the national level, some efforts to move thinking away from BRT-led 
reform. In July 2012 the DoT published a request for terms of reference for the appointment of 
a service provider to investigate alternatives for regulating public transport that would be 
appropriate in South Africa. The three key issues that the study had to address in its six-month 
timeline were whether the current licensing system was still relevant, whether there was a more 
effective and enforceable way of regulating public transport, and the way in which the existing 
regulatory system could be improved if it was found still to be relevant. Its findings were not 
published. More than a year and a half later, in February 2014, the DoT issued invitations for a 
brainstorming session to obtain broader input. Whether or not this points to the fact that the 
study findings were inconclusive or unsatisfactory, it is encouraging that there is a national 
dialogue on the topic of public transport reform. That it has taken so long to move forward is 
indicative of the complexity of the task at hand.  
If the reform process to date in Cape Town is taken into account it is evident that a standardised 
regulatory mechanism at national level will not suffice to cover the different scenarios that the 
PTS programme has led to. Moreover, reformulating the current operating licence regime in 
IPTN cities will in all likelihood require greater effort than elsewhere in the country. Public 
sector capacity is already being stretched to get the IPTNs built and operating, and to establish 
transport authorities with the appropriate devolved planning and regulatory functions. It is 
unlikely that even a relatively well-resourced and well-managed city such as Cape Town has 
spare human resources to develop or adopt a new regulatory regime. Where the DoT can play a 
role is to support city authorities around the local challenges of paratransit reform and 
implementation of the PTS, to lead thinking around alternatives to the regulatory system, and to 
document paratransit reform processes to increase learning between different locales. 
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6.2 PARATRANSIT ACTORS’ PARTICIPATION IN REFORM 
The propositions in this section focus on different paratransit actors’ roles in reform. A first 
proposition is that a revised and extended TRP is warranted and can impact positively on 
individual operators. Next, in engagement processes around reform, operators associations are 
best placed to mediate between the public sector and collective and individual paratransit 
business interests. Lastly, the detailed local operating knowledge of paratransit operators is a 
valuable resource in instituting reform, but there have been few efforts to draw on this resource.  
There is a strong case for reviewing and extending the TRP  
Operators’ responses during the interviews suggest that government efforts to reform public 
transport did not necessarily address the issues that they set out to attend to. Multiple concerns 
emerged in relation to the TRP in terms of the recapitalisation subsidy. The TRP capital 
subsidy was insufficient to be an effective incentive to entice operators to retire from the 
industry, which was one of the TRP’s intentions. If operators opted to use the subsidy to 
purchase a new vehicle it was reported that it did not necessarily fully cover the typical deposit 
required by a financial institution to secure a loan. A prospective new vehicle owner may be 
forced to approach less reputable credit providers to cover the shortfall should he or she not be 
able to borrow the money from family or friends or have savings from which to settle it. Even 
if it covered the deposit, the allowance covered only a small part of the cost of a TRP-
compliant vehicle.  
It also emerged from the interviews that some operators might make only enough from running 
their minibuses to cover the debt repayment on the vehicle. Though it would require financial 
statements to verify such claims, multiple respondents reported that their total monthly 
financing costs on a vehicle was in the region of ZAR10 000 (±USD830). This is not an 
unlikely monthly instalment depending on: the term of the loan; a purchase price of the vehicle 
at around ZAR340 000 (USD28 300) for the popular Toyota model less the current ZAR74 100 
(USD6 175) scrapping allowance; and an interest rate reported typically to be 15%-18% 
charged by commercial banks but up to the legal maximum of 25% charged by SA Taxi 
Finance.  
On the income side one of the interview intermediaries’ estimated that the daily target amount 
that drivers pay to owners was in the range of ZAR400-ZAR1 000 per day (Botha, personal 
communication 2011, 20 June), corroborated by sources quoted in the press that estimated 
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ZAR500 per day (Smith, 2011) and up to ZAR1 000 per day (South African Press Association, 
2013). Based on a six-day workweek an operator’s monthly income could thus be in the range 
of ZAR10 000-ZAR26 000. Allowing for ownership costs (such as maintenance and 
insurance), days on which the vehicle is not operating (due, for instance, to breakdowns or 
impoundment), and association membership dues, it is conceivable that an owner’s monthly 
income could be below ZAR10 000. This may especially be the case of a one-vehicle business 
operating on a less lucrative route. Respondents’ claims that the TRP created a debt-trap for 
them are thus not farfetched. It is furthermore not surprising that operators engage in long-
distance, shuttle and contract services, which allow them to cross-subsidise their licensed 
public transport service component and to extract a profit for themselves. Such cross-
subsidisation was indeed reported during one interview to be exactly what happened in 
practice.  
Why then do operators continue to buy into the TRP, and take on new debt in order to do so? 
The interview results shed some light onto answers to this question. Barriers to entry are not as 
low as one might think in an industry incorrectly understood as ‘unregulated’: traffic law 
enforcement efforts regularly conduct road-blocks to confirm valid operating and drivers’ 
licenses; income tax registration and a valid operating licence are mandatory for vehicle 
scrapping; and associations move forcefully against rogue operators. Nonetheless, the capital 
and human resources required to start a business are relatively small, and as a result a 
paratransit business offers an individual the prospect of full ownership. By starting and running 
such a business the operator also creates employment not only for him- or herself, but also 
directly and indirectly for others in the community. Operators’ home communities are often 
characterised by high levels of unemployment and social marginalisation, and being able to 
start and run your own business is an antidote to these ills. The status that being a business 
owner and employer and having purchasing power brings with it cannot be underestimated. 
Such status is furthermore embedded by offering an array of local, long-distance and contract 
services that fill a multitude of transport needs. By being able to do so in a new vehicle attracts 
or fulfils the expectations of passengers who, when circumstances allow, choose to wait for 
new vehicles rather than board old ones. It also allows an owner to demonstrate that he or she is 
part of the modern economy. Thus, though there may be flaws in the TRP’s implementation, I 
would argue that it has responded to an all too human need for status and distinction and has 
prompted operators to act on their aspirations.  
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What a sufficient capital subsidy amount would be and how it should be delivered are difficult 
questions to answer. Operators’ circumstances vary widely and the accessibility and efficacy of 
debt funding mechanisms may be problematic. Despite such challenges the TRP has stimulated 
large-scale fleet renewal: as noted by respondents, and observable from the reduction over the 
years of the number of dilapidated minibuses on the road, the service to and safety of 
passengers has seen improvement. It is a concern that the TRP is coming to an end in the near 
future, and the vehicles replaced near the start of the programme in 2006 will soon be reaching 
their replacement date. There is as yet no clear indication of whether the TRP will be replaced 
or extended in some form or another. This does, however, offer opportunities for further 
research, including what mechanism of public financial support might be appropriate for the 
paratransit sector to improve its service to passengers; the quantum of such support; and 
whether it should take the form of capital or operating funding or both, or indeed non-financial 
support.  
In terms of cost to the national public purse, explorations of the possibilities that an extended 
TRP offers should be seriously considered. Despite significant overspending on its budget, by 
2013 the TRP had contributed to the renewal of a fleet of over 54 000 minibuses across the 
country at a cost of ZAR12.9bn (USD1.1bn) (Ensor & Vecchiato, 2013). As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, in the same year the capital costs of the complete first phase of MyCiTi were 
estimated to be ZAR4.6bn (USD383.3m). There were 661 minibuses involved in this project 
phase (as stated in Chapter 3). Clearly the service that MyCiTi offers is much more 
sophisticated than that of recapitalised paratransit minibuses. But in terms of the geographical 
extent of public transport service improvement, the sheer number of paratransit businesses (and 
passengers) it has reached, and its overall cost there is much to commend the TRP as an 
approach to reform. 
Operator associations are well placed to mediate collective and individual 
paratransit interests 
The paratransit operator’s business is not independent of collective interests. Operator 
associations served as the platform through which the interviews were conducted; though my 
initial aim was to reach individual operators, in practice the associations served the dual roles 
of gatekeepers and facilitators. The controlling role of associations was evident in my personal 
observations of many of the interviews – during a number of the interviews I got the 
impression that respondents toed the association’s line. Yet being able to reach individual 
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operators through an association made gaining access to respondents much easier. Another 
instance of individual business in the context of the collective was illustrated in the MyCiTi 
industry transition process. Around the negotiating table were municipal officials and 
association representatives – not individual operators – and decisions around corporatisation 
and compensation were left in the hands of associations. It would be difficult to argue that 
associations and operators do not form a unit, however uncomfortable individuals may at times 
find this arrangement.  
Associations have long been part of the industry, and in its final report the NTTT (1997) 
recognised their central role and recommended that they be supported and strengthened in this 
role. The NLTTA that followed in 2000 recognised associations’ primacy, formalised their 
regulatory role, and made it difficult for operators who did not belong to associations to apply 
for operating licences. Only under exceptional circumstances could non-members qualify to 
apply for licenses, such as there not being an association in the area being applied for or an 
association preventing a prospective operator from joining it or from operating (NLTTA 22 of 
2000: s113). In practice such ‘pirate’ operations are uncommon. It is unlikely for there not to 
be an association with a presence in an area where there is a market for paratransit services. 
Associations’ role as territorial protectors would furthermore make it difficult for rogue 
operations to go unnoticed and unchallenged for long. Lastly, despite there being evidence that 
associations were not taking in new members, it would be unlikely that a prospective operator 
would be refused entry as new members bring with them new membership fees.  
Though the NLTA is silent on association membership being a requirement for license-holding, 
the dominance of associations and their leaderships over operators was thoroughly entrenched 
prior to its enactment in 2009. It is improbable that this hierarchical relationship will change in 
the near term. The PTS has demonstrated that with sufficient public sector effort and funds –
mediated through associations – a small proportion of operators can be incorporated into 
companies (or can retire comfortably). But within these companies the hierarchy has remained 
more or less intact through the structure of shareholding and management. Ultimately, if 
individual operators have a need for self-determination, the industry in its present form does 
not allow for them to express it (nor does the group interview setting). In the absence of a PTS-
funded retirement from the sector it is, however, not easy for them to exit the industry. The 
industry may have served the entrepreneurial spirit in its heyday, but it is has grown into a 
remarkably rigid and regulated playing field akin to the formal economy. 
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Despite the imbalance of power between operators and associations and the potential for 
unexpressed resentment on the part of some individual operators, the association as a collective 
institution can serve the shared interest of individual operators. The interview findings 
demonstrated a number of ways in which associations worked in their members’ favour. 
Besides serving to mediate in internal disputes, protect members’ operating rights, and manage 
day-to-day operations, associations can also be drivers of internal reforms. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, such initiatives, whether successful or not, included collective fleet management, 
converting to scheduled and contracted operations, cashless fare collection, a pension scheme 
for operators, and selling advertising space on vehicles to secure additional revenue. These 
initiatives were planned or undertaken without public sector support, and could be interpreted 
as the paratransit industry’s expression of an internal need to reform. Not to harness or explore 
the internal reform that is already in evidence would be a missed opportunity; how these 
internal changes could begin to be incorporated in, and strengthen, reform endeavours where 
the public sector is involved is discussed later in this Chapter.  
The NTTT did not only put forward recommendations with regard to local associations. It also 
set out at length the need for, and manner in which to establish, a full hierarchy spanning city, 
provincial and national interests. The NTTT found that “[u]mbrella bodies do not help the 
associations under them” (NTTT, 1997:13) and recommended that “the fragmentation among 
[the industry’s] institutions (associations) has to be overcome through endeavours to unite and 
formalise” (NTTT, 1997:4; round brackets in original). The result of the recommendation was 
the national body, SANTACO, and its regional offices.  
Respondents’ views on SANTACO and its subsidiary offices tended to be that these did not 
offer effective representations of associations’ and operators’ attitudes and interests. As such 
they failed in their role as intermediary between government and individual operators and 
associations. Respondents’ motivations for expressing these views were often difficult to 
penetrate – some were not re-elected to serve within SANTACO in recent elections and may 
bear grudges, while others could well have been using the national body as a scapegoat for their 
frustrations with a difficult operating and business environment. Personal differences did not 
hide the fact that the body was not the uniting force amongst operators and associations in their 
day-to-day endeavours that it was supposed to be. It was clear from the interviews that there 
were opposing factions within SANTACO and that it ran the risk of becoming a political 
battleground and universe on its own, removed from operators’ needs.  
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Drawing on the PTS and MyCiTi implementation processes (described in Chapter 3) the 
national body furthermore had limited, or no, involvement in supporting operators to face the 
challenges posed by corporatisation and contracted operations. It would, however, be unfair to 
SANTACO to claim that it did nothing in exchange for the ZAR16m (USD1.33m) in public 
funds that it received from the DoT in the 2012-2013 financial year or ZAR21m (USD1.75m) 
the preceding financial year (DoT, 2012; 2013b). It does serve to lobby for, and comment on, 
paratransit policy and regulatory issues at the national level. It is, rather, the degree to which it 
represents the individual operator’s needs and aspirations that is questionable. Ultimately the 
multiple and conflicting views expressed during the interviews suggest that it is, in fact, 
doubtful whether anything except direct engagement with the variety of interests in the 
paratransit arena would offer sufficient insight into the compliance of present policies and 
regulatory frameworks with needs on the ground. Such sector-wide investigations may, 
however, come at a cost far beyond what the public purse would accept. Should efforts have to 
be rationed local operator associations are best placed to be the mediator of individual and 
collective interests.  
Operators’ knowledge of local operating conditions is an underutilised resource 
The City of Cape Town publicly committed to be more inclusive in its MyCiTi consultations 
with paratransit entities (Nicholson, 2012). This aligns with the constitutional imperative that 
the public administration encourage participative policy-making (Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996, as amended, 2009:s195). It follows that the municipality in Cape Town 
(and in other cities) elicits operators’ and associations’ views on reform prior to embarking on 
full engagement around their corporatisation and transformation. The risk of operator resistance 
and the costs of buying out their businesses and installing a new mode of public transport are 
too great not to do so. IPTNs installed to date adequately demonstrate these risks.  
However, besides risks there are also advantages to engaging operators prior to setting out in 
any particular policy direction. Operators have a detailed understanding of local operating 
conditions. One of the more obvious benefits of this would be to avoid a situation that arose 
during MyCiTi implementation where procured feeder buses could not navigate the narrow 
side streets in the Du Noon township (McLachlan, personal communication 2011, 17 March). 
There are tacit signs from the municipality that smaller vehicles (essentially rebranded 
paratransit minibuses) would form part of its reform strategy going forward, but costly practical 
implications and embarrassment could have been avoided in the first place merely by drawing 
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on paratransit operators’ existing knowledge. Similarly, operators have a detailed 
understanding of localised passenger demand, and fluctuations therein. Based on this 
knowledge operators have developed a trunk and feeder system using particular paratransit 
ranks as interchanges or locating near other modes’ major stops. As with paratransit routes, 
rank locations would typically follow demand patterns, and thus existing interconnection points 
are unlikely to be arbitrary. By drawing on operators’ insight the municipal administration 
might have focussed efforts and funds on replacing line-haul paratransit services, and where 
economies of scale justify, use of larger vehicles and dedicated infrastructure. Line-haul routes 
could then have inter-linked with feeder paratransit services in their existing form at established 
ranking points, rather than replacing vehicles that were in fact already fit for the feeder 
purpose.  
Especially in view of significant cost overruns and funding uncertainty such a pragmatic 
approach should hold much appeal. Moreover, the initial concept in the project was that 
paratransit and bus operators would jointly own and operate MyCiTi services. In practice this 
has not been the case. In the first project phase the incumbent bus operator established a 
dedicated BRT operating company and only runs trunk operations. Paratransit-owned 
companies run feeder services and share some of the trunk lines. In this manner at the 
ownership and operational level paratransit is still the feeder. The one area where the City has 
successfully tapped into the paratransit ‘logic’ has been through targeting associations as the 
parties to be negotiated with. The locus of power is clearly located at the level of the 
association, and not lower – with individual operators – or higher – with the national or 
regional bodies. If the association can be convinced to change, it is likely to be able to convince 
its members. Though it was not unheard of for friction between association leaders and 
ordinary member to erupt at times, on the whole their acceptance of the City’s offer seems to 
have won half the battle.  
At the broader level, engaging operators from early on in any change process reduces the 
chances of their walking away from the negotiating table or being able to claim that their 
reason for rejecting a proposal is that they have not been consulted. Starting engagement early 
in effect allows for the conditions for buy-in to develop. The interview findings revealed two 
important issues surrounding the approach that government has taken in engaging paratransit 
operators that are pre-requisites for such conditions to emerge. Firstly, there seems to be too 
little information available for operators to be able to make informed decisions around opting 
into the programme or not. Secondly, the information that is available may not be in a 
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vocabulary that operators can easily understand. Frank and frequent communication between 
government and paratransit entities might begin to forge the trust that is a necessary foundation 
for the complex negotiations that are required to corporatise existing operations, and to allay 
uncertainty and fears on the part of paratransit operators who are being asked to abandon their 
familiar and decades-old business format, however flawed it might be. 
The findings of the semi-structured interview method, as well as the MyCiTi’s first phase 
engagement process, provide some pointers for the reform policy engagement process going 
forward. Engagement with paratransit operators is an intensive and at times volatile procedure 
with unpredictable results. Penetrating operators’ views will require sustained effort especially 
in view of the significant potential for a hostile reception. The paratransit sector has created a 
niche for itself in the passenger transport arena despite receiving little public sector support, 
particularly prior to the TRP. Approaches by the public sector around paratransit restructuring 
are therefore typically viewed as unwanted outside interference. Focused and transparent 
efforts will have to be made to overcome the ‘us/them’ boundary for a mutually acceptable 
reform agenda to be established.  
Government may ultimately have to accept that this agenda does not revolve primarily around 
the introduction of a new public transport mode, but rather around unlocking the human capital 
that is embodied in the multitude of paratransit businesses around the country and in each city. 
Such capital includes a wealth of operational experience and local knowledge. Conversely, 
paratransit operators and associations may have to move away from seeing themselves as the 
owners and operators of a particular vehicle and mode of operations, and recognise that their 
businesses are located in a segment of the economy that is receiving significant public sector 
attention and funding. The outcomes to date of the government-led engagement process and my 
interviews would suggest that both government and paratransit have the capacity to achieve 
such shifts in focus. On the part of the public sector its mandate to serve the residents of the 
country and, I would argue, the political imperatives and kudos of being seen at the head of 
visible urban improvements would motivate for continued reform efforts. On the part of 
paratransit the driving force behind change will in all likelihood continue to be the prospect of 
greater financial profit.  
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6.3 PROSPECTS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORM 
This section presents three propositions around the prospects of the current reform approach in 
Cape Town. The first is that MyCiTi’s initial project phase has shown that comprehensive BRT 
implementation relying on the assimilation of paratransit operators has not been the panacea 
that it was initially expected to be. The second proposition is that further MyCiTi project 
phases will necessarily have to shift away from the BRT-led approach to reform. A third 
proposition is that the reform process in Cape Town will result in a hybrid outcome: some 
paratransit operations will be shifted into the scheduled and subsidised services fold, while the 
majority will continue in their present format. 
The comprehensive BRT approach is not a panacea  
Without having embarked on the first phases of IPTN roll-out at national and local levels it 
would not have been possible to gauge the extent of the impact of the reform programme on 
local institutions and operators. What the MyCiTi project has demonstrated, though, has been 
that the initial timeline for BRT implementation was optimistic (see Figure 6-2). This in itself 
is no revelation: it is not difficult or unusual for a project at the scale of the MyCiTi to exceed 
deadlines. The project had to confront a complex mixture of existing and new challenges in 
terms of rights-of-way and infrastructure provision, vehicle procurement and maintenance, 
operator reorganisation, vehicle and station service contract design, a nationally interoperable 
fare system, centralised monitoring and control over the entire system, and dynamic local and 
national funding mechanisms.  
Even in terms of only the infrastructure, arguably a core strength in the South African transport 
field, unfamiliar obstacles such as trunk bus priority at intersections, physically segregated 
lanes and median bus stations confronted the project. Add to this the project streams dealing 
with the existing paratransit and bus operator transition, balancing capital and operating 
incomes and expenditure, and drafting long-term contracts within an intricate regulatory 
system, and it becomes clear why a number of the project components lagged behind the initial 
schedule, in some cases extensively so. 
 
 













Figure 6-2: MyCiTi phase 1 planned and actual timeline comparison 
Sources: CoCT, 2007b; 2008; see also Chapter 3 
Actual routes that were not in the original proposal  
have been excluded from this comparison 
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Clearly, managing all the work-streams of the first phase of the project concurrently has 
stretched institutional capacities. Despite the initial project phase not yet being complete, since 
2013 planning, construction and operator engagement in the second project phase were added 
to the workload, with a view to launching a three-year pilot service. As the full second project 
phase is only in the early stages it presents a moment for critical reflection, and two potential 
project paths present themselves. The first is to substantially increase institutional capacity and 
funding to continue the comprehensive BRT and operator transformation approach. The second 
is to scale back the project specification to more closely match present capacity and a realistic 
projection of capacity growth in coming years.  
Scaling back the project may be all but necessitated by the higher than expected cost of full-
specification BRT as demonstrated by cost escalations in the first project phase. From an early 
projection of ZAR1.4bn (USD116.6m) (Lewis, 2009) capital costs were later estimated to be 
ZAR4.6bn (USD383.3m) upon phase completion (CoCT, 2013e). Ultimately BRT was new to 
South Africa, and possibly the only way to have found out what it would cost in the local 
context at the time was to implement it. Perhaps a better measure of project cost is the total 
expense of the endeavour in relation to the degree to which it has benefitted the passenger. The 
City’s figures indicate that over the 2011-2013 financial years MyCiTi capital expenses totalled 
59% of the City’s total transport capital expenditure for the period (CoCT, 2012b). Yet, as 
reported in the City’s transport plan (CoCT 2013d), by 2013 MyCiTi was the main mode of 
only 0.3% of weekday trips (see Table 6-1). 
Table 6-1: Public transport operating subsidy in Cape Town 
Data source: CoCT, 2013d 
Subsidy per passengers assumes 261 weekdays per year and two trips per passenger per day. 
In terms of its draw on operating subsidy there is an equally stark bias. Comparing the transport 
plan’s 2013 survey and 2013/2014 subsidy information across public transport modes reveals 
that the annual operating subsidy per passenger for the first phase of MyCiTi is more than 
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double that of either rail or bus (as shown in Table 6-1 above). The National Treasury 
contributes a portion of MyCiTi’s operational subsidy through the Public Transport Network 
Operating Grant (PTNOG), but even so the amount that the City has to cover will only increase 
as more MyCiTi services come on stream. This raises serious questions about the financial 
sustainability of MyCiTi at its Phase 1 specification level.  
The role that international advocates of the “Bogota model” of BRT played in it being 
transferred to South Africa and Cape Town should not be understated – nor should the 
significance of “gold standard” BRT as promoted by the ITDP and associated individuals and 
agencies (ITDP & GIZ, 2012), or similar best-practice handbooks such as the 2004 and 2007 
BRT planning guides (Wright 2004, Wright and Hook 2007). Both the model and the standard 
contribute to a notion that BRT is a comprehensive product that can resolve the messiness of 
uncoordinated and poorly integrated urban public transport operations in a developing country 
such as South Africa. In a sense, BRT is a solution looking for an application. Priemus 
(2008:105) notes that it is not unusual for this to occur internationally in large-scale projects: 
for a lobbyist-supported solution which suits the initiators to present itself early on in the 
project and then for it to go in search of possible implementation opportunities. Indeed, from 
the perspective of the South African public transport reform strategy this is what has happened. 
BRT as a modal technology was identified as a quick fix to upgrading public transport services, 
rather than there being a careful assessment of problems and then an equally careful 
consideration of a suite of potentially appropriate actions that would address each. 
I do not suggest that BRT as a technological offering is at fault. In many cities around the globe 
BRT has encountered a fertile mix of pre-existing institutional structures, passenger demand 
and urban circumstances that has allowed it to make a positive difference to passengers’ 
experiences. Even in South Africa there are instances of high demand corridors where BRT 
would be an appropriate transport solution, but the highly challenging urban spatial legacy in 
South Africa limits the number of these corridors. Thus, promoting BRT as a panacea across all 
South African cities borders on being reckless. In many cities that are implementing BRT the 
realisation has not yet dawned that reforming paratransit comprises far more than constructing 
new infrastructure and drawing up contracts, and that the main thrust of the reform project is 
indeed not the installation of BRT services but a multi-faceted transition process for which the 
public sector is not adequately prepared. 
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Forthcoming MyCiTi phases will have to shift away from a BRT-led approach 
An expectation created by using BRT in Bogota as a reference point was that MyCiTi services 
would only require capital subsidy in each phase, with operations completely supported out of 
farebox revenue. The capital subsidy was seen as a necessity to overcoming the apartheid 
spatial legacy and historic under-spending on public transport infrastructure, but operating 
subsidies were not foreseen. The result has been that the City has had to allocate a portion of its 
own budget to funding MyCiTi operations, in essence taking on a new fiscal responsibility 
without having dedicated funding for it. Ultimately it is the city’s ratepayers who will pay for 
the operating deficit in a rather direct way; in view of the initial ‘operating subsidy free’ claim 
for the new system this is a significant unfulfilled expectation for the municipality.  
In order to ameliorate the impact of an unforeseen operating subsidy for the MyCiTi, the City 
announced that it would cap this subsidy to 4% of its overall municipal budget (CoCT, 2012a). 
While this measure may offer at least some reassurance to ratepayers, it has had, and will have, 
a negative effect on an array of the attributes of the resulting public transport services. Indeed, 
while City officials have already tried to make the operating contracts as lean as possible, they 
have come to the realisation that there simply are not enough funds to run the full scale BRT 
model to the specifications initially envisaged and are investigating cost reductions (CoCT, 
2012a). In the first phase, where the infrastructure is built and the buses bought, the most likely 
impact will be on the service level in terms of reduced headways between buses. This will be 
detrimental to the car-competitiveness of the system, and impact on residents’ perceptions of 
and support for the reform project. The City’s reasoning for selecting the West Coast corridor 
was that this area lacked a high-capacity public transport service; thus the construction of the 
BRT trunk line. This corridor, however, runs through a large portion of the city’s middle-class 
suburban households (i.e. ratepayer territory) – a politically important group to the ruling party, 
and a source of political ammunition to the opposition. With a poor level of service the large-
scale and costly investment in MyCiTi/BRT would be difficult to justify particularly to the 
ratepayers – and, crucially to the local government, rate-paying voters – who would have to 
contribute to the costs of these services. 
In the second phase of the project, the City’s realisation of its constrained financial resources, 
as well as its lessons learnt in the first project phase, has led to a review of the MyCiTi 
operating concept. Rather than aiming to replicate the conventional BRT approach of the first 
phase, a shift towards a more flexible system design seems to be emerging that might be more 
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appropriate to variations in localised passenger demand. New buses are likely to be configured 
to allow for more operational flexibility, i.e. not exclusively high-floor with right-hand 
boarding. This means that they would not require the specialised and raised stations as per the 
first phase, nor would they be bound to using only dedicated median lanes or stops. This also 
opens the possibility for minibuses to use MyCiTi infrastructure, and for the focus of the 
operator industry transition process to shift from assimilation into BRT to making minibus-
based paratransit services part of the MyCiTi service offering (Van Ryneveld, personal 
communication 2014, 17 October).  
The shift away from full-specification BRT may, however, also be linked to political 
imperatives. In response to criticisms of favouring a relatively wealthy part of the city in the 
first project phase, the local governing party, not unexpectedly, might want to be seen to be 
improving services to the main concentration of poor households, i.e. those in the city’s south-
eastern sector. Simplified infrastructure and less restrictive vehicle specifications would allow 
for truncated completion times compared to the first phase. Indeed, the mayor at the end of 
2012 promised that the N2 express service, spearheading the second project phase with 40 
buses running along the freeway, would take place by the end of 2013. This date slipped to 
mid-2014. Quicker implementation timeframes and the pilot express service were expected to 
be political boons, particularly in view of national and provincial elections held in May 2014.  
To what extent the reduction in specification would be of concern to residents and potential 
users in the city’s southeast would be difficult to gauge, but the potential for a backlash by the 
electorate should not be excluded. Of even greater concern at present, and critically absent from 
the discourse around the project, is the first phase lessons around existing operator engagement. 
The reception that the project received in the first phase from affected operators has 
encountered similar resistance from operators in the second project phase. The number of 
conflicts in future may well escalate as only a small proportion of the substantially larger 
number of associations in this part of the city has been engaged to date. In addition, operators 
remain sheltered by the national principles of existing operator and labour retention and income 
guarantees, and are by now aware of the quantum of compensation that affected operators 
qualified for in the first-phase MyCiTi transition process. The PTISG only made provision for 
cities to claim for transitional costs, including operator buy-outs, during the initial phase of an 
IPTN (DoT, 2011). 
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In relation to compensation the municipality will either have to accommodate it in its own 
budget, or ensure that demands for compensation are much reduced or sidestepped altogether. 
With the forthcoming Phase 2 pilot route being termed a “top-up” service (CoCT, 2012a), the 
municipality was hoping to avoid the issue of compensation. It was deemed that no existing 
operations would be displaced as there was unmet demand requiring additional public transport 
capacity. However, in my observations during meetings around the N2 Express since the latter 
half of 2013, some operators have experienced a reduction in patronage and compensation is 
already a topic of discussion and concern. The consequences of the national promise of no 
operator being worse off after BRT implementation continue to be a thorn in the side of local 
government. In the City’s own assessment as early as 2010 it reported that: 
… the financial viability of the existing [minibus-]taxi and bus industry versus the proposed 
MyCiTi system, viewed from a vehicle operator perspective, indicates that the existing industry 
will generate significantly more profits than what the corresponding MyCiTi vehicle operator 
company is projected to generate. Had the profits in the vehicle operator company been equal or 
better, it would be less of a challenge to convince taxi and bus operators to voluntarily surrender 
their existing permits and vehicles in exchange for a share in a new vehicle company. (CoCT, 
2010:99) 
In all likelihood the municipality will have to include into its own budget the cost of continued 
paratransit business buy-out if its present approach to reform is to succeed. The experience of 
inserting a BRT system in Mexico City supports this view. Flores and Zegras (2013), in their 
analysis of the cost of including bus and paratransit in the Metrobús BRT system, found that 
with the addition of each new corridor, operators and implementers adjusted their expectations 
and vied for the best position to gain from system expansion. Each new corridor resulted in 
more incumbents being affected, more operator collectives being engaged, and the slice of 
passenger demand (and revenue) shrinking accordingly. As in Cape Town, it was also the case 
in Mexico City that BRT was promoted as operating subsidy-free, but the deals struck with 
operators in order to protect them from losses came at the price of public funding for the 
operating deficit. In short, the Cape Town municipality is unlikely to convince paratransit 
operators to participate in the present reform programme without some form of financial 
enticement, be it through a once-off capital pay-off or through a continuing operating 
contribution to ensure that their profits as new IPTN operators match up to their current 
paratransit operating profit. 
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Paratransit-public transport hybridity will be a reform outcome in Cape Town 
The public sector’s role in the reform process, the manner in which paratransit operators have 
been engaged in relation to such reform, and operators’ aspirations and attitudes as expressed 
during the interviews indicate an overall impact on paratransit operations quite dissimilar from 
the initial intention of the national reform agenda. The financial, human resource, and practical 
limitations outlined above support this view. Rather than the corporatisation of the paratransit 
sector and the wholesale absorption of paratransit MyCiTi operations, my research suggests 
that only a portion of paratransit operators will find their way into the reformed public transport 
fold in Cape Town. Probable outcomes of the paratransit reform process at city level are that 
the majority of paratransit operations will continue in their present form, albeit with some 
recapitalised vehicles partially funded via the TRP, and a small minority of paratransit 
operations will effectively be absorbed in MyCiTi operations. Failing incorporation in the 
IPTN operators and associations might well continue to explore other avenues to formalise or 
improve their operations. Figure 6-3 is a conceptual representation of these outcomes in 
relation to what the Public Transport Strategy set out to achieve.  
Consolidated operators (and those that are likely to do so with some encouragement) and the 
more ubiquitous one-vehicle/one-owner paratransit business both have their places in a 
reframed reform strategy. In the context of constrained public finances it would make sense to 
concentrate investment on higher density passenger movements (i.e. trunk corridors) where the 
largest number of passengers would benefit from such investment. With one of the public 
sector’s strengths demonstrably being infrastructure provision, municipal efforts could focus on 
the provision of dedicated trunk rights-of-way. Experience already gained in the first phase of 
MyCiTi in relation to, for example, trunk lane design, pavement technology and station layouts 
would be a resource. The capacities to undertake such design and implementation have already 
started to be developed in-house within a handful of municipalities. The aforementioned 
paratransit operations showing signs of corporatisation should be encouraged and supported to 
become the operators on these trunk lines. This transition could follow the current BRT-led 
approach (and as discussed in Chapter 2). It is also on these trunk lines where paratransit’s 
present 16-seater minibuses are inefficient, and the more corporatised operators would more 
likely than not be able to see the benefits of converting to such larger vehicles.  
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 Initially envisaged outcome:  
complete shift to formal public transport operations 
 
 Probable outcome:  





Figure 6-3: Impact of the reform process on urban paratransit operators  
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One-vehicle/one-owner paratransit businesses would also fit into this schematic. Paratransit 
operators already informally serve a feeder and distributor function to rail, bus and line-haul 
paratransit services. The value of consolidating small-scale paratransit operators into large 
operating companies is debatable. This is where paratransit business fragmentation aligns 
with the large number of routes that need to be served and the 16-seater vehicle already suits 
the local feeder-distributor function. It is at the level of local land use where changes occur 
fastest, and paratransit operators can respond quickest. An alternative approach to improve 
the service of these operators to passengers would, however, be warranted. Primary 
considerations in such an approach should be addressing the safety of passengers, which 
would be reliant on mechanisms to improve the condition of vehicles and driver behaviour, 
and managing passengers’ travel costs. This could draw on the in situ improvement approach 
mentioned in Chapter 2. 
A starting point would be the TRP, which has had a demonstrable impact on vehicle safety, 
but is soon to become defunct and only delivers a once-off boost to operators. A refreshed 
recapitalisation programme should build on the established institutional and administrative 
systems of the TRP but narrow its focus to small operators and feeder-distributor routes. It 
should also take a more realistic view on the capital subsidy amount so as not to create a debt 
trap for a single-vehicle business, and be more pragmatic by viewing vehicle replacement as 
a cyclical, ongoing need. Funds that the PTISG would have provided for transition costs 
related to IPTNs could be redirected to fund such a programme. The PTISG’s focus on 
capital contributions would sit more comfortably in the remit of the grant than present-day 
business buy-out payments.  
Changing driver behaviour, however, may present a greater challenge as it would require 
more radical intervention. Removing the incentive to speed would involve the eradication of 
the target and commission systems. This could be achieved by making drivers salaried 
employees, though such a change may attract resistance from drivers and owners alike. 
Drivers handle farebox income in cash, which makes it easy for them to under-report 
earnings while giving them ample opportunity to siphon off income for themselves, while 
owners would take on the risk of having to pay a driver during lean times and be more closely 
involved in labour, financial and tax administration. Introducing a mechanism to improve a 
paratransit business’s cash flow and internal accounting may address this issue as well as that 
of moderating passengers’ travel cost. This could take the form of a cashless fare collection 
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system. Such a system would limit cash losses, enabling owners to receive more revenue, 
establish and project income more accurately, and consequently to pay drivers more and on a 
regular basis. Passengers would have more transparency on fare setting, and, if the system 
were sophisticated enough, allow government agencies to institute a direct-to-passenger 
subsidy with the possibility of special fare classes for target groups such as scholars and 
pensioners. Drivers arguably stand to lose most in such an arrangement, but incentives could 
be built in; for instance, for carrying a particular number of special fare travellers to allay 
their concerns. Moreover, as the equity, vehicle and licence-holding (and consequently the 
responsibility for passenger carriage) are in paratransit business owners’ hands, the primary 
targets for engagement – and likely drivers of change – would be these owners.  
In relation to feeder-distributor operations the need for operator associations as internal 
regulators would remain. Associations have shown themselves to be capable of managing 
operator rotation, route allocation, and demand identification, so the need for these functions 
would not change. If the bulk of paratransit operations were to be contained within a local 
area, as would be the case with feeder-distributor services, there may well be benefits in a 
return to area or radius-based licensing with operator associations being the central managers. 
The potential of these associations to play a more formal regulatory role through their 
becoming area-based franchise-holders (considered in Chapter 2) is worthy of further 
investigation. This would require associations corporatising to the extent that they can enter 
into franchise agreements with the local municipalities, but this may be too ambitious a target 
to be achieved in the short term.  
6.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: PARATRANSIT PARTICIPATION IN 
REFORM 
In this chapter I presented propositions that drew on the research presented in Chapters 2 to 5. 
These chapters respectively outlined alternative approaches to public transport reform, the 
approach to reforming public transport and incorporating paratransit in Cape Town in recent 
years, and paratransit operator respondents’ business aspirations and views on reform.  
I presented propositions in relation to the public sector’s role in public transport reform in 
Cape Town. The first proposition was that reform implementation had been led by 
infrastructure construction rather than by the operator transformation process. Secondly, the 
reform approach demonstrated significant institutional capacity limitations. The third 
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proposition was that public sector political imperatives impacted on reform programme 
formulation and implementation. The last proposition was that there was scope for 
government to explore mechanisms of reform other that the implementation of BRT systems 
and the assimilation of paratransit in such systems.  
Subsequent to public sector considerations I put forth propositions focussing on paratransit 
sector actors’ roles in reform. The first was that a revised and extended vehicle 
recapitalisation programme was warranted and could make a positive impact on individual 
paratransit businesses. The next proposition was that operators associations were best placed 
to mediate between the public sector and paratransit business interests in engagement 
processes around reform. Thirdly, the paratransit operators’ detailed knowledge of local 
operating conditions was an underutilised but valuable resource in planning reformed public 
transport systems.  
The last part of this chapter presented propositions around the prospects of the current reform 
approach in Cape Town. The first proposition was that the first MyCiTi project phase 
demonstrated that the BRT-led reform approach did not meet initial expectations that it could 
resolve numerous challenges faced by Cape Town’s public transport system. The second 
proposition was that further MyCiTi project phases would necessarily have to shift away 
from a reliance on BRT-led reform. Lastly, the reform process in Cape Town would result in 
a hybrid outcome. Certain paratransit businesses would likely be absorbed in the scheduled 
and subsidised services fold, though the majority of paratransit operations would continue in 
their present format. 
As per the case study strategy that I followed (described in Chapter 1), the propositions that I 
presented in this chapter serve as a starting point for exploring a revised approach to reform 
in the Cape Town case, but can also be tested in further case study research on public 
transport reform processes that involve the participation of paratransit operators. In Chapter 
7, the concluding chapter of this thesis, I reflect on considerations for such further study. I 
also return to the research aims, and on how the propositions – and the research that I 
conducted to generate these proposition – served as response to these aims.  
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7 CONCLUSION  
The conclusion contains three parts. The first part describes ways in which the research 
responded to the research aims and questions, and the key contributions that the research 
makes. This chapter then focuses on ways in which the propositions from Chapter 6 could be 
generalised through further research. The second part discusses the implications of the 
research specifically in relation to public transport reform in other cities in South Africa, 
while the last part of the chapter presents pertinent considerations for further and broader 
study.  
7.1 RESPONSE TO RESEARCH AIMS AND RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
In the preceding chapters of this thesis I presented a detailed case study of public transport 
reform in Cape Town and of paratransit operators’ limited participation in such reform. Two 
reform programmes have been developed by the national government since the transition to 
democracy in 1994. A Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP), launched in 1999, aimed to 
assist operators across the country to replace ailing vehicles and has achieved some success in 
renewing the fleet of paratransit-owned minibuses. With national funding support a more 
recent programme at municipal level has been to install a high-specification BRT system and 
to incorporate and replace existing road-based public transport services into the resulting 
Integrated Public Transport Network (IPTN) in a geographically phased manner. This 
programme has seen resistance, at times violent, from the paratransit sector, and in the years 
since its introduction in 2007 only a small portion of Cape Town’s paratransit businesses 
have been absorbed in the new system.  
Though a strong argument exists for public transport reform in this city and for drawing 
paratransit operators in on such reforms, as outlined in Chapter 1, reasons for their limited 
participation particularly in the creation of the IPTN have been poorly studied. If paratransit 
operators’ views on the reform programmes and the business needs and aspirations were 
documented, it could provide insight both into the slow progress with reform and how such 
reform might better incentivise their participation. Prior research engaging directly with 
paratransit operators in South African cities on their views on business and reform has been 
very limited, and has focussed predominantly on the TRP. One commonality in the TRP-
focussed literature is that method descriptions tend to be very limited or are absent altogether. 
This undermines attempts to replicate the research, and also does not provide a basis for 
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comparing the successes and failures of any particular approach to engage this hard-to-reach 
research population. Also, despite the bulk of this body of literature arising out of academic 
research, its general lack of engagement with theoretical literature on public transport reform, 
methodological debates, or with precedent of similar studies is problematic. There is a body 
of literature documenting the implementation of IPTNs in a number of cities in South Africa, 
but despite links that this literature makes between slow progress on IPTN implementation 
and resistance from paratransit operators, these operators are not cited as a primary source of 
information. Operators’ underlying motivations for resisting change or their aspirations for 
their businesses are thus obscure. A significant gap in this literature is that there are no 
reports available or in open circulation that detail processes through which paratransit 
operators have been incorporated into IPTNs in any city in South Africa. There is also no 
central repository of government reports on public transport reform implementation. 
Against this background my research made two original contributions to knowledge. These 
contributions respond to the research aims. The first contribution is the first-hand insight into 
the business needs and aspirations of paratransit operators, as well as into their attitudes 
towards public transport reform, that the interviews that I conducted with paratransit 
operators in Cape Town afforded, as presented in Chapter 5. The second original contribution 
of my research is the detailed chronological account of the process that the municipality 
followed in incorporating paratransit operators in its MyCiTi system. This is documented in 
Chapter 3. However, my research also addressed the gaps in current knowledge and in 
research practice on public transport reform and paratransit participation in such reform in 
South Africa that I referred to above. At the outset my research engaged critically with the 
theoretical literature on public transport reform and on international cases of reform involving 
paratransit. This is the subject of Chapter 2. I also describe in detail the method that I 
followed in conducting the interviews with paratransit operators, in particular noting the 
process through which I gained access to operators. Chapter 4 contains this method 
description.  
By reflecting on the alternative approaches to public transport reform discussed in Chapter 2 
and drawing on the evolution and implementation of public transport reform in Cape Town 
from Chapter 3, I answered the first research question on the approach the government 
followed in incorporating paratransit operators in reform. IPTN implementation in Cape 
Town was led by BRT construction, and operators were not consulted in the planning phases 
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of the MyCiTi project. There was also very little evidence of engagement between 
government and paratransit interests in formulating the national strategy that underpinned 
IPTN implementation. It was only once detailed negotiations with operators commenced 
around their assimilation into BRT operations that they could start inserting their voice in the 
reform process. The TRP followed a different approach: in practice it was an in situ 
improvement programme. This reform programme resulted from the NTTT’s 
recommendations that were made in 1995 and the subsequent Moving South Africa process. 
The NTTT drew directly on the views of many paratransit operators and representative 
bodies across the country, and thus the TRP can lay claim to being consultative.  
The outcomes of the qualitative interviews presented in Chapter 5 responded to the second 
research question on how paratransit operators’ needs and aspirations around their businesses 
related to the current approach to public transport reform. Respondents were proud of their 
businesses and wanted to improve the viability of their services, but their view was that 
public authorities were either not offering support or that such support by way of the reform 
programmes did not meet their needs. Though there were respondents who saw benefit 
particularly in being incorporated in the IPTN, they were distrustful of government’s 
motivations and were concerned about not having been consulted in the formulation of the 
BRT-led approach to reform. This was a significant obstacle to respondents’ participation in 
reform. Some respondents had, however, been involved in internal attempts to better organise 
their operations and bolster their finances. This suggested that appropriately framed reforms 
that responded more closely to operators’ needs and aspirations might be more positively 
received than the reform programmes in their current format.  
Chapter 6 presented propositions that answered the last research question on ways in which 
the current reform approach might be adjusted to secure greater participation from paratransit 
operators. Public sector capacity limitations suggested that the current IPTN implementation 
process’s concurrent focus on multiple dimensions of reform is problematic; paratransit 
reform might be best served by focusing on the operator transformation process as the 
priority, rather than on infrastructure construction. The first MyCiTi project phase also 
demonstrated that the BRT-led reform approach did not meet initial expectations that would 
be a panacea for public transport in Cape Town. Further MyCiTi project phases would 
benefit from a lesser reliance on BRT-led reform. The reform process in Cape Town is 
furthermore likely to result in a hybrid system, where certain paratransit businesses would be 
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absorbed in the ITPN, but the majority of paratransit operations would continue in their 
present format. A revised and extended TRP providing greater financial and business 
planning support could make a positive impact the services that this latter group of operators 
provides.  
7.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORM IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
In proceeding with revisions to the current reform programmes government should draw on 
its strengths. These strengths have been demonstrated in the implementation of the reform 
strategy to lie in the infrastructure funding and provision arenas, and more broadly to be the 
driving force behind public transport reform. There is sufficient motivation for the need for 
operational, regulatory and institutional reform, but the evidence suggests that the present 
strategy has obvious shortcomings. In other words, it should not be automatically assumed 
that government is best placed to dictate the format of reform along all these axes. 
Conversely, a limiting factor on the side of paratransit operators – emerging strongly during 
the interviews and in the media – is that their views on reform are often reactionary. Their 
capacity to propose high-level alternatives to their present business model is also limited. The 
public sector can play a catalytic role by stimulating and informing discussion around 
operational, regulatory and institutional options for reform, and then formulate the outcomes 
of such engagement into an appropriate infrastructural response. The public sector 
furthermore has the resources to investigate the fit of alternative modal technologies within 
the relevant regulatory structures and to assess travel needs at the city scale. In view of these 
strengths local government can play an important role in identifying key demand patterns, 
providing infrastructure that would facilitate these movements, and supporting shifts towards 
more efficient vehicle sizing and utilisation. The way in which this infrastructure should be 
utilised should, however, be done in close collaboration with operators, who have detailed 
operating knowledge. The experience with Nelson Mandela Bay’s IPTN illustrates what can 
emerge from such engagement, but also what the risk factors are.  
Paratransit operators who have of their own accord corporatised or embarked on joint 
ventures to explore operational alternatives demonstrate aspirations that align with the 
present aims of the reform strategy. Larger businesses have greater access to capital (placing 
them in a better position to change the composition of their vehicle fleets) and greater 
revenue (allowing more stable labour relations to emerge) to the extent that they may 
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increasingly become viable entities to enter into public transport service contracts. Such 
internal business evolution disturbs vested interests, which may have been a factor in limiting 
their prevalence. These large paratransit businesses undermine the dominance of the route 
association as the de facto regulator of individual operators, but are also a direct threat to the 
market niche of established scheduled bus operators. However, the phenomenon of larger 
paratransit businesses is unlikely to rival that of present bus operating companies, as the 
distrust between operators, even those belonging to the same association, runs strongly. 
Without outside financial incentives they are unlikely to grow beyond collectives of more 
than a handful of individual operators. Nonetheless, where conditions of trust exist, for 
example through kinship or longstanding acquaintance as is already evident, and where even 
a small number of individual operators combine economic forces, these businesses may in 
fact represent fleet sizes of dozens of minibuses. A reframed public transport reform strategy 
would do well to recognise these near-contracting size entities, which would require a 
significantly shorter path to become formal vehicle operating companies than has been the 
case in the present approach to reform. This path would have much in common with the 
stepped transition process (as contemplated in Chapter 2). 
In reviewing the approach to public transport reform there is perhaps a key public sector role 
that should not be overlooked – a role for which officials in the Johannesburg and Cape Town 
municipalities are uniquely equipped. Through their involvement in the first phase IPTN 
industry transition negotiations, municipal officials have had access to and insight into the 
pre-transformation finances and internal arrangements of paratransit operators and 
associations. They have also developed skills and increased local government capacity to: 
• be partners in the overall operator transition process;  
• understand and manage the costs and organisational challenges of establishing the 
new corporate structures; 
• resolve limitations in the existing operating licensing system (especially in relation to 
dormant and inactive licenses, as discussed in section 3.2); and  
• negotiate and conclude vehicle operating agreements that were new to the local 
context (i.e. gross cost contracts). 
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Arguably the only function that local government is involved in (as per Table 1-1 in  
Chapter 1) that has not seen direct capacity growth as a result of the transition process has 
been in law enforcement. Such capacity would be necessary to ensure compliance to the 
reformed regulatory regime.  
The experience of these officials, and the financial and organisational information that they 
have gained, are of enormous value. By drawing on the knowledge of these individuals, 
government agencies and researchers can populate and compare proposals for reform 
alternatives with actual financial information from existing operations, but also gain 
additional insight into the acceptability and ‘implementability’ of proposed alternatives from 
an institutional perspective. The actual transition costs of paratransit operators becoming full 
BRT vehicle operating companies, as well as the costs of electronic fare collection systems in 
the IPTNs as implemented, would furthermore serve as a base against which to compare 
alternative reform mechanisms.  
Despite the beneficial outcomes achieved so far in Cape Town, engagement between the 
municipality and paratransit has been a time-consuming, intensive and at times volatile 
process, and the effort and commitment required to engage paratransit around reform in 
future should not be underestimated. It is likely to remain difficult to gain access to 
paratransit operators and associations, who in essence constitute a closed community that has 
managed to develop a sector of the public transport market largely on its own initiative and 
often in spite of government initiatives to prevent its expansion. Government and private 
sector players may well continue to be seen as outsiders attempting to meddle in paratransit’s 
affairs, and gaining the trust of operators would require sustained effort to overcome such 
perceptions.  
One of the key ways in which more trusting relationships have been established around the 
negotiating table has been to employ intermediaries between the municipality and paratransit 
who have a track record with actors within the paratransit hierarchy, but who also have 
credibility in the public authority’s eyes. Experience has shown that there are few people who 
can play such an intermediary role, which is not surprising. Public transport service reform on 
the scale of the PTS programme has been unprecedented, and was initiated relatively 
recently. There has not been a long history of training and development in, and exposure of 
existing professionals and officials to, this particular field. As a consequence there is little 
established expertise with sufficiently grounded knowledge of local conditions. This may 
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potentially be an area where increased investment in human capital may be critical as the 
scope of engagement in the second MyCiTi phase grows beyond the express service to 
involve a much larger number of stakeholders than has been the case to date. 
Questions around the appropriateness and feasibility of the national Public Transport Strategy 
remain, as do concerns about how this national focus is translated to local impact. How can 
the national strategy be reframed to more closely respond to operators’ needs and aspirations, 
national fiscal and institutional limitations, and the challenges that municipalities have 
encountered to date in the implementation of the national policy? Here the national 
government will have to take the lead, but in what way and with which part of the paratransit 
sector? Broadly speaking there are two potential pathways for engaging paratransit: 
aggregated or disaggregated. The research suggests that SANTACO is not broadly 
representative or inherently trusted, and thus is not the shared access point between 
government and operators that it was intended to be.  
While aggregated engagement naturally would hold appeal due to its apparently simpler 
process and lesser draw on time and financial resources, it does not lend itself to gaining 
deeper, contextually-grounded insight, and would most likely fail in the face of the 
fragmented nature of paratransit interests and capital and the absence of effective collective 
representation. Disaggregated engagement would necessarily involve a more localised focus, 
albeit spread across a number of locales. Such a process would have much in common with 
the NTTT’s process, which was nationally led, but had a strong local focus by way of its city-
/town-based hearings. The NTTT process impacted positively on passengers and operators, 
for example through the TRP’s vehicle replacement component and the establishment of a 
legislative and regulatory framework overtly recognising paratransit. However, it had its 
limitations in terms of stimulating operator corporatisation and it entrenched associations in 
their de facto regulatory role. Moreover, the appetite and capacity of the DoT to replicate the 
NTTT process is doubtful.  
What seems to remains a constant is that the drivers of change, and thus key parties to be 
engaged, are associations and the more influential operators within those associations. 
However, rather than directing engagement around a reframed reform proposal through the 
paratransit hierarchy, marred by factionalism and inefficiency, the national government could 
gain much through engaging the services of city officials who have the local expertise and 
who have been able to develop channels of communication with local paratransit interests. 
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From a public sector perspective city authorities and individuals within these local structures 
are the drivers of, and intellectual capital behind, public transport reform. A national 
programme should limit itself to capturing the broad aims of public transport reform rather 
than suggesting a particular modal technology, and should provide reliable financial 
resources to achieve such aims. This would do much to facilitate the task of local government 
actors to develop contextually appropriate responses to public transport improvement and to 
effectively engage paratransit operators. 
7.3 TRANSFERABILITY AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH  
Searching for a perfect-fit reform approach that, when implemented, addresses all possible 
problems and concerns would be futile. This is especially true in a multi-participant situation 
where perceived and actual needs may diverge greatly. The reform approach – in the case of 
this thesis, the approach to public transport and paratransit reform – is at best a comprise that 
attempts to meet some of the many needs and interests of involved and affected parties, and 
often may achieve something very different from that which was initially envisaged. Reforms 
are not, however, developed in a vacuum. There is often a history of trial and error in 
implementing reforms. In this thesis I presented one case of reform implementation, in the 
hopes that it could inform public transport reforms, and research on such reform, in other 
cases.  
The propositions that I drew from the Cape Town case can serve to guide such further efforts. 
Drawing on these propositions, and on my research that allowed these propositions to be 
generated, I would like to highlight the following key points for consideration in further 
study, as well as for those involved in reform in practice, beyond Cape Town and South 
Africa:  
• With regard to alternative mechanisms to stimulate reform, investigations should 
explore all axes of reform to look beyond technology-specific considerations such 
BRT, light rail or underground rail. In situ upgrades to existing modes should be 
considered as a potentially feasible path, especially where funds are scarce. These 
upgrades could also be limited to improving labour relations and working conditions, 
which might be challenging to negotiate but likely more affordable than 
infrastructural or operational investments.   
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• It would be unusual for there not to be significant vested interests in the public 
transport system, whether in the form of individual government officials, public 
agencies, operators, unions, or commercial entities with a stake in the system. Before 
deciding on a reform approach consider likely responses from these interests and what 
the incentives could be that might spur change. In other words, foreshadow the 
outcomes of an operator transition process. 
• Operators have the potential to create widespread disruption whether through strikes 
or violent backlashes. Though the public sector should not pander to the every 
demand of operators, operators’ day-to-day role in the existing public transport 
system should at the very least be acknowledged and their desire to participate in 
reform processes not assumed to be automatic. 
• Consider the scale of reform as a function of institutional capacity, in particular 
human resources and finances. Can the involved public sector agencies manage and 
fund a reform process that involves concurrent changes to infrastructure, competition 
regulation, ownership structures and the format of public transport services? If 
operators’ buy-in is not guaranteed, engagement with operators becomes a project 
stream in its own right and one that requires skilled management.  
• The sustained presence of one or a group of like-minded politicians may carry a 
longer-term reform project to fruition, but political leaders may also place the support 
of an electorate or loyalty to a party above technical project considerations. Reform 
programmes should be packaged in a way that both these aspects – successful 
implementation and political survival – can be accommodated. Dividing a project into 
phases or components that mirror the political life cycle is one way of doing so. 
Ensuring that reforms have tangible aspects – for example, a new piece of 
infrastructure or new vehicle fleets – could be another way.  
The above are suggestions where transferability could be investigated or tested in practice. 
However, as the review of international cases in Chapter 2 and the findings in the Cape Town 
case in Chapter 6 showed, there is no single action or set of actions that is guaranteed to 
secure paratransit participation in reform. Though some cases might appear to have followed 
the same reform approach or have similar geographic, institutional or socioeconomic contexts 
when viewed superficially, in practice reform trajectories and outcomes vary widely. There is 
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no substitute for a firm grounding in the particular local technical and social complexity that 
constitutes the public transport system in any one city or area.  
The reform alternatives that are explored, and the ultimate mechanism or mix of mechanisms 
decided upon, would depend, amongst other factors, on where the greatest needs lie and the 
financial resources that are available to address these needs. The location of the balance of 
power amongst the vested interests in the public transport arena would also differ from place 
to place, as would the incentive that would trigger operator participation. Paratransit is likely 
to hold a major interest in public transport reform in Sub-Saharan African cities and in other 
developing regions, though the incentives to reform may be very different from city to city 
and region to region. Institutional capacity and political decision-making structures that 
underpin a reform endeavour are equally variable, and would require a local investigation 
firstly of what these capacities and structures are, and secondly how these could work hand-
in-hand with the approach to reform. A public transport reform approach drawing both on the 
experience in other cases and on context-specific knowledge should increase the chances of 
ensuring a good, if not perfect, fit between the aims of reform and the needs and aspirations 
of operators on which such reform is focussed.  
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APPENDIX A: ASSOCIATIONS BY MYCITI PROJECT PHASE  
The spreadsheet of operator associations in Cape Town is provided in electronic format. The 
data records in this spreadsheet are the names of each association. The data fields are the 
number of associations, the regions of the city in which each association is located, the 
number of associations in that region, the acronym of the association, the full name of the 
association, and the MyCiTi project phase in which each association fall. The data records are 
colour coded to the map of the MyCiTi project phases (Figure 1-1). 
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APPENDIX B: PILOT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
  




• appropriateness of current public transport reform model in resource and capacity-
constrained context 
• necessity of replacing ITP/TRP as a regulatory model, if these models’ strengths and 
weaknesses are not clearly understood 
• lack of structured engagement with paratransit associations and operators around the 
design of the ITP/TRP and IRTPN ownership and competition regulation models 
• gap in existing knowledge: paratransit associations’ and operators’ business needs and 
aspirations 
 
Objectives of the interview process 
• gain insight into the responsiveness of the current ITP/TRP ownership and 
competition regulation model to paratransit associations’ and operators’ business 
needs and aspirations  
• gain insight into the responsiveness of the ownership and competition regulation 
model proposed under the IPTN reform policy to paratransit associations’ and 
operators’ business needs and aspirations  
• if these models are not responsive unearth information that can allow 
recommendations to be made on how the reform policy can be adjusted to be more 
responsive 




• The purpose of the interview is to understand the minibus-taxi association’s or 
operator’s business needs and aspirations 
• The research is independent of any government agency or private business 
• All notes and data are collected as part of a research project at the University of Cape 
Town 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: MINIBUS-TAXI ASSOCIATIONS 
 Question/topic Prompts Purpose Commentary on … 
A Context: “Tell me about the association…”    





Hierarchy in decision-making 
Leadership structure 
Reform policy: vested interest 
Aspirations: corporatisation 
A2  How many board members does the association have? Active  
Inactive 
Ratio of board members to 
operators 
Decision-making complexity 
Reform policy: engagement 
A3  Do the persons representing the association own and 
run minibus-taxi operations? 
Answered by each respondent Understanding of members’ on-the-
ground operational issues 
Reform policy: engagement 
Diversity  
A4  What business interests does the association have 






Relative importance of income 
stream derived from operations 
Capacity  
Aspirations: corporatisation 
Needs: financial security 
Diversity  




Reform policy: vested interest 
Diversity  
A6  How many routes do the association’s members 
operate? 
Licensed and unlicensed Market share in the city Aspirations: territory  
Regulation: internal 
A7  The association’s interaction with its members. Operating licence applications 
Rotation of vehicles on routes 
Internal conflict management 
Interaction with other associations 
Membership fees 
Service on association board 
Association’s business goals  
Aspirations towards corporatisation 
Need for active management of 
routes and members 
Management role and capacity  
Internal regulation 
Regulation: internal and external 
Reform policy: vested interest 
B Your minibus-taxi business    
B1  Why do you think passengers use minibus-taxis? Travel time 
Cost 
Get respondent to think about 
service from external point of view 
Reform policy: strengths of 
paratransit 
 192  
Comfort  
Flexibility  
Captive to mode 
 
B2  What do you think would make the minibus-taxi 
industry more successful? 
Dedicated road space  
Improved competition regulation 
Improved law enforcement 
Larger vehicles 
Subsidy – capital or operational 
Representation structures 
Recognition  




Reform policy: relevance 
Regulation: relevance 
 
B3  Do you think the Operating Licensing system works 
well? 









Reform policy: relevance 
Regulation: relevance 
 
B4  Do you think the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme 
works well? 





Flaws and strengths of current 
regulatory model 
Impact of inefficiency in 
conversions on improving service 
to users 
Interaction with banks 
Aspirations: general 
Needs: general 
Reform policy: relevance 
Regulation: relevance 
 
B5  Have you heard of the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system? 




City of Cape Town engagement 
Other  
Engagement process and 
penetration 
Marketing efficacy 
Reform policy: engagement 
 
B6  Do you think the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system offers a 






Scale of change 
Inform association of reform policy 
contents 
Test attitude towards reform policy 
Aspirations: general 
Needs: general 
Reform policy: engagement 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: MINIBUS-TAXI OPERATORS 
 
 Question/topic Prompts Purpose Commentary on … 
C Context: “Tell me about your minibus-taxi business…” 
C1  How did you start in the minibus-taxi industry? Timeline  
Up through ranks 
First job 
Vested interest of operator 
Tenacity and survival 
Diversity 
Aspirations: business development 
Reform policy: vested interest 
C2  How many vehicles do you own and operate? Minibus 
Sedan 
Other 
Market share  
Business size 
Aspirations: business growth 
Regulation: formalisation 
Reform policy: new/old fleet ratio 
Diversity 
C3  Do you drive any vehicles yourself? Full-time 
Part-time  
Business type  
Day-to-day involvement 
Needs: financial sustainability 
Aspirations: corporatisation 
Diversity  
C4  On how many routes do your vehicles operate? Routes’ location in city Market share 
Degree of formality 
Reform policy: fragmentation 
 
C5  How many operating licences or permits do you have? In service at present 
Dormant  
Market share 
Degree of formality 
Diversity 
Regulation: scale of operations 
C6  Do you keep a record of your minibus-taxi business’s 









Reform policy: capacity 
Needs: business support 
C7  Are your minibus-taxis your only source of income? Minibus-taxi related business 
Other business 
Relative importance of income 
stream derived from operations 
Capacity 
Aspirations: corporatisation 
Needs: financial security 
Diversity 
C8  The operator’s interaction with his/her association. Operating licence applications 
Rotation of vehicles on routes 
Internal conflict management 
Interaction with other associations 
Membership fees 
Involvement in management 
Scale of internal regulation  
Cost of business 
Responsibilities 
Regulation: internal and external 
Reform policy: vested interest 
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D Policy and regulation: “Let’s discuss the minibus-taxi industry…” 
 
 




Captive to mode 
Get respondent to think about 
service from external point of view 
Reform policy: strengths of 
paratransit 
 
D1  What do you think would make your minibus-taxi 
business more successful? 
Dedicated road space  
Improved competition regulation 
Improved law enforcement 
Larger vehicles 
Subsidy – capital or operational 
Representation structures 
Recognition  




Reform policy: relevance 
Regulation: relevance 
 
D2  Do you think the Operating Licensing system works 
well? 









Reform policy: relevance 
Regulation: relevance 
 
D3  Do you think the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme 
works well? 





Flaws and strengths of current 
regulatory model 
Impact of inefficiency in 
conversions on improving service 
to users 
Interaction with banks 
Aspirations: general 
Needs: general 
Reform policy: relevance 
Regulation: relevance 
 
D4  Have you heard of the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system? 




City of Cape Town engagement 
Other  
Engagement process and 
penetration 
Marketing efficacy 
Reform policy: engagement 
 
 195  
D5  Do you think the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system offers a 






Scale of change 
Inform association of reform policy 
contents 
Test attitude towards reform policy 
Aspirations: general 
Needs: general 
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Faculty of Engineering & the Built Environment 
Centre for Transport Studies
c/o Department of Civil Engineering 




Telephone: +27 (21) 650 3499 
Facsimile: +27 (21) 689 7471 
Email: roger.behrens@uct.ac.za 
Website: www.cfts.uct.ac.za 
26 June 2013 
Dear Sir/Madam 
RE: INTERVIEWS ON BUSINESS NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS IN THE MINIBUS-TAXI SECTOR 
Herrie Schalekamp is a registered PhD student at the Centre for Transport Studies at the University of 
Cape Town. As part of his PhD research he is conducting interviews with operators, associations and 
representatives in the minibus-taxi industry in Cape Town to gain an understanding of business needs 
and aspirations in this industry. 
His research is independent of any government agency or private business, and will comply with the 
research ethics of the UCT Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment. Under these ethical 
standards he will ensure that the respondents being interviewed will be treated as anonymous, and 
that all responses will be used for academic and research purposes only. 
Your assistance and/or participation in his research is greatly appreciated. Should you have any 
queries in relation to the above please feel free to contact me. 
Yours faithfully, 
A/Prof Roger Behrens 
Director: UCT Centre for Transport Studies 
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APPENDIX D: MAIN INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
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INTERVIEW INTRODUCTION 
1. The purpose of my research is to understand the minibus-taxi industry’s business needs and
aspirations
2. All notes and data are collected as part of my research at the University of Cape Town
3. My research is independent of any government agency or private business
4. The respondent will remain anonymous and personal details will not be linked to responses
5. The record of the interview will be my written notes and recording, where allowed by the
respondent
6. If the respondent wants to add any responses after the interview is over they can contact me
telephonically or by e-mail
7. The respondent is free to end the interview at any time




A “Tell me about the association…” 
A1 Which association does the respondent belong to? Name of association 
A2 What is the role of the interview respondent on the 




A3 How many board members does the association have? Active 
Inactive 
A4 Do the persons representing the association own and 
run minibus-taxi operations? 
Answered by each respondent 
A5 What business interests does the association have 






A6 How many members does the association have? Licensed and unlicensed 
A7 How many routes do the association’s members 
operate? 
Licensed and unlicensed 
A8 The association’s interaction with its members. Operating licence applications 
Rotation of vehicles on routes 
Internal conflict management 
Interaction with other associations 
Membership fees 
Service on association board 
B Your minibus-taxi business 
B1 How did you start in the minibus-taxi industry? Up through ranks, first job 
B2 How many vehicles do you own and run? Minibus, sedan, other 
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B3  Do you drive any vehicles yourself? Full-time, part-time  
B4  On how many routes do your vehicles operate? Routes’ location in city 
B5  How many operating licences or permits do you have? In service at present 
Dormant  
B6  Do you keep a record of your minibus-taxi business’s 
income and expenses? 
Fares, fuel, wages, repairs 
B7  Are your minibus-taxis your only source of income? Internal or external to industry 
C The minibus-taxi industry  
C1  Why do you think passengers use minibus-taxis? Travel time, cost, comfort  
Captive to mode 
C2  What do you think would make minibus-taxis more 
successful? 
Dedicated road space  
Improved competition regulation 
Improved law enforcement 
Larger vehicles 
Subsidy – capital or operational 
Representation structures 
Recognition  
C3  Do you think the Operating Licensing system works 
well? 





C4  Do you think the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme 
works well? 





D IRT/MyCITI/BRT system  
D1  Have you heard of the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system? 
Where did you hear? 
Press/internet, word-of-mouth 
Representative structures 
City of Cape Town engagement 
D2  Do you think the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system offers a 






Scale of change 
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Date: 12 July 2011 







Respondents were from the outset receptive to being interviewed; were not suspicious of my 
motivations 
At the end of the interview respondents wanted to know whether my research results would reach 
decision-makers in the government hierarchy; they had previously been exposed to 
researchers/officials asking about their businesses and had not seen any positive impact of those 
studies; I spent some time at the end of the interview addressing this concern by explaining how my 
research results would be disseminated; the respondents did not seem convinced that my work would 
benefit them, but this did not seem to have detracted from their participation in the interview 
Respondents appeared to be timid (daunted by the big unknown of the reform process?)  
The mechanical questions-and-answer format didn’t work well (i.e. to ask a question and wait for an 
answer as per my interview schedule); the more insightful parts of the interview were when 
respondents were talking with minimal prompts from me 
 
Interview record 
- In order to serve on the association board a board member has to be a paratransit operator 
- Three respondents arrived for the interview 
- Respondents appeared very keen to hear about the details of IRT corporatisation; didn’t have 
access to information through other channels 
- R2: “A taxi cannot compete with those [IRT] buses” 
- R2: fares in TA1 area are kept low to attract passengers; appears that respondents are 
undermining their own income by doing so 
- R2: “In [TA1 area] we are the type of people who want to progress” 
- Respondent appeared willing to accept change if the scope of change is presented 
understandably 
- R1’s children not interested in entering the paratransit business 
- They do not want empty promises or hear that funds have run out; distrust government 
assurances due to broken promises in the past [TRP-related] 
- Disgruntlement around procurement of TRP vehicles  - reason unclear 
- Respondents wanted my research to make a difference, and asked for an explanation of how 
my research will be applied 
- Respondents did not want other operators/associations to know that they had spoken to me; I 
reassured them that each interview would be run without mention of previous interview 
responses or respondents’ details; this was satisfactory. 
- Capacity building aspect of interviews may be key – operators really seems hungry for 
information and advice on how to earn a better living 
- Respondents were concerned that people higher up the paratransit hierarchy are preventing 
information to flow down and are trying to enrich themselves only 
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Question/topic Prompts Response 






R2: Board member 
R3: Board member 
A2 What business interests does the association have 







B1 How did you start in the minibus-taxi industry? Timeline  
Up through ranks 
First job 
R1: inherited business from father 
R2 & R3: bought minibuses after finishing school and became driver 
operators 
R3: was mechanic on taxis and saved up to buy a minibus 
B2 How many vehicles do you own and operate? Minibus 
Sedan 
Other 
(R2 had to leave interview at this point in the interview) 
R1: 2 minibuses 
R3: 2 minibuses 
B3 Do you drive any vehicles yourself? Full-time 
Part-time 
Used to but not any more 
B4 How many operating licences or permits do you 
have? 
In service at present 
Dormant  
All vehicles have operating licences 
B5 Do you keep a record of your minibus-taxi 






Respondents acknowledged that this is a weakness in their 
management of their businesses 
B6 Are your minibus-taxis your only source of 
income? 
Minibus-taxi related business 
Other business 
Yes 
Long distance trips are made to increase income in order to increase 
income to be able to afford post-recap vehicle instalments  
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Captive to mode 
Quicker and safer than buses and trains 
Cheaper than single fares on buses, especially in peak hours 
C2  What do you think would make your minibus-taxi 
business more successful? 
Dedicated road space  
Improved competition regulation 
Improved law enforcement 
Larger vehicles 
Subsidy – capital or operational 
Representation structures 
Recognition  
Subsidisation: historic lack of subsidisation makes respondents feel 
left behind and unable to grow their businesses 
Eradicate discrimination: “this business of the taxi is for the coloured 
and the blacks”; belief that if white people were running paratransit 
businesses these white operators would receive preferential treatment 
from government 
Information: lack of information such as on the business opportunities 
offered by IRT 
“The Western Cape is an oppressed province” 
Fines and vehicle licence application fees are seen to be very 
expensive; fines are imposed twice for one offence – once for driver, 
once for OL infringement 
Larger vehicles are seen as undesirable as they are expenses, and 
disembarkation and embarkation take longer – passengers see this as a 
drawback and opt to use smaller vehicles 
C3  Do you think the Operating Licensing system 
works well? 





OL and additional permission application fees are expensive, with 
extraordinarily large increases taking effect in 2010 – reason behind 
increases not explained, no consulation by OLB 
Competition is not seen to be a problem 
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C4  Do you think the Taxi Recapitalisation 
Programme works well? 





Funding gap to get a new Quantum vehicle 
R11 000 monthly instalment difficult to afford 
SA Taxi Finance charges high interest rates 
Vehicles are often repossessed 
Scrapping allowance not enough 
Old Hiace Siyaya is still a firm favourite due to reliability 
Maintenance costs of new vehicles an important consideration: 
Toyotas seen as reliable and parts easy to get hold of; Chinese imports 
require frequent maintenance and parts not readily available 
Lack of consultation on approved vehicle range 
C5  Have you heard of the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system? 




City of Cape Town engagement 
Other  
Through SANTACO, CATA, CODETA, and other associations 
around 2007 after SANTACO trip to Bogota 
 
C6  Do you think the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system offers 






Scale of change 
Financial stability of long-term contracts would be a benefit, 
especially for operators nearing retirement age 
Do not want to leave the industry, but willing to change manner of 
operations 









Date: 14 February 2012 






Personal observations  
I was made to feel welcome upon arrival; besides some crass jokes prior to starting the interview the 
respondents’ attitudes were generally professional, as was the setup of their office 
Respondents were keen to provide information; R2 handed me a business proposal that had been put 
to, but rejected by, the local government; I was cordially invited to follow up after the interview at 
any time 
After providing the introduction to my research (as per introduction sheet) there was not a lengthy 
discussion about my motivations or how my data would be used; I was surprised by the lack of 
suspicion of my research aims 
 
Interview record 
- Respondents felt that where industry comes from should be captured and better understood; 
Apartheid played a significant role in the history of the industry 
- Concern around CCT and TransPeninsula [IRT operating/airport/World Cup] agreement 
- “IRT should belong to the people”; respondents expressed a concern that there was 
insufficient engagement with industry around the IRT plan; that feeder role inside suburbs 
shouldn’t be overlooked as the focus appeared to be mainly on trunk routes; respondents 
wanted to know how Phase 2 is being planned. 
- There was concern around the allocation of subsidy to buses 
- R1 wanted to be able to use larger vehicles, ideally 35-seaters, for greater efficiency 
- Respondents wanted to be assured that they would be better off under the future [IRT] 
dispensation 
- R1: Operators “own routes”, while CCT owns infrastructure 
- R1 believed that TransPeninsula’s Tap-I-Fare smart card was a positive development 
- R1 wanted taxi associations in TA2 area to be part of ownership of IRT 
- R1 in terms of IRT: “[TA2 area] will be a hard one to crack” 
- R1: started in industry as a gaardjie (“sliding door engineer”) > driver > illegal owner > legal 
owner > executive of association > national executive of SANTACO, removed end 2010 > 
now on executive of association; spent 10 years working in German-owned printing business 
while being a taxi owner on the side, gained experience in running a business 
- Started a self-owned [holdings] company under which he bought 7 Toyota Quantums on hire 
purchase 
- Line fees are used to support [subsidise…] the association’s members and executives, 
amongst other ways to help with purchasing new vehicles [line fees are charged on each 
vehicle’s departure from the rank, and also covers rank management overhead fees] 
- R1: “we can proudly say that we are living from this [MBT] business” 
- R1: wants to become training officer for the province [to assist MBT owners to improve their 
business skills and to assist with driver skills training] 
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- The association earns rank fees exceeding R600 000 per month 
- R1: “I’ve lost almost 50+ drivers and sliding door engineers”; tired of this situation: “if the 
government comes to us with a reasonable offer we will accept it; we want to retire”; 
gangsterism is a big problem in the area and leadership is preventing gangsters joining the 
association 
- R1: “I am very sentimental – I don’t want government to steamroller operators”; likened IRT 
process to District Six forced removals 
- Rank managers, and by extension the association, keeps record of passengers numbers per 
vehicle and vehicle trips – can value each members’ business should government require it 
- TRP is not working: operators can’t afford to maintain vehicles properly, scrapping allowance 
is insufficient and is not tracking inflation, scrapping allowance was more feasible at first for 
then approved Toyota Siyaya (operators only had to fund R60 000 after R50 000 allowance 
was received) 
- Association operates 1000 taxis from MP rank on 40 routes 
- World Cup exposed many white people to the minibus taxi industry during park and ride trips 
- When asked why the industry was not consolidating into companies, R1and R2 replied that it 
was due to a lack of “intellect” and “in-fighting”; R1: It’s going to take another 30 years for 
them [taxi owners in general] to see the bigger picture” [essential role that training could 
play] 
- Customer care is seen as a key are in which training is required. 
- R1 doesn’t want second round of IRT 12-year contracts [after first round of negotiated 12-
year contracts] to be open to tender – foreign operators unwelcome 
- Greed in MBT industry is a big problem – leads to overtrading and violence; in TA2 area and 
Khayelitsha the old guard is still in charge, which moderates overtrading 
- R1: “we want to stay in the industry until death do us part” [contradicts previous R1 statement 
that he wants to retire from the industry] 
- R2: started in industry when he was 28 years old; incarcerated for over a year because of 
operating illegally (See Traffic Act of 1977, section 74, subsection 34 
- R1 owns 2 minibuses in personal capacity and further 10 minibuses through his holding 
company; R2 owns 10 vehicles through his holding company. 
- R2 is keen to be incorporated in the IRT proposal, but they are being “coerced” into IRT 
- Both visited Bogota after 2008 failed Ratanga IRT meeting; did not hear from Bogota’s 
paratransit operators about their experience of the reform process – only saw glossy side 
- The City must respect the local industry’s knowledge; unhappy about the amount of money 
that is going to consultants 
- There is insufficient information around IRT filtering to the MBT industry, and the language 
that is being used is not understandable 
- R2: X is keeping information close to his chest” 
- Phase 2 cannot be infrastructure-led 
- R2: “when you [consultants and officials] negotiate [around IRT] here [in TA2 area] you talk 
to me” [wants to be engaged directly, not through intermediaries] 
- Respondents first heard of BRT through Klipfontein Corridor project ±2004, went to Bogota 
on a study trip [KC was similar to IRT in terms of trunk-and-feeder operations and operator 
formalisation] 
- Respondent involved in George Mobility Strategy their official capacities in SANTACO after 
KC collapsed; when they were ousted from SANTACO involvement in GMS ceased. 
Through their involvement in SANTACO they first heard of IRT 
- [Rank managers are a rich source of information on operations of MBTs] 
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- R2: “They’re keeping us in our old shoes” [government is not providing opportunities for 
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 Question/topic Prompts Response 





R1: chairman; formerly on SANTACO national executive 
R2: board member; formerly on SANTACO national executive 
A2  What business interests does the association have 






Rank management; inter-association coordination [not explored 
further] 
B1  How did you start in the minibus-taxi industry? Timeline  
Up through ranks 
First job 
R1 &R2: Sliding door operator > driver > owner > board executive 
B2  How many vehicles do you own and operate? Minibus 
Sedan 
Other 
R1: 2 minibuses in personal capacity, 10 minibuses in holdings 
company 
R2: 10 minibuses in holdings company 
B3  Do you drive any vehicles yourself? Full-time 
Part-time  
No  
B4  How many operating licences or permits do you 
have? 
In service at present 
Dormant  
 
B5  Do you keep a record of your minibus-taxi 






[R2 temporarily left interview] 
B6  Are your minibus-taxis your only source of 
income? 
Minibus-taxi related business 
Other business 
 




Captive to mode 
Flexibility 
Feeder service function 
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C2  What do you think would make your minibus-taxi 
business more successful? 
Dedicated road space  
Improved competition regulation 
Improved law enforcement 
Larger vehicles 
Subsidy – capital or operational 
Representation structures 
Recognition  
R1: Larger vehicles – more cost effective and reduces traffic 
R1 & R2 Access to capital and operational subsidy 
R2: Recognition 
Improved engagement between CCT officials, national government, 
MBT associations and members 
C3  Do you think the Operating Licensing system 
works well? 





Oversupply and related violence problematic 
C4  Do you think the Taxi Recapitalisation 
Programme works well? 





Scrapping allowance may have covered around 40% of vehicle 
purchase cost when TRP introduced, but has not kept up with inflation  
Small operators struggle to finance deficit after subsidy 
 
C5  Have you heard of the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system? 




City of Cape Town engagement 
Other  
R1 & R2: 
IRT: through involvement in SANTACO 
BRT: through involvement in Klipfontein Corridor  
C6  Do you think the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system offers 






Scale of change 
R1 & R2: 
Keen to be involved, but officials should draw more on MBT 
industry’s knowledge of local (i.e. TA2 area) operating, social and 
urban conditions 
Fear of being sidelined, in both current and future long-term IRT 
contracting regimes 
Will be difficult to penetrate TA2 region – gangsterism, in-fighting 
 




Date: 16 February 2012 







After being introduced to the respondents by TB I provided the interview introduction; upon asking 
whether the interview could proceed there was an uncomfortable silence; the respondents appeared 
suspicious of my credibility and R2 asked how my data would be used; I spent some time assuring 
them of anonymity, that I was independent of any government and private entity and that one my key 
aims was to tell the story of paratransit to the public at large; I still felt at this point that there was a 
large chance that the interview would not proceed; when I mentioned that I had published in Mobility 
Magazine and that I was planning further opinion pieces in Mobility and local newspapers R2 
mentioned that he had read Mobility; from this point onwards the respondents became much more 
open and the interview proceeded smoothly  
My interpretation is that I had to establish my credibility in terms of independence (from govt and 
paratransit’s competitors) and benevolent aims (publishing as unbiased an account as I could), after 
which I was accepted and the interview proceeded; nevertheless the respondents remained wary in 
answering particularly the question of how many vehicles they owned 
I formed the impression that all respondents were well-respected figures and knew their own 
businesses and the paratransit industry very well; I would say that are of the ‘old guard’ or ‘elder’ 
figures in the industry, by comparison to which the TA2 respondents were ‘newcomers’ 
The respondents did not agree amongst themselves on all issues; this demonstration in my presence 
added to my perception that their responses were by-and-large transparent 
 
Interview record 
- TA joining fee in =  ±R60 000 
- R1 started in MBT industry in 1980s during bus boycotts; had access to a van and used it 
during weekends to transport passengers for fare; formed a TA in 1985 to transport people 
between TA3 area and Cape Town CBD, was in competition with TA operating in TA3 area 
internally; TAs only allowed by govt to operate within townships 
- R1: difficult to get permits in 1980s, but the township community supported the application 
and operators used and adapted available vehicles such as kombis and panel vans to serve as 
MBTs 
- R1 & R2: biggest obstacles to operations at the time were conflict amongst competing MBT 
operators and govt restrictions limiting permits to within townships only 
- R2: permits between townships and Mowbray [main destination from townships] or CBD 
were only issued to coloured operators; black operators rented these permits, or where not 
possible operated illegally – the risk with the latter was that if caught the vehicle would be 
confiscated and impounded permanently 
- R2: WEBTA (Western Cape Black Taxi Association) was formed to support black operators, 
but they were still without permits 
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- R1: the permit deregulation during the late 1980s was intentionally introduced by apartheid 
state to cause conflict amongst black operators so that they eradicate one another, “we’ve lost 
many, many people in the process” 
- R3: what caused the industry to pull through the deregulation and conflict was the support of 
people from the community – MBTs went where people wanted to go despite govt-imposed 
restrictions 
- R2: “the taxi industry is the only industry that is completely owned by black people” 
- R2: “our businesses were not supported by the previous govt, and they are not being 
supported by the present government”  
- R1: there is no law that is protecting the operating permissions of MBT operators, and no 
government protection of the right granted under permits 
- R1: the one positive aspect of the previous government was the granting of indefinite permits 
[which current govt is proposing to take away] 
- R1: predecessor SABTA was better than present day SANTACO in terms of managing the 
industry – SANTACO seen as being full of corrupt individuals  
- R1: in the Western Cape the industry employs many people, second only to agriculture and 
surpassing mining  
- R2: the banking industry is exploiting taxi industry through inflating costs and rates on hire-
purchase of vehicles 
- R3: owners are forced to pay a 20% deposit on a vehicle hire-purchase plan 
- R2: there are limited insurance options: only one company is willing to offer cover for MBTs 
but as it has a monopoly it is charging inflated premiums claiming that MBTs are ‘high risk’ 
without qualifying what those risks are 
- R1: pre-TRP Toyota Siyayas (costing R135 000) were affordable and appropriate to the 
industry, but they are no longer an option and have been replaced by much more expensive 
Toyota Quantums (R300 000-R400 000); the seating capacity has also been reduced to 12 
passengers reducing cost-effectiveness 
- R1: the TRP scrapping allowance is completely insufficient 
- R2 &R3: TRP5 (the Taxi Regulatory Plan 5) proposes to remove all pre-2006 vehicles and is 
a form of “oppression”; the resale value of a 2001 Siyaya in good condition is ±R110 000, but 
the scrapping allowance is only R59 400;  
- R1: TRP5 should include vehicles up to 2001 models 
- [at this point I asked what form of engagement would be appropriate] 
- R3: IRT should invite all associations to participate in IRT planning; where they are not 
affected they should be there as observers 
- R1: direct engagement with each TA is not a good strategy: it would be seen as perpetuating 
the “divide and rule” approach of the past 
- R1 a critical problem is that not all routes or TAs have people who are competent to 
negotiate, therefore some centralised form of engagement is more desirable 
- R1: if IRT is a city-wide project everyone should be treated and engaged in the same way 
- R2: motherbodies don’t necessarily represent all their members, but should still be observers 
in IRT engagement processes 
- R3 expressed concern that IRT Phase 1 may be a failure but due to unaffected operators being 
excluded from engagement they would not know of such failure – therefore the call to be 
observers [secrecy around IRT is not being received well] 
- according to what R3 had heard the general operator buy-out figure is R300 000, to which R1 
countered that the figure is still being negotiated; R3 likened this amount the value of a single 
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vehicles, which was insufficient enticement [clearly the buy-out figure is contentious and 
critical] 
- R1: what can possibly come out of Phase 1 negotiations if the service is already running? 
[cart before the horse] 
- R1: there is a need for more competent people on SANTACO who are accountable to the 
industry [this was said in the context of the stake that SANTACO has, or will acquire, in the 
BRT proposal; respondents were distrustful of SANTACO’s motivations] 
- R3 suggested that a steering committee be elected to negotiate on members’ behalf; R2 said 
that would be unacceptable in his association and that “I would never allow another person to 
negotiate on my behalf around my future without me being present”, whether such a person 
be a consultant or if it be a steering committee 
- R2: motherbodies were side-lined on study tours to Bogota; he was adamant that affected 
Cape Town operators and influential persons in the industry [respondents knew very well who 
these persons were] be exposed in person to the details of engagement and the transition 
process in Bogota through talks with Bogota operators both within and outside Transmilenio 
operations 
- R3: the currently engaged parties [operators, officials] don’t know what the general industry 
feeling is 
- R2: an educational workshop is a necessity to expose the industry at large to the IRT business 
plan, operator prospectus, and purpose of surveys, amongst other matters [up-skilling/training 
are critical] 
- R2: negotiations on Phase 2 should start well before operations commence; Phase 2 
engagement should start immediately 
- R1: “black people do not own mines, do not own malls, do not own farms; black people own 
shebeens and we own taxis” [reveals a deep rift in the black well-to-do and black general 
population; respondents were in the latter group] 
- R2: “BRT will bring poverty and unemployment if the value chain is not included” 
- All respondents: “We are proud of it [the minibus-taxi industry]; it’s a legacy to our 
children”; R1 stated that the children of current operators would be ashamed of the current 
owner generation if they surrendered with no good reason the MBT industry in which they 
invested so many decades of their lives  
- [there is a definite sense of ownership of the routes that will be very difficult to overcome, but 
realistic financial incentives may well be key] 
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 Question/topic Prompts Response 





All were on provincial SANTACO board 
Board members of local TAs 
A2  What business interests does the association have 







B1  How did you start in the minibus-taxi industry? Timeline  
Up through ranks 
First job 
Built up own businesses from scratch during apartheid years 
B2  How many vehicles do you own and operate? Minibus 
Sedan 
Other 
5 minibuses each 
B3  Do you drive any vehicles yourself? Full-time 
Part-time  
 
B4  How many operating licences or permits do you 
have? 
In service at present 
Dormant  
 
B5  Do you keep a record of your minibus-taxi 






B6  Are your minibus-taxis your only source of 
income? 
Minibus-taxi related business 
Other business 
 




Captive to mode 
Offers a demand-responsive services, goes to areas where passengers 
want to go 
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C2  What do you think would make your minibus-taxi 
business more successful? 
Dedicated road space  
Improved competition regulation 
Improved law enforcement 
Larger vehicles 
Subsidy – capital or operational 
Representation structures 
Recognition  
Operations subsidy and more realistic scrapping allowance 
Trust-worthy representationals structures 
Recognition by government 
 
C3  Do you think the Operating Licensing system 
works well? 





Prefer indefinite permits 
No mention was made of overtrading 
C4  Do you think the Taxi Recapitalisation 
Programme works well? 





Insufficient scrapping allowance 
Approved vehicle seating capacity too low 
C5  Have you heard of the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system? 




City of Cape Town engagement 
Other  
Through representational structures 
C6  Do you think the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system offers 






Scale of change 
Skepticism around motivations of IRT project 
There was great concern around the lack of transparent engagement 
The respondents seemed keen on improved financial prospects but 
appeared not to know what the operator transition plan entailed 
 
 




Date: 29 May 2012 







It seemed as if the association took care to have diverse representation during the interview – 
members and non-members, senior and junior 
Curiosity and eagerness to improve their businesses: they were very keen to hear more about IRT 
proposal as respondents said they had no information on it – empowerment  
It is not really possible to have a conversation about discrete topics during an interview, especially 
with this many respondents – the conversation interwove comments and questions (both ways: from 
me, TB and from respondents) on their needs, IRT, business improvement tactics, problems 
This interview clearly demonstrated that there is a need for business capacity building – the interview 
was more interactive (i.e. questions in both directions) than previous interviews 
There was much talk and questions around the financial figures being offered by IRT in terms of early 
exit and contract share income – I pointed out a few times that there is still much uncertainty and it is 
impossible to speculate; TB provided some ballpark figures 
The TA leadership has proposed collective fleet management already, but insufficient trust amongst 
owners has apparently been the main reason that this is as yet not feasible 
After the interview started to break up there were some questions around what role GABS played in 
the IRT, but there was not time to explore this. Judging by how late into the interview this topic 
emerged it did not seem to be of primary concern 
The TA seemed to be well organised and calm; despite responses (listed below) that trust was missing 
between owners/members there was a sense that there was a collective mindset, or at least that they 
were ready to think and act collectively 
 
Interview record 
- Upon commencing the respondent believed that this was an official meeting, not a 
information and interview session; R7: “Are you bringing us money?” [this may have been 
meant jokingly, but there was a serious undertone to the question] 
- R3 was the only female respondent – included in session for that reason; had a formal sector 
job, but quit that and took the payout to buy her first vehicle in 1990s; her husband had 
already been a MBT owner; [I got the sense that she preferred the self-determination offered 
by being an MBT owner] 
- R7: entered industry after school age – aspired to being a driver; vehicles that he owned are 
now scrapped – didn’t buy new vehicles and is not operating at present  
- R8: started as a driver in 1980s, owns 1 vehicle, “I can’t go back to any other job” [sees his 
fate as tied to that of the MBT industry] 
- R2 was a younger member, vehicle driver and not on exco - included in session for that 
reason; started as a gaardjie in 1993 
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- R7: “Not all of the owners are interested in their own businesses” [on whether owners
actively manage their MBTs, e.g. bookkeeping]
- Association is in the process of fitting vehicles with a prepaid voucher fare system which the
driver would scan upon embarking, shops in area would sell vouchers similar to prepaid
cellphone airtime – motivation is so that owners can check income
- R3: quite a bit of power in the drivers’ hands [i.e. drivers are in control of income and
operations] and owners are trying to gain control with fare system
- [I asked it the TA believed the fare system would warrant the additional expense:] R3: A
cashless system would reduce the risk of robbery of passengers and drivers, which occurs
relatively frequently
- R7: “Van die drivers steel gevaarlik” [“Some of the drivers steal like crazy” – drivers don’t
accurately report farebox takings to owners]
- The majority of the TA’s members approve of the fare system, have even had talks with TAs
in the Northern Cape to adopt the system
- Owners’ ‘takings’ equals around R700 per day in general, respondents agreed that they
should increase the daily amount they recover from drivers for the use of the vehicles
- Fare system/better management of drivers is not only way respondents are trying to increase
their income – are using advertising in vehicles as well
- R7: “Weet jy wat soek ‘n taxi man? … Gee vir my ‘n R500 per maand van advertensies”;
“Die man op die grond moet benefit” [“Do you know what a taxi man wants? … Give me
R500 per month income from advertising”; “The man on the ground must benefit”] [on how
the association is seeking to increase owners’ revenue through collectively arranging
advertising on vehicles]
- R7: Fare system has a pension component to it: Old Mutual, Cell C and advertising
companies are on board to make a success of it [didn’t pursue this discussion, but presumably
a proportion of the revenue is being diverted to a pension scheme]
- [TB spent some time explaining what the IRT proposal is in terms of operations (trunk and
feeder) and how the shareholding and corporatisation process will work]
- R1: TA is not taking in new members [TB asked the question and recommended they do not
consider taking in new members in preparation for the IRT negotiation: more members =
smaller share for each]
- R7: on how to run a business [in the context of being able to provide proof of the value of
MBT businesses once IRT corporatisation process comes this way] “Gee vir ons iemand wat
ons kan kom wys so werk dit” [“Bring us someone who can show us how it works”]
- The respondents were heavily disgruntled about SANTACO not performing on its mandate to
support and train operators, despite SANTACO being funded to do so by government and
member associations
- R7: “Ons is nie lief vir daai mense [SANTACO] nie – hulle steel van ons” [“We don’t have
much affection for those people (from SANTACO) – they are thieves”]
- R7: The TA has not been engaged at all around the IRT; there was only the failed Ratanga
Junction meeting and nothing thereafter
- [I questioned respondents on whether they have a long term plan in place for their respective
businesses]
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- R1 reflecting on how shareholding in VOC will be calculated and risk of violence in MBT 
sector: “but if I die how do I [my share/family] benefit?” to which TB responded that 
shareholding is calculated on passenger and vehicle market share and not on a per person 
basis [I think the implication here was that R1 was concerned that IRT process might lead to 
further violence to reduce number of shareholders but due to the way in which shareholding is 
calculated this will not be the case] 
- R1: “We don’t realise what we have in our hands” [in terms of the present system’s 
ownership equity and future possibilities]  
- R1: around 80% of owners have MBT businesses as their sole source of income 
- The respondents seemed to realise during the interview that they must organise and document 
their business matters better, and asked for assistance with planning their businesses better 
[the strategic planning / long term component is missing in the MBT sector] 
 
- [I proposed to respondents that it is critical that they start thinking about creating a formal 
business entity, that they understand their cash flow better and that the TA should petition the 
City to bring the IRT their way sooner rather than later] 
- R7: has already proposed that TA vehicles be pooled and managed collectively so that if one 
vehicle is out of action it doesn’t jeopardise any particular owner’s income – “but we don’t 
trust one another” was the reason that this hasn’t happened yet 
 
- R1: IRT “sounds good” but what was presented during the interview session had to sink in 
first [the exco went into a meeting straight after the interview was concluded 
 
- [The discussion returned to respondents’ present financial situation and what could be done to 
improved their businesses]  
- On some routes “drivers never go home with less than R2500 per week” 
- Respondents believe they should manage their targets better and work more collectively 
- R7: “Onse drivers kry meer as wat die owners kry” [“Our drivers earn more than the 
owners”] 
- [The word subsidy immediately came up but when asked specifically what type:] A fuel 
subsidy would assist 
- The problem with the TRP was that obtaining credit to finance the remainder of the purchase 
sum was difficult because many owners had poor credit records – this was the primary way in 
which the TRP could work better; some voices around the room said that increasing the 
scrapping allowance would help, but this did not appear to be the main issue 
- There was some agreement that customer care could improve – that drivers treat passengers 
poorly despite relying on customers for their own income 
- The respondents generally believe that passengers choose to use MBTs because it offers a 
service which is faster and cheaper than other modes of public transport 
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 Question/topic Prompts Response 









R5: deputy vice-chairperson 
R6: assistant treasurer/financial manager 
R7: treasurer 
R8: training officer 
[R9: joined mid-way, was not introduced, did not participate] 
A2  What business interests does the association have 






Mainly involved in MBT businesses 
B1  How did you start in the minibus-taxi industry? Timeline  





Most as first job, R3 opted out of formal sector 
B2  How many vehicles do you own and operate? Minibus 
Sedan 
Other 
Most respondents owned 2 minibuses, R2 owned one 
B3  Do you drive any vehicles yourself? Full-time 
Part-time  
R2 only driver 
B4  How many operating licences or permits do you 
have? 
In service at present 
Dormant  
 
B5  Do you keep a record of your minibus-taxi 
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B6  Are your minibus-taxis your only source of 
income? 
Minibus-taxi related business 
Other business 
R1: Around 80% of TA members have their minibus as the sole 
source of income 




Captive to mode 
Faster and cheaper than other modes 
C2  What do you think would make your minibus-taxi 
business more successful? 
Dedicated road space  
Improved competition regulation 
Improved law enforcement 
Larger vehicles 
Subsidy – capital or operational 
Representation structures 
Recognition  
Operational (fuel) subsidy 
Better representative structures particularly in relation to training 
Recognition didn’t come up at all during the session 
 
C3  Do you think the Operating Licensing system 
works well? 






C4  Do you think the Taxi Recapitalisation 
Programme works well? 





Obtain financing/credit to fund capital shortfall a problem 
C5  Have you heard of the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system? 




City of Cape Town engagement 
Other  
Heard at Ratanga meeting 
Interview was the first time they heard of any details 
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C6  Do you think the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system offers 






Scale of change 
Seemed promising, but as the interview was the first time they heard 
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INTERVIEW RECORD 
Code: TA5 
Date: 30 May 2012 





There was a tense atmosphere on the groun: Member of another association challenged R1 when he 
saw R1 and me crossing the street to TA offices; I presume they thought I was a consultant or 
government employee dealing only with GCTA; the aforementioned let us proceed after R1 said I was 
from UCT 
R1 was pleased that I had come to “ground level”, that I came to meet with him on his home ground 
Provided insight into Jammie Shuttle contracting issues – follow up to discuss inclusion in CfTS bus 
course on JS experience 
Interview record 
- R1 has been in industry for 22 years, started by driving an unlicensed minibus
- TA in existence for 20 years, R1 was a founder member
- Owns 4 vehicles, involved in the running of ±80 vehicles on behalf of other owners
- Keeps financial records of own vehicles, stated that this is required by law and for income tax
purposes
- Stated that all TA members keep financial records and confirmed that TA is well run
- Officially membership is closed, but TA will consider new members if they have a strong
business background; a few existing members are very wealthy
- “We don’t allow drug dealers” [to become members of association]
- Passengers use MBTs because “they have no choice”; R1 admits that it is “not the best ride
quality”, but believes they provide a critical service
- MBTs served as a springboard for members to expand into other businesses; MBTs were the
core business but now owners’ business interests are half in MBT and half elsewhere
- R1 believes that the industry lacks driver training and skills such as providing customer care
- Government can provide better ranking facilities as these are in need of improvement; R1 is
aware that a significant amount has been set aside for improving TA5 main rank
- Facilities at stops along routes could also be improved (shelters and embayments)
- TA owns taxi loading bays on Main Rd in TA5 area – apparently despite being on roadway
the property was privately owned; purchased for R180 000 per bay from private owner with
acknowledgement from City; problems with metered taxis using these bays as ranks
- Waiting time for approval of OLs exceeds the 30 day official period; officials handling
process are not well informed
- TA arranged for one of their members to be on SANTACO to ensure that the application
approval process runs smoother
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- “Taxis are our tool” – critical that licencing process runs smoothly so that MBT businesses 
can continue to function properly and legally 
- “POLB is doing OK”, “there’s not too many taxis on the road – there’s taxis off route” – 
problem is not that there are too many licences being awarded, but rather that taxis are not 
being forced to keep to there official routes; TAs are encroaching on one another’s legally 
recognised routes [problem is not POLB, but that there is insufficient law enforcement] 
- TA had 20 more operating licences approved recently but they are not putting the vehicles on 
the road as it doesn’t make business sense [the TA is managing its supply and demand; ties 
back to earlier statement that owners know the financial statuses of their businesses] 
- There is tension between CATA and CODETA: interchanges are being bypassed and taxis are 
going off their routes [leading to these tensions between motherbodies] 
- Law enforcement officers are well trained: they are not well informed on how taxis work [that 
TAs runs organised businesses and manage their routes and members] and on how to read the 
permits [they don’t know the rights that the OLs grant to the holder and if a taxi is on or off 
its route by reading the OL] 
 
- “This routes of ours is a goldmine” [the TA5 area is a very important hub in the transport 
system] 
 
- There is high churn amongst the public sector officials that they have to deal with: the 
frequency with which owners/the TA had to re-establish relationships with City or law 
enforcement officials [to form trusting relationships] was seen as a problem 
- R1’s perception is that the public sector is not recognising the role and value of the MBT 
industry and assisting it: “You know, the taxi industry is not being taken seriously”, “our 
problems just get bigger and bigger” 
- But “I must give credit to [TA5 area] Business Council” in the way that they engage with the 
TA if there is a problem or if something in the area changes [e.g new property development] 
- R1 stressed that this is his personal view on TRP scrapping allowance: “The money, you can’t 
do anything with that money”, “We’re in it to make money” [owner is not going to replace a 
functioning vehicle to take on new debt – eats into profit]; “Maybe R150 000 [scrapping 
allowance] would give you breather space” 
- TA owners can’t fill the gap between recap allowance and new vehicle price: “They’d 
[owners would] rather stick with their old vehicle”; maintenance on the new vehicles are 
expensive – a sliding door for a Toyota Quantum costs R36 000 [more than the value of a a 
Siyaya] 
- TRP: “Maybe it’s a government scheme to root people out, to kill the industry” 
 
- The TA does not allow the renting out of permits; “Our membership is tight” – the TA’s 
members run on strong business principles 
- “We’re all originally from here [TA5 area]” [there is a sense of pride and belonging to the 
area] 
 
- “We hear in 2013 that IRT is coming this way”, “We have nobody come to us” [to talk about 
rank facility of IRT-related upgrades] 
- On where TA first heard about BRT/IRT: “We always had people on SANTACO” and was 
thus exposed to the BRT concept engagement with Tasneem Essop and the Klipfontein 
Corridor project 
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- “All these local associations look up to us to set the bar” [implying that R1’s TA had taken a 
leading role in on the Klipfontein project and on the study tour to Bogota] 
- “We were all for it at one stage, at the beginning stage” 
 
- [On how formalised the TA is in preparation for IRT] was a partner in ATS (Amalgamated 
Transport Services) on a 50:50 basis to tender for UCT Jammie Shuttle service provision 
 
- R1 not sure about what IRT is offering 
- The lack of information and lack of trust amongst rival TAs is making it difficult to buy into 
IRT 
- “We need expertise in the industry, we need skills, we need outsiders” [outsiders = 
professionals from outside – R1 mentioned legal advisors as an example] 
- TA wants to be in a position to formulate proper business plans and proposals, but owners are 
unwilling to spend money outside their daily MBT operations [on professional services and 
training that is not of immediate apparent benefit to their business] 
 
- [On Jammie Shuttle] TA supported original JS operating licence applications because these 
did not duplicate MBT routes existing at the time; support was given on the understanding 
that if JS services expanded where there were MBT routes that the TA would become a 
formal partner and “share in the income” 
- JS contract with AMS, not with TA 
- AMS bought new Toyota Quantums that are being used exclusively on Jammie Shuttle routes 
to Claremont; after the JS services end at 9am these vehicle are parked and are not used for 
normal MBT services [demonstrates that the TA is willing to invest in  
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Question/topic Prompts Response 






A2 What business interests does the association have 






Around half of TA members’ collective income derived outside MBT 
business – did not specify what types of external businsesses 
B1 How did you start in the minibus-taxi industry? Timeline  
Up through ranks 
First job 
Driver 




B3 Do you drive any vehicles yourself? Full-time 
Part-time 
No 
B4 How many operating licences or permits do you 
have? 
In service at present 
Dormant  
B5 Do you keep a record of your minibus-taxi 






B6 Are your minibus-taxis your only source of 
income? 
Minibus-taxi related business 
Other business 




Captive to mode 
“They have no choice” 
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C2  What do you think would make your minibus-taxi 
business more successful? 
Dedicated road space  
Improved competition regulation 
Improved law enforcement 
Larger vehicles 
Subsidy – capital or operational 
Representation structures 
Recognition  
Increased capital subsidy 
Recognition 
C3  Do you think the Operating Licensing system 
works well? 





High turnover of public officials – difficult to maintain trusting 
relationships 
Poor level of education amongst public officials on how to interpret 
OLs 
Insufficient law enforcement 
Application approval takes longer than indicated 30-day period 
C4  Do you think the Taxi Recapitalisation 
Programme works well? 





Allowance completely insufficient 
C5  Have you heard of the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system? 




City of Cape Town engagement 
Other  
Through involvement in SANTACO  
C6  Do you think the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system offers 






Scale of change 
Does not have sufficient information to be able to say 
 
 




Date: 31 May 2012 







Throughout the interview various of R1’s comments made it clear that there was a big gap between 
the level of technical knowledge (contracting and financial nuances) that IRT required in contrast to 
taxi operators’ present situation where the only focus is on daily or really short term considerations  




- On challenges presented by IRT: “We never used to be in the corporate world … We do not 
have the educational background” 
 
- Father was a MBT owner, R1 was started as a gaardjie, then driver at age 16 (without driving 
licence), bought Hiace while still at school 
- Concurrent to driving MBT completed NTC 2 and 3 of electrical engineering, but dropped out 
- Motivation for studying was R1’s realisation that “There’s more to me than that” [than being 
a taxi driver and owner] but there was more money in being in the taxi business 
- Left Cape Town when taxi wars broke out (also spent time in Lesotho) – wars between 
opposing tribal sides 
- Started as operator in Gugulethu before taxi wars, moved to central Cape Town afterwards 
and joined Peninsula TA 
- After a year broke away from PTA: PTA didn’t want black drivers to hold permits – were told 
that this caused too much competition on the road; black operators were only allowed to rent 
permits from coloured permitholders, as late as 1993/1994 
- It was easier to get hold of a vehicle than a permit; to obtain his first permit R1 resprayed his 
first minibus, sold it for R18 000 and purchased a permit for R15 000 
- Once the permit was secured he worked hard at convincing his brother to lend him money and 
he bought a Ford Husky minibus  
- “I sort of struggled [financially] when I started [operating in central Cape Town]” 
- A few months later bought a second minibus (“van”) and rented a permit from PTA [had by 
this point ceased being a PTA member]; PTA leadership however didn’t want to sell off any 
permits – this led to R1 and fellow operators forming TA6 so that they could apply 
themselves for permits 
- There was a lot of fighting (fist fights) [with PTA members] and it was a difficult process to 
establish their own TA as a TA had to have at least 10 members to register 
- The SLP process [government amnesty programme?] allowed permit renters to become 
permit holders 
- Once formed TA6 took in black, coloured and white [possibly meaning Muslim based on 
examples given during interview] members 
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- R1 owns 12 vehicles all with OLs, doesn’t drive any longer 
- TA used to have a limit of 5 vehicles per member, but there was internal friction around this 
limit and the TA finally decided that it would be in the TA’s interest not to have a limit so 
that it could grow in numbers [vehicles and OLs] 
- “In the taxi industry you need to have a good lawyer” – the laid back African mindset doesn’t 
serve the development of the industry, although this mindset persists 
- As the government is taking on a more hand-on approach to regulating the taxi industry of 
late the industry is trying to clean up its act, but this is moving slowly 
- TA members don’t discuss finances as this is very sensitive and can get you killed; “The taxi 
industry is a mafia”, “The taxi industry has lost a lot of people because of asking about 
money” 
- Having executive committees [official management and representation] within TAs has 
brought a lot of legitimacy to the industry 
- [Basic and business] literacy is lacking: people in the taxi industry don’t have the proper 
education/background to manage and account for their money – this applies especially to 
operators’ own businesses but much less so to TAs’ finances; “Most of our people run from 
hand to mouth” [i.e. don’t manage finances beyond daily income and expenses, no long term 
vision] 
- There have been initiatives to educate and train owners by the TA, SANTACO and other 
agencies [unspecified] in terms of understanding technical & legal documents, customer care, 
vehicle care [including maintenance] and rank management, but “nobody attended” [possibly 
a source of embarrassment on the part of those involved in arranging these events] 
- Drivers’ attendance at driver-focussed courses was higher; “SANTACO did make an effort” 
but owners weren’t sufficiently interested 
- Taxi owners are only interested in their present situation and are not thinking ahead: “I need 
to make money for food”, “Don’t stand in my way, I want to make money” 
- IRT is far too demanding in terms of paperwork and technical proficiency/preparedness that it 
requires of taxi operators; taxi operators prefer to deal with what they are familiar with: “Take 
the key, start the car [minibus-taxi], I’m gone” is the way they are used to running operations 
[with no contracting, timetabling, legal issues taking months to negotiate and resolve] 
- PTA is using IRT to get ahead of its fellow TAs; “City is also in favour of him [PTA 
chairman]”, TA6 is getting the short end of the stick 
- All local [i.e. non-long distance] TA6 routes (all 56 operating licences) are affected by IRT, 
yet “we are not so sure about what’s happening in the IRT” – PTA is far bigger (400 
operating licences) and is dominating the engagement process on the MBT side 
- “We are walking into the unknown”, uncertainty around official promise: "How [in what 
way] are we not going to be worse off?”  [It seemed that TA6 are being sidelined in the Phase 
1 negotiation, dragged along only because their OLs are affected] 
- There is also uncertainty around what will happen with minibuses during IRT: the TA holds 
valid long-distance licences not affected by IRT but if vehicles are scrapped then these OLs 
are meaningless; long distance OLs holds promise of future growth and a way out of present 
difficult positing in which TA finds itself [squeezed between PTA and IRT]  
- There aren’t enough job positions in IRT vehicle operating companies – some of the positions 
require people with degrees: “The only jobs that are out there [i.e. in IRT] for us are drivers” 
 
- “We create our own problems”, “It always goes back to the culture” [i.e. ‘small-mindedness’, 
operators only interested in short term interests], “We’d rather want money in our pockets” 
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- R1 would prefer that TA has a kitty to deal with communal issues [defending OLs, legal 
issues]: the City only pays attention to lawyers’ letters 
- The younger generation of operators (“new guys with better education”) is more progressive 
and understand the needs for greater collective action [longer term planning] 
- “We’re really not getting anywhere” [as an industry and as a TA]  
 
- [When prompted as to what would resolve their internal impasse and how MBT industry can 
become more successful]: starting to focus on long distance services as a source of income, 
especially during season [holidays] 
- R1 said that it makes sense to use minibuses on long distance routes; [I questioned him on 
whether larger vehicles wouldn’t be a better proposition:] “If you transport people with 
smaller vehicles you don’t run the risk of having a half empty bus”, especially applicable to 
the return leg of the journey 
- Local ranking spaces don’t allow for larger vehicles (i.e. 22-seaters), but R1 admitted that it 
could be a consideration for longer distances if passenger demand allowed and it led to 
reduced operating costs; however, less vehicles equalled to less drivers [employment] 
 
- TRP is not an issue any more as all vehicles are subject to IRT processes 
- The TA is negotiating with the City at present to keep some minibuses for long distance 
services 
- A further issue that isn’t resolved is that some owners still have down payments to make on 
their recapped minibuses – it is not clear how this will be addressed by the IRT offer; the TA 
proposed that the City only takes the OL and leaves present vehicles with owners, but the City 
said that this would lead to them coming back as pirate operators to compete with IRT 
 
- Passengers use MBTs because they get from A to B much quicker; MBTs offer a convenient 
service – go where passengers are and want to be [i.e. offers a flexible service] 
- Despite all the accidents and lack of subsidy the industry still prospers 
 
- R1 said that it was wise to start with the IRT in the CBD as there are less owners and TAs 
affected – the risk of problems in the Metro Southeast is far greater [in terms of opposition, 
violence and disgruntlement] 
- IRT was not a good opportunity because it is taking away the flexibility of the present MBT 
system – convenience for passengers is much reduced; R1 reflecting on the study trip to 
Bogota and Curitiba which he took part in: metered taxis filled the gap left by taking 
paratransit off the road and the same might happen in Cape Town 
- Study tours only focussed on technical matters; when R1 and others questioned officials about 
whether certain operators were excluded they were informed that the purpose of the tour was 
technical learning only: “It’s irrelevant [it’s not important which or why operators were 
excluded]; it’s a technical tour” 
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 Question/topic Prompts Response 





Public relations officer/ previously chairman 
Chair of holdings company in IRT VOC 
A2  What business interests does the association have 







B1  How did you start in the minibus-taxi industry? Timeline  
Up through ranks 
First job 
Father owned an MBT, started as driver 




B3  Do you drive any vehicles yourself? Full-time 
Part-time  
No  
B4  How many operating licences or permits do you 
have? 
In service at present 
Dormant  
12 
B5  Do you keep a record of your minibus-taxi 






B6  Are your minibus-taxis your only source of 
income? 
Minibus-taxi related business 
Other business 
 




Captive to mode 
Convenient, faster, flexible 
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C2  What do you think would make your minibus-taxi 
business more successful? 
Dedicated road space  
Improved competition regulation 
Improved law enforcement 
Larger vehicles 
Subsidy – capital or operational 
Representation structures 
Recognition  
Increased development of long distance transport services (in SA and 
to neighbouring countries) 
C3  Do you think the Operating Licensing system 
works well? 






C4  Do you think the Taxi Recapitalisation 
Programme works well? 






C5  Have you heard of the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system? 




City of Cape Town engagement 
Other  
Affected operator in Phase 1, but TA is being sidelined in engagement 
process 
C6  Do you think the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system offers 






Scale of change 
Too many uncertainties 
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INTERVIEW RECORD 
Code: TA7&8a 
Date: 26 June 2013 





This group of respondents appeared to play an active role in the management of their minibus 
businesses 
Highly mistrustful and unhappy about TRP – saw it as a scheme designed to eradicate minibuses  
Link between land use and transport: construction of township malls has reduced the demand for 
longer distance trips to old commercial centres, negatively impacting on farebox revenue 
Respondents did not comment on their market being saturated despite my asking them directly about 
this – protecting what is theirs (?) 
Want to keep money in-house – did not look favourably on outside driving schools receiving SETA 
funding to train drivers 
Investigate the funding sources and quantities that are at present available to MBT businesses or that 
could in future be directed their way: PTISG, PTOG, TRP, IRPTN compensation/contracts, dti grants, 
other? 
Interview record 
- All own multiple vehicles
- Not involved in other businesses – large administrative load as 15/15 executives
- R4 started as a driver in 1993
- R6 started as an owner during bus boycotts in mid-1980s running routes to Claremont and
Wynberg, acquired permits to operate to CBD in 1988
- R5 used a payout (“package”) from formal sector job to purchase minibus
- R1 started as an illegal (“pirate”) owner-driver in 1986 working part-time after work on
weekdays and full-time over weekends
- R2 purchased minibus in 2000
- R3 used a package from formal sector job to purchase minibus in 1993
- All keep books of daily minibus business expenses and income, including insurance, fuel
charges, maintenance costs
- R2: they destroy books of previous years as they see no need to keep these
- R1: keep books due to “government demands”, i.e. for tax/SARS purposes; they keep very
careful records particularly of late
- R6: banks require financial records during loan applications to purchase new minibuses
- R6: “we never enjoyed this taxi recap programme”, more interested in subsidy aspect of TRP
than in the particular range of TRP-compliant vehicles that were introduced
- R3: the TRP cripples operators and repossessions are common
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- R6: disgruntled about reduced passenger capacity of approved vehicles; the “calibre” of 
approved vehicles did not match up to the prices being charged for these vehicles 
- R6: owners were promised at start of TRP that they would be compensated (i.e. subsidised) 
for half the value of a new compliant vehicle, but the subsidy remains at R50 000 
- SC: government did not consider affordability when implementing the TRP; by introducing 
TRP government instituted a policy that ruined operators 
- All: repossessions are a huge problem due to the loss of investment value (i.e. capital already 
paid off) and resulting blacklisting of operators 
- R6: TRP is a case of “regulatory failure”: he was enticed to purchase a (larger capacity) 22-
seater minibus, but no licences were made available (presumably because of NLTA clause 
that existing MBT licences adding up to that capacity had to be surrendered); vehicle ended 
up being repossessed by banks because owners could not obtain licences (seemed to be a 
requirement for instalment sale agreement) and he ended up being blacklisted 
- R1: 22-seater vehicles do not qualify for scrapping 
 
- SC: panel van conversions are unreliable, and followed up personally with manufacturer but 
did not receive a satisfactory responses; thus present case lodged with public protector 
 
- R1: Siyaya was a very good product – affordable purchase price and maintenance; commuters 
(i.e. passengers) never complained about the nature (comfort) of the vehicle 
- R1: government introduced the new vehicles without consulting with MBT owners 
- R6: commuters are comfortable with Siyayas – they have more urgent priorities than the 
actual taxi vehicles (i.e. passengers are far more concerned about getting to and keeping their 
jobs than in what kind of vehicle they are being transported in) 
- R2: used the new Quantum on a trip to the Eastern Cape, but passengers afterwards asked him 
to use a Siyaya; the comfort levels of both are the same despite size differences (roof height, 
seat width) 
- R2: operators have been noticing that the (build & material) quality of Quantums is not up to 
the same level as that of the Siyaya, but when the confronted the manufacturer about this they 
were told that it would be too expensive to build the Quantum to the same standard 
(presumably because of more complex technology and safety features?) 
- R7: the Quantum is faster because of its larger engine, which causes more accidents; it uses 
more fuel yet carries less passengers 
- R1&R2: the Siyaya’s financing and insurance costs amount to R4 000 per month, while that 
of the Quantum is R10 000pm; yet the number of trips that operators make did not increase – 
the opposite was true: the construction of malls in the townships means that many previous 
passengers don’t travel to town (i.e. Cape Town) to do their shopping 
- SC: a plan for the MBT sector is absent – most repossessions are the result of uncoordinated 
government land use and transport planning, which mean that MBT operators’ income is 
being negatively impacted on; the IDP process is not working 
 
- HS: How can the industry be improved? (supply, demand, ownership structure)  
- R6: the taxi industry uses a lot of fuel, and thus generate income for government; operators 
did not increase their fares despite the additional cost involve in purchasing recapped vehicles 
yet they are not receiving increased financial support from government 
- R6: driver training is critical to improving the minibus taxi sector 
- R6: MBT lanes do not work properly – failure of infrastructure to serve operators’ needs 
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- R2: the taxi industry is open to increased driver training; the SETA has funds available for 
training but is only accessible to driving schools – these funds get misused by these schools 
- R2: there is a lack of oversight of how government funds are being spent 
- R2: dedicated lanes were seen to impact positively on reducing drivers having to speed to 
make their daily target (i.e. freer-flowing traffic means more trips per day), but these lanes 
were lacking in traffic law enforcements and “tourists” were driving in these lanes more and 
more (possibly alluding to tourist vehicle operators) 
- R6: proposed that government provide more dedicated lanes 
- R6: MBT problems result from both government and MBT industry actions 
- R6: owners are being overloaded with debt and fines: “the plan is to get rid of us” 
- R6: their main passenger market is domestic workers; they all start working at the same time 
thus there is a high demand during peak hours which requires the present vehicle fleet 
capacity (i.e. there are not too many minibuses on the road); more dedicated would allow 
them to serve peak demand better 
- R1: most demand is from informal settlements – in those settlements government provides a 
housing subsidy, but minibus operators don’t get a subsidy 
- R1: congestion is increasing – MBT use should be encouraged over purchasing private cars 
 
- R2: MBT businesses are being paid off to be replaced by MyCiTi vehicle operating 
companies – why can’t minibus-taxi owners not buy Marcopolo (i.e. large) buses individually 
and provide MyCiTi services? 
- R1: “government doesn’t consult” though MBT operators have been accommodating 
government demands – why have operator not been consulted despite having been around for 
a very long time? 
- R5: “government treats us as small boys” – operators should be accorded the same courteous 
treatment as other businesses (in other sectors) 
- SC: “at the end of the day no-one takes us seriously”; operators are not necessarily rejecting 
MyCiTi, but they need to be included in the engagement process 
- R2: minibus-taxi operators are being made to be scapegoats for all transport problems 
- R7: “we are very insecure [about what BRT/MyCiTi entails]” (lack of information about what 
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 Question/topic Prompts Response 





R1: TA7 vice-chairperson 
R2: TA8 vice-chairperson 
R3: TA8 vice-secretary 
R4: board member 
R5: executive member 
R6: TA7 executive member 
R7: board member  
A2  What business interests does the association have 







B1  How did you start in the minibus-taxi industry? Timeline  
Up through ranks 
First job 
mainly as driver or owner-driver 




B3  Do you drive any vehicles yourself? Full-time 
Part-time  
no 
B4  How many operating licences or permits do you 
have? 
In service at present 
Dormant  
 
B5  Do you keep a record of your minibus-taxi 






B6  Are your minibus-taxis your only source of 
income? 
Minibus-taxi related business 
Other business 
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Captive to mode 
it serves to transport them to work 
C2  What do you think would make your minibus-taxi 
business more successful? 
Dedicated road space  
Improved competition regulation 
Improved law enforcement 
Larger vehicles 




improved law enforcement 
subsidy 
more reliable approved vehicle range 
C3  Do you think the Operating Licensing system 
works well? 






C4  Do you think the Taxi Recapitalisation 
Programme works well? 






C5  Have you heard of the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system? 




City of Cape Town engagement 
Other  
grapevine 
C6  Do you think the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system offers 






Scale of change 
yes, but lack of available information is leading to a feeling of 
insecurity 
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INTERVIEW RECORD 
  
Code:  TA7&8b 
Date: 27 June 2013 







Respondent seemed to choose to reply in Xhosa even if they could speak English so that co-
respondents who were not fluent in English could follow – suggested that there is strong peer censure 
or pressure to keep within the ranks 
SC said that the ‘old guard’ from Interview TA7a (possibly others from the main leadership) wanted 
to attend this interview to monitor what the more junior respondents (R1, 2, 4 and 5) said. R3 was the 
only from the TA7a group who was present – the remaining three from the old guard who had 
intended to attend were late, but SC spoke with them over the phone prior to their arriving, arguing 
that it would not be necessary for them to be present and that they should not try to veto or influence 
what was said in the interests of transparency. In the end they did not attend the interview. 
Since exchanges were not conducted only in English and responses were translated in long ‘batches’ 
(i.e. relatively telegraphically) it was usually not possible for me to interject with clarifying questions 
of my own. This and TA7a interview also proceed slower as a result of the translation, though not as 
slow as I expected since a lot of information was still forthcoming and it seemed to me that all 
respondents could get their views across. 
Many TAs seem to limit fleet size per owner – might be why saturation did not really come up during 
any of the interviews: operators and TAs may think that this is enough control of supply 
 
Interview record 
- R1: 3 vehicles 
- R2: 3 vehicles 
- R3: 1 vehicle 
- R4: 1 vehicle 
 
- None have business interests outside MBT operations 
- SC: operators would rather stick to one industry, demonstrates their dedication to public 
transport service provision 
- R1: “you cannot worship two masters”, “who’ll be looking after your business at the rank if 
you’re elsewhere?” 
 
- R1 & R2: started in 1980, government did not allow them to be both formally employed and a 
taxi operator, they chose the latter, worked in collaboration, used their retrenchment packages 
to purchase their first Chevrolets, bought their first minibuses in 1982 – old Toyota Hiace 
(Xh: “ncula-ncula”, Af: “arkie”) 
- R4: bought a Valiant in 1986 
- R5: started as a Valiant driver, bought own Valiant in 1986 and Hiace in 1987 
- All started as owner-drivers 
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- R3: keeps financial records; single-vehicle owner-drivers had the knowledge of their finances
in their heads (±mental arithmetic) and thus did not keep financial records; after purchase of
second vehicle it became too complex to do this and they started to keep books – primarily to
manage drivers’ takings and payment
- R2: keeps financial records – same as R3 after purchase of second vehicle; also to manage
driver since driver earns a percentage of income generated by MBT
- R1: keeps books to establish what his profit is at the end of the month
- R5: as per R3; keeps records on a 7-day cycle (i.e. calculates total income and expenditure on
a weekly basis); 25% of fare income goes to driver as a wage
- All: general agreement that TA7 & TA8 drivers’ wage is 25% of farebox income
- R5: the gap between TRP subsidy and new vehicle price is too great; R63 000 subsidy does
not cover the typical new vehicle deposit of R75 000; the shortfall has to be found somewhere
else; monthly instalment = R10 000; as a result cannot meet [financial] obligations and are
being put out of the game; the recap has put operators in a terrible situation
- R3: scrapping cancels previous permit – has to convert to an operating licence and lose the
freedom that the indefinite permit allows; administrative delays to get new operating licences;
forces illegal operations to maintain an income, but vehicles get impounded at road blocks;
TRP brought change, but not positive change for operators, and created [administrative]
bottlenecks
- R2: if you scrap with a permit you are then coerced into an approved recap vehicle; you are
not allowed to purchase a vehicle registered before September 2006 but this has implications
on affordability – a Siyaya will cost R120 000-R150 000 while a new vehicles will cost R300
000-R400 000; affordability of approved vehicle range is an issue
- R5: a new operating licence application takes 90 days to be processed; but to get an OL
approved you need to demonstrate that there space at the rank and in the [ITP/Ratplan]
allowance
- R5: with the scrapping allowance paid out the operators approach financial institutions to
fund the outstanding balance, but then get told that they do not qualify for a loan because of
credit blacklisting and thus become excluded from operating [legally]
- R5: on OL it states that operators are providing a service to the City – ‘service agreement’
being undermined by government
- R5: if not operating for 180 days the OL is cancelled; happens that vehicle is in another
province, repossessed or accident-damaged (and owner can’t afford repairs for lack of
income) and then consecutive random City surveys or cameras on freeways do not pick up
that vehicle in 180-day period and OL is cancelled; there is no space for owners to provide
motivation why vehicle was not operating (no avenue to appeal process cancellation of OL)
- SC: unreliable vehicles (MB Sprinter; IVECOs) are highly problematic because of 180-day
clause
- R3: surveys are a problem; there is no forewarning to prepare documentation that proves why
the vehicle was off the road for 180 days
- SC: maintenance costs of non-Siyaya vehicles is expensive; owners just work to pay the
instalments (caught in a debt trap)
- R5: Quantum Sesfikile is unreliable, Quantum GL not; most of the approved vehicles don’t
even last the financing term of 52 months
- R5: if the TRP were aimed at advancing the sector owners should be compensated (scrapping
allowance of) 50% of the price of the new vehicle (profit margins are too small at present);
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this proposal is repeated every year at the SANTACO and regional conferences but nothing 
comes of it; operators do not have direct access to government so they have to work through 
representative structures (the implication was that representation was not working well) 
- R5: most TA7 members have become credit-unworthy as a result of the TRP; proposes that as 
long as a member has a valid OL he should qualify for financing with government acting as 
guarantor; SA Taxi Finance is the only option at present for operators with bad credit record 
but they charge maximum interest rate of 25% and show no mercy when it comes to vehicle 
repossession due to non-payment 
- All: Big Four commercial banks provide finance typically at 15-18% interest (but require 
candidate to be credit-worthy) 
 
- R3 & R5: no one came directly to them to discuss the IRT/MyCiTi proposal, but they were 
not too concerned as they thought in would not affect them as it seemed to be confined to 
what is the Phase 1 area; were under the impression that MyCiTi would only be a top-up 
service and that existing services would continue to operate 
- All: direct engagement started in May 2013; operators heard through the grapevine about the 
after-effects (protracted negotiations and disgruntlement) of Kidrogen; direct engagement was 
requested by operators; first contact was during City officials’ presentation (to 15/15 group) 
on 22 April 2013; since then City is maintaining contact with operators to provide 
information; respondents are still trying to make sense of the proposal and contract structure 
- SC: Kidrogen deal seems to be coercive and some operators have been sidelined; promises 
have not been realised; City’s attitude seems to be “this [N2 Express service] is what is going 
to happen on the 14th of December [2013]”; political pressure to make it happen 
- All: timeframe is too tight for proper engagement 
- SC: public officials are under pressure from the mayor to push through the N2 Express 
service implementation; City officials know that something is not right with the MyCiTi 
model and that significant time is required to address the skills gap between present MBT and 
future BRT operational and managerial requirements 
- SC: being called a ‘top-up’ service provides the space for the City to avoid complicated 
questions (around transitional arrangements); the City gave the impression that it was open 
for suggestions around routes (in Phase 2), but routes are now being prescribed  
 
- R5: he is not comfortable commenting on IRT proposal as he has insufficient information and 
does not understand the impact it will have on his MBT business; he does not know what their 
(MBT industry’s) reactions will be during the negotiation process 
- R1: MyCiTi was aimed at replacing MBT and is not a project to improve MBTs; he is very 
concerned about the potential outcomes due to what happened in the Port Elizabeth project 
- R4: (a number of MBT representatives) visited Port Elizabeth for 2 days, spoke to affected 
operators who don’t see BRT as working for them; he would like time to investigate other 
(reform) options as he sees that public transport needs improvement   
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 Question/topic Prompts Response 





R1: chair TA8-Cape Town route 
R2: vice-chairman TA8-Bellville/Stellenbosch/Paarl routes 
R3: vice-chairman TA8-Claremont/Wynberg routes, executive (also a 
respondent in interview TA7&8a) 
R4: route manager TA8-Mitchells Plain route  
R5: route manager TA7-Sea Point/Cape Town (entered interview ±10 
mins late) 
A2  What business interests does the association have 








B1  How did you start in the minibus-taxi industry? Timeline  
Up through ranks 
First job 
owner-driver 
B2  How many vehicles do you own and operate? Minibus 
Sedan 
Other 
BN: All routes: maximum of 6 vehicles allowed per owner 
R1: 3 vehicles 
R2: 3 vehicles 
R3: 1 vehicle 
R4: 1 vehicle 
B3  Do you drive any vehicles yourself? Full-time 
Part-time  
no 
B4  How many operating licences or permits do you 
have? 
In service at present 
Dormant  
 
B5  Do you keep a record of your minibus-taxi 





yes, paper-based after purchase of second vehicle 
B6  Are your minibus-taxis your only source of 
income? 
Minibus-taxi related business 
Other business 
yes 
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Captive to mode 
 
C2  What do you think would make your minibus-taxi 
business more successful? 
Dedicated road space  
Improved competition regulation 
Improved law enforcement 
Larger vehicles 
Subsidy – capital or operational 
Representation structures 
Recognition  
subsidy of 50% of purchase price of recap vehicle, or at least a 
scrapping allowance that equals the typical R75 000 deposit price of a 
new vehicle; more lenient lending criteria 
C3  Do you think the Operating Licensing system 
works well? 






C4  Do you think the Taxi Recapitalisation 
Programme works well? 





no – a scheme to root out the MBT sector 
C5  Have you heard of the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system? 




City of Cape Town engagement 
Other  
yes, but only recently; heard via colleagues in Phase 1 area 
C6  Do you think the IRT/MyCiTi/BRT system offers 






Scale of change 
too little information and understanding to determine this; are 
sceptical given very contracted timeframe to make December 2013 
implementation date 
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INTERVIEW RECORD 
  
Code:  TA7&8c  
Date: 4 July 2013 







Drivers’ fates seem closely tied to that of owners. 
This cohort of drivers all appeared to have good relationships with owners, though this is very unlikely 
to be the case in general. Nevertheless, if even this group is struggling when owners are under pressure 
financially or otherwise then a group experiencing poorer relations with their vehicles’ owners are 
likely to be even worse off. 
Unfair targeting of drivers by traffic law enforcement officers was an important topic during this 
interview; might be very difficult to prove this using statistics 
Disgruntlement with government was very evident 
As per TA7b responses, drivers get paid 25% commission on profit; if TRP vehicle instalments take 
up all of owners’ takings (as per some TA7c responses) then the driver is left with no 
income/commission 
Employment insecurity was an important recurring theme in this interview 
 
Interview record 
− All work only as a driver – no other form of employment 
 
− HS: started as driver? 
− R1: 1991, was previously a contract construction worker 
− R2: 1993, saved up for driver’s licence while working as a contract construction worker  
− R3: 2000, was previously a security guard 
− R4: 1990, was previously  
− R5: 2000, being a MBT taxi driver was his first job 
− R6: 2000, being a MBT taxi driver was his first job 
− R7: 1989, was previously a [roadworks] grader operator  
− R8: 1990, being a MBT taxi driver was his first job 
 
− HS: how do drivers account for farebox income and daily operating expenses? 
− Respondents agreed that they do one of the following: 
− R2: on long distance point to point trips there are no passengers getting on or off en route and 
the vehicle is always full; at the end of each day counts number of trips and multiplies it with 
vehicle’s seating capacity to calculate income; stated that each driver has own means of 
keeping track of income 
− R7: gaardjie collects fares; calculate earnings in consulataion with gaardjie at the end of each 
trip  
− R4: as per R2 
− R8: tallies income at each major stop (i.e. per trip section) 
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− HS: why do passengers use MBTs? 
− R5: “the taxi is faster than the bus, especially in the morning” 
− R2: clientele are predominantly “previously disadvantaged individuals” (i.e. there are 
cultural/racial alliances) [interpreter used this term – was referring to non-white persons, was 
possibly not sure how to be politically correct in my presence]; there is a long-standing 
relationship between these passengers and individual drivers; if a particular passenger doesn’t 
have the fare he or she can make a temporary arrangement with the driver 
− R7: MBT services are convenient to passengers; they stop nearby where passengers want to 
go; passengers can reason with MBT drivers if the don’t have the cash for the fare 
− R3: taxis serve as feeders to buses and trains 
− R1: drivers make special provision for disabled passengers by dropping them at there houses if 
requested to do so 
− R8: drivers are able to assist passengers when the have lots of baggage or if they are elderly 
they drop them straight at their houses 
− All: there was general agreement that there are many repeat passengers, i.e. they seek out the 
same driver/minibus 
 
− HS: what are their views on regulation/government intervention/traffic law enforcement 
− R2: law enforcement officers stop MBT drivers irrespective of whether there are problems 
with their vehicles/licences 
− R8: drivers get abuse from traffic officers; BMT lanes are being encroached on by private 
cars, but unlike MBTs these don’t get pulled over; MBTs are then forced to offload passengers 
on the freeway and the driver must then take the vehicle to Green Point [Gallows Hill] to be 
inspected (dangerous to passengers, who must then find other means of transport) 
− R2: law enforcement official are undermining the work that drivers and MBTs are doing, 
which in turn affects their relationship with passengers; passengers lost faith in the MBT 
system, which is not the case with Golden Arrow; the minibuses are new and drivers have 
their PDPs, so this respondent doesn’t see why they are being treated unfairly 
− R7: buses and construction trucks heavily overloaded with passengers are not being pulled 
over by traffic officers, but MBTs are even if they are carrying only one extra passenger 
− R2: it is an everyday experience that you going to be fighting with government; MBTs are 
being targeted by law enforcement officials; all modes should be treated equally 
− R6: traffic officers specifically plan road blocks only for MBTs, thus inconveniencing 
passengers and discouraging them from using MBTs 
− R7: there are designated units in the law enforcement corps to target MBTs; there are no such 
units for buses of for trucks [transporting passengers in the load bays] 
− R6: GABS buses are no impounded if they don’t have an operating licence, but the owner of a 
MBT must pay a R7000 impoundment release fee for the vehicle and the driver gets fined a 
further R2 500 
− R3: SAPS are also abusing MBT drivers; if a driver stops in the wrong area or zone his licence 
gets confiscated and after a few weeks the driver then receives fraudulent fines 
− R7: a vehicle that gets impounded in Mowbray has to be collected in Strand – it may take 
some time for the owner to locate the vehicle and during this time the driver does not have an 
income 
 
− HS: what is the relationship like with your vehicle’s owner? 
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− R7: we’ve got a close relationship “like cousins” [both like actual relatives or in the manner of 
relative – trusting] 
− R2: we work in the same way as relatives – there is trust between the owner and the drivers; 
owners are willing to help drivers out if they experience financial difficulties; their 
relationships are strengthened by the fact that owners are aware of drivers’ domestic 
circumstances 
− R8: the vehicle owner helped him to pay for his sister’s university fees; the respondent is now 
paying this money backbit-by-bit through a deduction on his wages 
− R7: he has been working for a long time with the same owner; the owner is helping him to 
save towards purchasing his own vehicle 
− R2: employment benefits in the informal sector are easy [straight-forward]; if there is a death 
in the family the owner lend him the money for the funeral and provides the vehicle for him to 
travel to the Transkei; things don’t work like this in the formal sector 
− R7: drivers get additional income: on days such as holidays they get given the vehicle for their 
own use and keep all farebox revenue 
 
− HS: TRP/scrapping process/recap vehicle quality 
− R7: deposits on new vehicles are expensive and it takes an owner a long time to come up with 
this money after their old vehicle is scrapped; during this time the driver derives no income 
− R8: the old vehicle that is being scrapped is paid off, but the new vehicle is expensive and 
places the owner under financial pressure; this impacts negatively on the driver’s income 
− R2: there has not been a thorough assessment of all routes to determine whether there is 
sufficient income on different routes to enable owners to pay the instalments on the new 
vehicle; if the owner ends up being under financial pressure the driver’s income suffers too 
− R7: owners are using all the money to pay off the new TRP-compliant vehicle and do not have 
money left to pay the driver’s wage 
− R2: drivers’ job security is under threat since the vehicle can be repossessed at any time [due 
to non-payment of loan] 
− R6: new vehicle [Quantum] fuel consumption is very high compare to old Siyaya [impacts 
negatively on income] 
− R7: out of 10 owners who have gone for the TRP only 3 have managed to keep their vehicles; 
the other 7 have been repossessed [might be relative figures, i.e. R7’s perception of a 
percentage of all owners] 
− R2: when the TRP was introduces everyone thought that the new vehicles would improve the 
MBT system; the [Khayelitsha to] Cape Town route is not as lucrative as it used to be, and 
there is a direct impact on the driver as they have to work harder to make an income; the 
reduced passenger capacity of the new vehicle also impacts negatively on their income and 
has left many drivers without jobs 
− R7: because of reduced income R7 had to get rid of gaardjies and is not using a cleaner or car-
washer any more; [many] drivers have to do all the tasks [including fare collection and 
cleaning] themselves 
 
− HS: how can the TRP be improved? 
− R2: route [profitability] assessments should have been conducted; the TRP blanket assessment 
[approach] is affecting the less lucrative routes negatively 
− R8: high instalments are problematic and are making drivers’ job risky and insecure; Siyayas 
make owner feel that they are in business and they can pay the drivers properly 
 254  
− R7: attention should be given the high instalment; law enforcement should be more lienien in
peak hours as they are affecting drivers’ income and travelling workers
− R5: a contribution from government to assist owners to meet their financial obligations would
be welcome [access to some form of operational/capital subsidy]
− R4: new vehicles’ technology is making them difficult and expensive to maintain – they
should revert to the Siyaya
− R6: the Chinese vehicles (“Inyathis”) are not up to the task of being MBTs and end up
standing idle at owners’ houses; this translates into drivers losing their income
− R7: grant support from government would be an improvement; GABS drivers get
unemployment benefits such as medical aid and pension but MBT drivers not; they rely solely
on the availability of the vehicle to make an income and get no sick pay
− HS: have respondents heard about IRT/MyCiTi, where did they hear, and what do they
understand it entails?
− R7: saw it in the newspapers; there was never any interface with the drivers to explain how it
impacts on them [in terms of employment]
− R8: there is a skills deficit [to drive the BRT buses]; respondent only has a code 8 licence as
he has no formal education; he sees himself as having to sweep streets in the near future [will
not be eligible to work in MyCiTi]; he has dependants and is unsure whether he’ll be able to
support them; he sees MyCiTi as a threat [to his livelihood]
− R4: MyCiTi buses take 100 passengers and require 1 driver; one of these buses replaces far
more MBTs – 20 by his account – and now all these drivers can be absorbed; what will
happen to the rest of the drivers?
− R2: is worried about labour retention; heard from colleagues in Kidrogen; they see [MyCiTi
on the roads] and hear about it in the media by nobody know what MyCiTi is about; he wants
to have someone informed to speak to them; MyCiTi poses a threat to drivers’ jobs and
survival; MyCiTi’s current perception is that it will only disadvantage owners and drivers; it
would be great if it could empower owners and drivers but there is a fear of the unknown in
the form of the impact of MyCiTi [on present MBT operations] and thus it is being rejected;
− All: they only hear about the negative things
− R8: drivers discuss the MyCiTi amongst themselves when are together on the Top Deck [Cape
Town Central Station deck taxi rank]; a Du Noon owner committed suicide because of
problems with his compensation [TB stated in a separate meeting that he took early exit
payment and squandered the money] and now the drivers who used to work for him are sitting
without an income; other drivers also feel stranded [after their MBTs’ owners joined
Kidrogen]
− R6: informal workers at the ranks are being affected by MyCiTi – they cook for MBT drivers
but they will be removed [have no role] after MyCiTi’s introduction
− R4: most drivers only have a code 8 licence; buses will require a code 14 licence and a matric
pass; there is no space for them in MyCiTi
− R1: there is high unemployment rate amongst the black community; the introduction of
MyCiTi will further impact [negatively] on this community; R1 is the only breadwinner in his
family [and is concerned how he will support them when MyCiTi come]; MyCiTi is seen as a
threat because he is not sure what opportunities there will be for him or for other employees in
the MBT sector
− R2: no information is brought to them [MBT drivers] about MyCiTi, which stokes their fears
and frustrations; owners are also unsure and this uncertainty is filtering down to the drivers;
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drivers’ background and education needs to be taken into account; drivers don’t see a 
possibility for alternative employment [outside MBT sector] and are concerned about their 
families who depend on them for support 
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APPENDIX G: INTERVIEW RESULTS ANALYSIS 
The interview results analysis spreadsheet is provided in electronic format. The main sheet 
contains the interview responses by associations sorted thematically. The data records are the 
responses, where applicable with text quotations alongside. The data fields are the themes and 
sub-themes of responses. A supplementary sheet contains the interview schedule responses 
from Appendix F: Interview records, but sorted according to the themes in the main sheet. 
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